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Abstract
In recent years the study of Samuel Beckett's work has moved into increasingly specialised 
and archival areas.  With the sheer wealth of work undertaken since the field began in the 
1960s and the availability of previously unobtainable materials this was somewhat of an 
inevitability.   The  sub-field  of  “Beckett  and  Philosophy”,  into  which  this  thesis  most 
comfortably falls, has become so saturated with differing approaches that one might be 
forgiven for thinking new work which examines the core ideas guiding Beckett's writing 
redundant.   One  of  the  key contentions  of  this  thesis  is  that  owing  to  the  resistance 
Beckett's novels offer to critical discourse, the task of understanding and explaining them 
is never complete.  Based on this belief, I have attempted a new survey of the evolving 
place philosophy occupies  within Beckett's  novels,  seeking not  to  discount  approaches 
such as the archival work already mentioned, but to incorporate them into the fundamental 
question of what these books mean.
Rather than relying upon only one theoretical approach, I attempt to draw from a variety of 
philosophical  and  literary  sources,  in  a  process  free  enough  to  work  with  the 
developmental refining of Beckett's novels throughout the years.  In the first chapters on 
his early books, Murphy and Watt, I argue they engage in a process of bricolage, bringing 
out their own philosophical perspectives in an illustrative manner.  The middle section of 
the thesis looks at the four 1946 novellas and the first work of The Trilogy,  Molloy,  as 
representative of a shift in Beckett's writing toward modes that employ form and content 
symbiotically in order to respond actively to metaphysical possibilities.  In the last two 
chapters on Malone Dies and The Unnamable I examine the process of reduction that leads 
Beckett to focus largely on form, and the consequences this may have for the achievements 
of previous work.
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1Introduction
The genesis of this thesis arose from the responses I had reading different kinds of Beckett 
criticism.  Essential to my own understanding of the author is the notion his novels are a 
hybrid of genres, including literature, philosophy, theology and critical discourse, whilst 
also never being fully any of these.  It is largely because of this oscillating engagement 
with genres that critical exegesis of the works is arrested before it has even begun.  For 
anyone who decides to write on Beckett the question that seems most pertinent to me, both 
at the outset and indeed throughout, is 'how does one write on Beckett?'  I was fascinated 
to see in the history of Beckett studies the various responses to this question.  Whether or 
not  as  a  consequence  of  being  the  initial  wave  of  criticism  to  tackle  Beckett,  the 
monographs of the 1960's tend to follow a fairly descriptive path, in which they remain on 
the outside, informing the reader of how the texts proceed, rather than fully engaging with 
them.  At the opposite end of the spectrum we have critics such as Alain Badiou and Gilles 
Deleuze who feel the need to formalise Beckett through a compartmentalised structure and 
quasi-poetical vernacular in order to overcome this inherent critical resistance.  It is very 
telling that so many, including myself, spend large amounts of time discussing the fact 
Jacques Derrida never wrote on Beckett  as central  to understanding the ineffability his 
work  seems  to  engender.   My approach  however,  although  informed  by these  highly 
conceptual and often quite abstract thinkers, is perhaps most indebted to John Pilling's first 
works on Beckett from the 1970s.  In books like Samuel Beckett (1976), which I draw on 
heavily within this thesis, the core focus is again a survey of what Beckett's works had 
achieved up to that point, yet Pilling manages to use emblematic examples to illustrate 
something true about the fundamental ideas the texts are informed by and work with.  In 
this thesis, which is essentially an examination of the changing role philosophy plays in 
Samuel Beckett's prose, I aim to replicate Pilling's simplicity and economy of expression, 
2whilst still articulating the inherently complex ideas driving this oeuvre forward.
On a number of occasions I challenge John Calder's assertion that 'what future generations 
can expect to find in [Beckett's] work is above all an ethical and philosophical message; 
the novels and plays will increasingly be seen as the wrapping for that message.'1  Whilst 
Calder's position here is clearly an oversimplification, illustrated by the kinds of readings I 
will examine in the thesis, his position is perhaps emblematic of a pitfall that work which 
deals with Beckett and philosophy must avoid.  I take issue with Calder's understanding 
because it is reductive.  It robs Beckett's work of artistic merit and renders it inert; a dry 
series of philosophical propositions that need a fictional shell for the sake of palatability.  I  
would  argue  that  above  all  Beckett  is  an  artist,  obsessed  with  the  capabilities  and 
limitations of the media he worked in, and compelled to create.  This is, after all, why he 
chose  to  write  plays,  novels,  poetry,  screenplays,  radio  scripts,  and  not  philosophical 
treatises.  It will be a key contention throughout that philosophy, especially the Western 
metaphysical tradition is, for Beckett, fundamentally flawed, and must be dismantled so as 
to  glean a  new mode of harnessing ideas.   The vagueness  of this  notion is  due to its 
unknown quantity.  Beckett understood the fundamental flaws inherent in the history of 
philosophical speculation and the tools used for the purpose, and yet what would come 
after these modes, what would replace them, he was unsure of.  In a letter to Axel Kaun 
Beckett speaks candidly about the role of the modern writer and what he or she should be 
doing with language.  He writes,
As we cannot eliminate language all at once, we should at least leave nothing undone 
that might contribute to its falling into disrepute.  To bore one hole after another in it, 
until what lurks behind it – be it something or nothing – begins to seep through; I cannot 
imagine a higher goal for a writer today.2
There is a strange and seemingly contradictory approach to language here that we will see 
1 John Calder, The Philosophy of Samuel Beckett (London: Calder Publications, 2001), p. 1.
2 Samuel Beckett, 'German Letter of 1937' in Disjecta (London: John Calder, 1983), p. 172.
3throughout the works.  Beckett does not want language to 'fall into disrepute' as he puts it,  
and yet he believes it needs to be at least partially destroyed.  In this attitude we can see 
how Beckett believes language needs to be opened up and examined through language. 
Yet, his belief is that the way to achieve this is through an exactitude and employment of it  
in areas outwith the strictly descriptive.  The leaving nothing undone he writes of speaks 
volumes about the process of reduction and negation which comes to be the heart of these 
novels  and  propels  them  forwards  towards  the  final  narrative  spiralling  of  The 
Unnameable;  a book so precise and tightly-wound that there is nothing left undone, yet 
everything is left open, continuous or deferred.  It is therefore with a degree of sympathy 
one can look at Calder's position.  In spite of my arguing Beckett's works are first and 
foremost imaginative exercises, I will also show how they are inextricably tied up with 
fundamental  ideas  on  existence  itself,  and  they  reflect,  and  act  upon,  the  Western 
metaphysical tradition.  
As well as a writer, Beckett was a scholar, classically educated at Trinity College, Dublin 
and briefly taking up a lecturing post there before becoming disillusioned.  Even after this 
he  continued  to  further  his  education  with  self-directed  research  into  new  fields  of 
philosophy, art and literature.  In the lead up to the Second World War he had undertaken a 
tour  of German galleries,  seeing first-hand not only some of the finest  works  German 
artists had produced, but also the early stages of Nazi censorship, with works by Jewish 
artists removed from view and put into storage.  Similarly he became interested in learning 
more  on  neglected  figures  within  the  philosophical  tradition  and went  back to  Trinity 
College library intent on reading one of the few copies in existence of Arnold Geulincx's 
Ethics  (1665).  By the time he came to write his first novel,  Dream of Fair to Middling  
Women (1932), he already had accumulated a personal history of philosophy, literature and 
4art he was ready to engage with and contest.  As we deal with the evolution of these novels 
what will become clear is that, based on this selected history of ideas, Beckett focused 
upon a revolving and intertwined set of themes designed to challenge the inescapability of 
affirmative metaphysical speculation.  As Beckett scholarship moves further into archival 
areas  one could  be forgiven for  thinking that  the  fundamental,  philosophical  questions 
these work raise have perhaps been resolved.  I seek to re-enter certain theoretical debates 
about  the broadest  meaning of  these novels,  working from critical  approaches such as 
Matthew Feldman's, Shane Weller's and Daniel Katz's, but establishing my own position 
and in doing so hopefully highlighting previously neglected or marginalised aspects of 
these works.  
Dream of Fair to Middling Women  has been omitted from this thesis, which aims to be 
fairly  comprehensive  about  the  character  of  Beckett's  novels.   The  earlier  works  are 
renowned for their overly erudite vocabulary and the vast quantity of allusions in the text. 
However, I would argue that it was only with the writing of  Murphy (1938) that Beckett 
began to truly engage with, rather than merely reiterate, his influences.  I will suggest that 
Murphy and Watt (1945) represent the first phase of the prose writing, captured in Derrida's 
conception of  bricolage,  in which Beckett  attempts  to  reflect  a  multitude of  ideas  and 
illustrate through the form and content of the works a response to these ideas.  Following 
this, there is a chapter on the four 1946 novellas Beckett wrote in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War.  Again, why write on these works and not the full-length novel 
Mercier and Camier (1946), composed in the same year?  As I argue in the chapter itself, 
for the purposes of tracing the specific evolution of ideas and methodology, this thesis 
focuses upon the novellas as bridging works; they contain remnants of Murphy and Watt, 
but also establish thematic and formal elements that will become recognisable Beckettian 
5tropes in The Trilogy (1951-1953).  I argue that Mercier and Camier on the other hand is 
equally an establishing force, but for Beckett's drama, not his prose.  In the relationship 
between the two characters we find what Badiou referred to as THE TWO in Beckett's 
works3, most famously offered in pieces like Waiting for Godot  (1953),  Endgame (1957) 
and  Happy Days  (1961).  Following this chapter on the novellas, are three chapters on 
Beckett's renowned trilogy of novels.  Beginning with  Molloy  (1951), I seek to define a 
shift  in  Beckett's  writing to  a  form which combines  accessibility with new conceptual 
depth,  and  marries  the  aforementioned  illustrative  method  in  the  prose,  with  a  new 
enacting  mode.   This  is  continued  through  Malone  Dies  (1951)  and  The  Unnamable  
(1953).  The latter aspects of these combinations comes to greater prominence, and the 
resulting ambiguity over their status as philosophical novels becomes a central concern. 
Beckett's final novel How It Is (1961) is absent from my discussion, but I would claim that 
the evolutionary leaps between his earlier prose works are on a much smaller scale at this 
juncture, and do not require a further chapter in the broad scope of this thesis.
This evolving conceptual framework also illustrates why there is still work to be done in 
terms of our understanding of these books.  As I mentioned, in recent years there have been 
moves  in  Beckett  studies  towards  highly  specialised  areas  of  interest.   Last  year's 
international  conference  'Samuel  Beckett:  Out  of  the  Archive'4 illustrated  just  how far 
Beckett studies has come from isolated textual analysis of the published editions in the 
mode pursued by the initial wave of the 1960s and 70s.  Ground-breaking works by authors 
such as John Pilling, Ruby Cohn and Hugh Kenner directly addressed the larger questions 
of what Beckett's writing was and what it meant.  This is not in any way a criticism of 
archival  studies,  which  is  helping  us  understand  the  minutiae  of  Beckett's  works  in 
3 Alain Badiou, On Beckett (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2003), p. 28.
4 Held at the University of York between June 23-26, 2011. <http://www.outofthearchive.com/> [Accessed 
30 December, 2012]
6previously impossible ways, and indeed correcting many erroneous assumptions previously 
held.   Similarly,  “Beckett  and  Philosophy”,  which  has  become  an  entire  sub-field  of 
Beckett studies often offers very specific readings of the works alongside the writing of 
one or two select philosophers.  Again,  I do not wish to contest  the legitimacy of this 
approach, and it is indeed testament to how rich and vast these works remain long after  
their publication.  However, I do not think this means there is nothing left to be done in 
terms of  these broader  approaches  which so dominated early Beckett  studies.   Indeed, 
much of the work undertaken by Matthew Feldman aims to reassess what we assume we 
know  about  the  larger  philosophical  influences,  based  on  his  archival  research.   In 
particular, the strides he has made in recent years towards establishing Fritz Mauthner as a 
central figure within Beckett's spheres of influence show us that, even now, our perceptions 
of the man and the works cannot be considered complete.  
As I said, this is owing to the nature of Beckett's work.  Another central figure in this thesis 
will be Jacques Derrida and key to understanding how I have approached the novels are 
some answers he gave during a now famous interview by Derek Attridge.  In this interview 
Derrida claims that he could deconstruct a writer as complex as James Joyce from a mere 
two words, as he of course did in his essay 'Two Words for Joyce', but could never even 
attempt the same with Beckett.  In the following exchange the problem with Beckett is 
summarised:
D.A.: Is  there a sense in which Beckett's writing is  already so “deconstructive,” or 
“self-deconstructive,” that there is not much left to do?
J.D.: No doubt  that's  true...   Above  all,  this  question  should  not  be  treated  as  a 
philosophical problem outside or above the texts.  When I found myself, with students, 
reading some Beckett texts, I would take three lines, I would spend two hours on them, 
then  I  would give  up  because  it  would  not  have  been possible,  or  honest,  or  even 
interesting, to extract a few “significant” lines from a Beckett text.5
5 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 61.
7The complexities  of  Beckett's  works  deconstructing  themselves  is  handled  in  the  final 
chapter of this thesis and will not be addressed here.  However, what this question and 
answer highlight is the degree to which these works arrest the critic and render analysis, at 
least in terms of traditional close or historical readings for example, somewhat redundant. 
As Derrida points out, the notion that we should or can approach the inherent philosophical 
issues contained within these novels from an objective, removed perspective is an illusion. 
As these novels  progress  they become increasingly engagements  with  the fundamental 
structural  base  underpinning  the  kinds  of  readings  one  could  attempt  with  a  more 
conventional author.  The following point on Molloy from the Longman Critical Readers 
volume on Samuel Beckett may hold true for the entire oeuvre:
A critical  discourse  with  pretensions  to  master  the  text,  to  assimilate  it  to  its  own 
preoccupations, will find on engaging with Beckett’s textuality that it cannot be master, 
and is itself ‘held’ (and at least partially assimilated) by the work it aimed to hold.6
These works fundamentally challenge critical discourse by anticipating and playing with 
many of  the prerequisites  that  determine its  function.   In terms of Beckett  studies  the 
question of how one can even successfully write on Beckett has always been the greatest 
obstacle, but also quite often the most fruitful of avenues.7  Some of the most incisive and 
lasting Beckett  criticism has approached the author in innovative ways,  not in order to 
surmount a problem, but to work with the text and get the most from it.  A perfect example 
of this is Badiou, who in On Beckett (2003) writes in a non-traditional, abstracted and, as I 
mentioned, almost poetic style.  In short, the fact remains that because of the impossibility 
of mastering the texts there always remains more to be said, even on the most established 
6 Samuel Beckett, ed. by Jennifer Birkett and Kate Ince (London: Longman, 2000), p. 28.
7 An issue Robert Eaglestone fruitfully explores in 'Beckett in the Wilderness: Writing about (Not) Writing 
about Beckett' in Beckett and Philosophy.  He writes 'I will suggest that thinking about Beckett's work 
highlights problems in 'thinking about literature' (a field broader than 'English', perhaps: 'literature science' or 
'thinking about literature'?).  This means that thinking about Beckett's work is a very useful way to judge the 
capability for crisis of 'thinking about literature' and so, in turn, judge its 'real movement'. This is not because 
I think that work by Beckett is a unique case – any more than any work of literature is unique or not unique – 
but because his works do clearly test the limits of our ideas about what literature is and what the foundations 
of 'thinking about literature' should be.' Robert Eaglestone, 'Beckett in the Wilderness: Writing about (Not) 
Writing about Beckett' in Beckett and Philosophy (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 41. 
8and fundamental questions under discussion here.  
Dealing as I am with multiple works spanning most of Beckett's prose career, my own 
methodology is not fixed in terms of arguing for the influence of a particular philosopher 
or philosophical school within the works.  I also do not attempt a conceptual reading based 
upon an established schema.  Rather, as these works evolve so will my approach, initially 
looking  at  much  of  the  content  of  the  work,  before  shifting  to  a  focus  more  on  the 
interaction  of  form and  content,  and  finally  almost  exclusively  the  form itself  as  the 
content becomes stabilised.  The issue with such a broad approach is that one can risk 
falling into overview and describing what the works are doing, rather than engaging with 
them.  It is my hope that by pinpointing specific emblematic examples from these works I 
can say something particular, but also more general about what these works are doing in 
terms of their philosophical reactions.
In chapter 1, 'Murphy – Philosophical Bricolage', I argue that Beckett engages in an overt 
form of bricolage, writing a novel which engages with a variety of sources and through this 
engagement offers illustrative assertions of its own, regarding their validity.  I begin by 
focussing upon Beckett's suggestion that the key to understanding Murphy was through a 
combination of Geulincx's 'Ubi nihil vales [,] ibi [etiam] nihil velis (position) [where you 
are worth nothing, you will wish for nothing] and Malraux's Il est difficile à celui qui vit  
hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les siens (negation).  [It is hard for someone who lives 
outside society not to seek out his own].'8  I suggest that in this we can see how it was 
Beckett's method to take individual ideas or concepts from an author or work and not 
necessarily subscribe to the entire source.  The rest of the chapter seeks to show how this is 
8 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 219. The 
translations and other additions within brackets in this quotation are from Knowlson himself.
9implemented in the novel with a discussion of the centrality of Cartesian rationalism to the 
work, leading from an analysis of the roots of Geulincx's part of the quotation.  From there 
I  move  on  to  an  examination  of  Murphy's  status as  comic  novel  and  the  critique  of 
rationalism this provides.  The next section looks at the inclusion of astrology as one of the 
central mechanisms determining Murphy's actions and spurring the novel forward.  Again, 
I argue that Beckett most likely did not find any validity in the practice, but rather that he 
uses it in the novel as a kind of replacement metaphysics; an illustration of the inherent 
failures in any fixed philosophical system and the suggestion one may as well look to the 
stars to guide one's thinking.  Returning to Geulincx more heavily in the next section I look 
at the mind-body problem addressed again and again in philosophy and which informs the 
central thematic concern of the novel.  I argue that Murphy is emblematic of what happens 
when one tries to apply abstract metaphysics to life, living as much within the confines of 
one's mind as possible.   I  then look at  Schopenhauer and how he and Beckett  share a 
convergence of thought in this area, with the philosopher bringing out the darker side of 
Murphy, namely  that  because  of  the  impossibility  of  living  exclusively  in  a  loftier, 
abstracted way it would be better for us not to have existed at all.  The final part of the 
chapter attempts to debunk any notion that 'section six',  which is to say the frequently 
alluded to coda toward the end of the novel, has the revelatory significance one may be 
tempted to grant it.  I argue that despite the apparent claims it makes to offer us a true 
insight into the inner workings of Murphy's mind, what it actually offers is simply a picture 
of how Murphy conceived it.  In this sense then it is simply a reaffirmation of what the 
novel illustrates, namely the impossibility of knowing and existing in the mind, abstracted 
from the realities of the body.
Chapter 2, 'Watt  and the Limits of Language',  posits this next novel as an evolution of 
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Beckett's prose; a more sustained and focused critique of metaphysical possibilities and 
specifically the failure of language.  Again I invoke the idea of Beckett as the bricoleur and 
the  centrality  of  ineffability  to  Watt  as  highlighted  in  Matthew  Feldman's  recent 
reconfiguring of Beckett as a Mauthnerian, as well as a student of Geulincx, in these early 
works.  I next look at how Watt marks the beginning of a greater commitment to using the 
form of the work symbiotically with its content in order to further Beckett's illustrative 
means, looking at the framing chapters and coda of the novel in particular.  I argue that 
these work in conjunction with choices over content such as extended descriptions of frogs 
croaking, and that they have an “antifictional” purpose, which calls into question what the 
novel can achieve, and more generally if affirmation is even possible.  I then attempt to 
examine  the  validity  of  the  idea  Watt  has  a  specific  target  in  the  contemporaneous 
philosophical movement of 'logical positivism.'  This movement, which claimed reality to 
be essentially linguistic and the truth of language exclusively related to what could be 
empirically observed, does seem to be the exact type of thinking Watt attempts to discredit. 
I next look at the overtly physical and often purposely disgusting aspects of the novel,  
which highlight, much as in  Murphy,  the limitations of structuralist thinking when faced 
with the realities of living.   I  argue there is  a direct  critique of unquestioning faith  in 
language and  structure  in  the  creature  Watt  becomes  once  institutionalised.   The final 
section of this chapter looks at the place of religion within the novel.  I argue that Watt is 
possibly Beckett's most overt critiquing of religion, using more allegorical means than we 
had seen before.  I look at the structure of Watt's journey as a kind of pilgrimage and in 
particular the relationship between the narrator Sam and Watt in the post-lapsarian Garden 
of Eden at the institution.  I also look at the influence of Dante in the purgatorial allusions 
within the work and conceive of the novel as taking place in a kind of secular purgatory; a 
world of endless unknowability we all must face.  The conclusion of the chapter asks to 
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what extent the aspects examined allow us to see Watt as proto-poststructuralist, and indeed 
as laying the foundations for a further commitment to this type of thinking in later works.
The third chapter, 'Reassessing the 1946 Novellas', seeks to trace the evolution of Beckett's 
prose writing outwith the full length novels, instead turning to these shorter works.  I argue 
that in them we can see the establishment of some key Beckettian concerns which will be 
central to The Trilogy of novels to come.  I begin by discussing the unavoidable presence 
of death in these stories and the shift  from younger narrators to the decrepit,  geriatric 
protagonists  who will  become the  Beckettian  archetype.   One of  the  key propositions 
guiding this chapter is Kierkegaard's assertion that because death is unknowable, when we 
speak of it all we truly do is reflect what we believe about our own living existence.  I 
argue that this is true of the stories; that they represent characters who may already be 
dead, but that this is illustrative of the state of ignorance we truly occupy whilst alive, with 
true knowledge of life or death equally unknowable.   The next  section focuses on the 
decaying bodies of these characters,  with Beckett  offering extended descriptions of the 
most base and distasteful of their physical degradations.  I argue that in many ways these 
are assaults on the notion of intelligibility, of trying to offer something lofty and abstracted. 
Beckett seems to suggest that the most we can expect from the world is the opposite: the 
crude eliminations and increasing decrepitude of the body.  The next section returns to 
Dante's The Divine Comedy (1308-1321), discussed briefly in the previous chapter.  Here I 
contend  that  Beckett  invokes  some  of  Dante's  hellish  and  purgatorial  imagery,  again 
reflecting the nightmarish conditions of damnation onto life thereby suggesting they are the 
only reality we can know.  I next look at the theme of love, most explicitly brought out in 
First Love (1946),  the only story to have a younger narrator.  In this story the traditional 
hierarchy of love with the purest forms dedicated to wisdom or God are mocked by the 
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again overtly physical and seemingly arbitrary relationship of the narrator and his partner. 
I then turn to the other three novellas and examine how it is the absence of love that is the 
tragedy of these men; not in the sense they don't have partners, but that they cannot love 
themselves as a consequence of their crippling awareness of unknowability, the very same 
thing that destroyed Watt in the latter  stages of that novel.   I  conclude the chapter by 
speaking of exile, which features literally in the novellas with two of the protagonists being 
evicted and forced to find new lodgings.  This is related to Beckett's own self-imposed 
exile, to the removal from the fraternity of one's countrymen, and to the impossibility of 
surmounting or ignoring the burden of awareness that any true knowledge of one's self is 
impossible.
In  chapter  4,  'Molloy  –  An  Endpoint  in  Beckett's  Prose',  the  themes  that  are  firmly 
established in the novellas are further refined and modified through evolutions in form and 
content.  I begin by discussing the first-person narration in  Molloy, the first of his full-
length novels to work in this mode.  I argue that Beckett takes stream-of-consciousness 
narration, which had featured heavily in modernist influences like Joyce's Ulysses (1922), 
and uses it to better convey the hopeless lack of understanding his characters feel.  I draw 
on Gilles Deleuze's formalising of Beckett's different types of language and show how his 
notion of the combinatorial, which is to say 'the art or science of exhausting the possible 
through inclusive disjunctions'9, shows how the method of using these sprawling, clause-
laden sentences is in fact as important as what is actually being said.  The disintegration of 
Moran's (the novel's other principal character) narrative from functional, brief sentences 
into the combinatorial narration of Molloy mirrors the lack of understanding the two men 
feel; the central point of the first-person mode.  The next section looks at Molloy as the 
9 Gilles Delueze, ‘The Exhausted’, in Essays Critical and Cultural, trans. by Daniel W. Smith and Michael 
A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), p. 154.
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archetype honed from the various narrators of previous novels and most directly from the 
1946 novellas.  The character is shown as the most evolved form we have yet seen of a 
being whose every action, thought and word is a farcical critiquing of specific targets like 
rationalist thought, but also of structuralist thinking more generally.  I look to examples 
such as the rotation of Molloy's sucking stones before dealing directly with what kind of 
comedy  this  is  and  how  Beckett  uses  the  generic  framework  for  his  own  purposes. 
Relocating issues of existence and ineffability to modes of the ridiculous strips them of a 
preordained authority and allows for new ways of seeing them.  Beckett equally unsettles 
the genre itself by swiftly moving within comedic moments into areas of unexpected or 
unprovoked violence.  I next look at how Steven Connor argues that we should be more 
concerned than we previously were with time in  Molloy.   I  argue that despite the twin 
narratives of the novel being written in the past tense, there is a strange fluid invoking of 
the  present,  as  if  events  and  ideas  invade  and overwhelm.   Again  we  find,  mirroring 
Moran's mental collapse, a slide into Molloy's understanding of time.  The final section 
focuses on language itself and looks at the collective purpose behind the modes and themes 
I examine in the chapter.
The penultimate chapter of the thesis, 'Overcoming an Impasse in Malone Dies?', questions 
where Beckett has left to go if in  Molloy he had found a marriage of form and content 
crystallised into a seemingly ideal realisation of his concerns.  I begin by discussing the 
somewhat relegated place this middle work of The Trilogy occupies as the bridge between 
the  accessible  Molloy  and the  experimental  The Unnamable.  I  concede that  in  many 
respects Malone Dies has thematic concerns expressed in previous works, but contend that 
a new focus on storytelling and narrative shifts our perception of these themes and is a 
fertile  area for discussion.   I  begin by looking at  a  new self-conscious attempt of this 
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narrator to tell not simply his own life story, but stories more generally.  In effect we have 
three parallel narratives with the first being Malone in his hospital bed, the second the 
semi-autobiographical  stories  of  Sapo  and  Macmann  and  lastly  Malone's  endless 
metafictional  interruptions  into  these  stories.   I  argue  these  interruptions  suggest,  like 
ripples moving out from a break in water,  a questioning of narrative,  a questioning of 
language and finally a questioning of affirmation generally.   I  argue this is a prescient 
example of Derridean freeplay, with the novel lifting all narrative layers off a hierarchical 
base and into a free exchange.  In the following section, on the shift in the presentation of 
death to include images of birth, I argue that Beckett has moved from a purely critical 
mode to one that tries to create a new aporetic space beyond the imprisoning structural 
restrictions the novels had sought to escape.  This is shown as also being invested in a new 
kind of intratextuality that emphasizes Malone as the last in a series of characters, a closing 
off of many of the observational tools these provided, again in favour of something more 
open.  The final section of this chapter focuses on a new kind of violence in the work, 
looking at the arbitrary attacks inflicted by the nurse Lemuel and the novel's subsequent 
conclusion.  I end by asking what the bleeding of this violence into a stuttering failure in 
the form of the work means.
The final chapter of the thesis, 'Narrative Method and Deconstruction in The Unnamable', 
looks more directly at an issue the previous chapters tackled only partially.  The evolution 
of Beckett's prose by the time of this last work in The Trilogy has reached a point where he 
is not merely using illustrative methods to critique philosophy, but is using the text itself as 
an  active  form  of  response.   With  so  many  of  these  active  modes  being  akin  to 
poststructuralist, and specifically deconstructionist methods, I ask if The Unnamable is in 
fact a “deconstructionist novel” and if such a thing is even possible.  The chapter then 
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examines exemplary and mostly formal aspects of the work, comparing them to selections 
from Jacques Derrida's seminal lecture 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the 
Human Sciences' (1966).  I begin by looking again at Derrida's own assertion he could 
never  find a way to deconstruct  Beckett  because the texts deconstruct themselves,  and 
further that the way we can align a novelist with a movement as various as deconstruction 
is  not  through manifesto,  but through method.   I  first  argue that the novel is  both the 
culmination and the untelling10 of  the evolutionary process traced through the previous 
works; but that in this, it presents us with a character who occupies a literal centre with 
past protagonists revolving around him.  This is of course problematic if we are trying to 
align the novel with a movement that is a debunking of structural thinking founded on a 
centre-proximity relationship.11  However, I go on to discuss how the rest of the novel does 
not follow this descriptive path and uses the more overt storytelling we saw in  Malone 
Dies.  As we shift to the interior and the strange memoir of first Sapo and then Macmann 
the narrative mode of the novel shifts dramatically.  Dispensing entirely with breaks of any 
kind the text becomes one sprawling, unruly paragraph, shifting in and out of ideas and 
snippets of story in an exaggerated form of Molloy's speech.  I try to show how this enacts 
a prototypical version of the deconstructionist idea of the chain of signification; an endless 
stream of language used as replacement for the possibility of full presence.  I then examine 
the potential effect this mode of what Deleuze called 'blendable flows'12 can have on not 
only the impetus of this novel, but on the novels as a whole.  By removing all space to 
breathe within the text, is Beckett moving toward a mode which suffocates affirmation 
10 This is a term explored in the chapter itself but which essentially comes to represent that pinnacle of a 
process, that presents a problem in its execution, namely that it could be said to undo and replace all previous 
effects which lead to its conclusion.  
11 Again, this is a concept that will be explored further in the chapter, but which is fundamental to 
poststructuralist understandings. Essentially it is the notion that the assumption structures have a hierarchical 
relationship within their elements is flawed and that their true nature lies in a far more open interchange in 
which there is no centre, in which everything exists on the margins. 
12 Gilles Delueze, ‘The Exhausted’, in Essays Critical and Cultural, trans. by Daniel W. Smith and Michael 
A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), p. 156.
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entirely,  to  embrace  a  relinquishing  silence?   If  so,  then  the  question  that  remains  is 
whether this silence manages to contain all that the previous novels have achieved?  Does 
this silence tell and untell all that came before or does it become for most readers simply a 
meaningless silence, devoid of context?  The chapter then moves on to how this purposeful 
loss of control, this zenith of abandonment could be seen as a positive force, in much the 
same way deconstruction's apparently critical nature could be said in its method to open up 
possibilities, rather than closing them off.  I again invoke the idea of play, and conceive of 
the sprawling narrative method as containing meaning both in terms of its content as well 
as  in  its  playful  form,  which  aspires  to  a  structure  beyond the  binary of  absence  and 
presence.   The final section of the chapter asks whether in traversing the experimental 
distance from the early works,  a novel like  The Unnamable  is  an endpoint  capable of 
containing the philosophical reactions of past works, and offering a response intelligible to 
anyone outside a limited circle of interested parties.
Throughout  the  thesis  I  use  The  Grove Centenary Editions  of  Samuel  Beckett,  which 
collects most of his work in four volumes.  As Beckett translated his own writing and took 
a  very hands-on approach to  its  final  presentation there was no need to  debate  which 
editions were most appropriate, but since the Grove Editions have a uniformity and were 
published as recently as 2006 they were the most logical.  As it is my intention to balance 
the complexities of these works with a transparent and accessible analysis I should reiterate 
the  central  issues  of  this  thesis.   These  are,  firstly,  the  evolving  relationship  between 
philosophy and literature  in  each subsequent  prose  work.   Secondly,  my desire  not  to 
surmount Beckett's challenge to critical exegesis, but rather, to find a methodology which 
works with the texts and elucidates their nature most clearly.  Lastly, my hope to avoid the 
pitfalls  of  a  criticism which  either  falls  into  bland  overview,  or  equally  dangerously, 
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mirrors the cyclically disorientating patterns Beckett's own writing engenders.  I seek to 
illustrate, at various points, what criticism may hope to achieve in the face of an oeuvre as 
critically and philosophically engaged as this.  Bearing these questions in mind, I begin by 
turning to the melting pot of ideas that is Murphy.  
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Chapter One:
Murphy   - Philosophical Bricolage 
In the course of Samuel Beckett's life and career the genesis of his second novel Murphy 
was attended by personal upheaval and change.  Deeply affected by the death of his father 
and plagued by physical symptoms of a clearly psychological condition, he was advised by 
his friend and doctor Geoffrey Thompson to undergo psychoanalysis.  However, owing to 
the  Catholic  Church's  opposition,  the  practice  was  illegal  in  Ireland,  so  shortly  after 
Christmas 1933 Beckett arrived in London for a near two-year stay.  Here he met regularly 
with his assigned psychotherapist Dr Wilfred Ruprecht Bion as well as educating himself 
further  in  literature,  music,  art  and  indeed  psychoanalysis.   He  absorbed  a  series  of 
experiences  to  be  worked  directly  into  his  new  novel,  'begun  at  34  Gertrude  Street 
[Beckett's second London residence] on 20 August 1935.'13
This was eventually completed upon returning to his childhood home of Cooldrinagh, but 
it took a further two years to find a publisher willing to accept a difficult novel by a writer  
who had as yet very little in print.  Despite his family's hostility toward the stories in More 
Pricks than Kicks (1934), and indifference to his more recent collection of poems, Echo's  
Bones and other Precipitates (1935), Beckett was driven to complete Murphy.  Much like 
Dream of Fair to Middling Women it is, certainly compared to the post-war work, the kind 
of personal novel many young writers must get out of their system before looking outwards 
and engaging with the world.  Again, as with  Dream,  the experiences of the writer are 
transformed by conflation  with many of  the artistic  and intellectual  influences  he  was 
encountering  at  the  time.   However,  unlike  Dream,  Beckett's  new  novel  rejected  the 
rhetorical flourishes and cultural allusions that so defined the earlier work.  These moved 
13 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 203.
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from littering every page of the text to more sporadic appearances as Beckett sought to find 
his niche, processing his history of ideas and art in a way distinct from the ubiquitous 
legacy of high modernism.
If we are to begin plotting the trajectory of Beckett’s oeuvre then it is essential we bear in 
mind this oft quoted, highly important admission:
I realised that Joyce had gone as far as one could in the direction of knowing more, 
[being] in control of one’s material.  He was always adding to it; you only have to look 
at his proofs to see that.  I realised my own way was in impoverishment, in lack of  
knowledge and in taking away, in subtracting rather than adding.14
Beckett's candid admission should not be underestimated. Yet viewing it in the context of 
his prose, it would be foolhardy to try to pinpoint the moment we can see this realisation 
implemented.  It is essential to take into account the refining, evolutionary process within 
Beckett’s  works;  each  subsequent  novel  is  a  more  precise  distillation  of  ideas  I  will 
examine as a developmental philosophical engagement.  Not only will we see Beckett's 
novels  respond  to  a  history  of  philosophy  through  which  they  will  form  their  own 
responses, but as the works progress early books like Murphy and Watt will be built upon 
to  form novels  which  present  the  question  of  when a work of  fiction  can  become an 
enacted philosophy. 
I will consider  Murphy, as indeed I am going to look at all of his work up to  Molloy,  as 
transitional  in  a  multitude  of  ways.   These  include  shifts  in  the  amount  of  personal 
experience  we  can  find  directly  in  the  works,  the  dwindling  of  their  reliance  upon 
rhetorical and referential flourishes, and the employment of comedic and realist genres 
through to the shell of the detective genre we find in the first work of The Trilogy.  From 
one  novel  to  the  next  Beckett  retains  many  of  his  concerns,  but  he  deploys  them in 
14 Damned to Fame, p. 134.
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radically different uses of form and content.  One could be tempted, when examining this  
body of work in the established and saturated “Beckett and Philosophy” field, to see it as 
moving inevitably towards some fixed conclusion.  One might say that as Beckett worked 
through the metaphysical traditions with each book, his own philosophical position became 
more defined, as did the tools used to render it.  There is some truth in this.  But this neat  
and convenient idea does not represent the whole truth, and often fails to take into account 
the complexities attending a body of work as conceptually rich as Beckett’s.  Bearing this 
in  mind,  as  we look at  the  various  philosophers  and principles  Murphy plays  with,  is 
essential to understanding Beckett’s often ambiguous, and rarely fixed, relationship with 
them.  
In Derrida's seminal 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' he 
discusses  Levi-Strauss's  concept  of  the  bricoleur  as  part  of  his  attempt  to  debunk  the 
logocentric  understanding of  language that  has  been the base for  centuries  of  Western 
thought.  He describes how one might use
the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, 
which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are 
to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to 
change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if 
their form and their origin are heterogeneous -- and so forth.15  
According  to  Levi-Strauss  this  is  in  contrast  to  the  engineer who  'should  be  one  to 
construct the totality of his language, syntax, and lexicon.'16  But for Derrida, the engineer 
is a myth, all discourse is an amalgamation of imperfect previous forms, and we are all 
bricoleurs performing bricolage.17
15 Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Human Sciences’, in Writing and 
Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 360.
16 ‘Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Human Sciences’, p. 360.
17 Derrida explains: 'If one calls bricolage the necessity of borrowing one's concept from the text of a 
heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is bricoleur.  The 
engineer, whom Levi-Strauss opposes to the bricoleur, should be one to construct the totality of his language, 
syntax, and lexicon.  In this sense the engineer is a myth.  A subject who would supposedly be the absolute 
origin of his own discourse and would supposedly construct it “out of nothing,” “out of whole cloth,” would 
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We will see in Beckett's postwar work that his more homogeneous approach in terms of 
content and form appears repeatedly in a subtle, developmental process.  If we agree with 
Derrida's assessment that when it comes to working with language there can be no original 
invention, only a process of intake and output spanning the entire history of ideas, then 
Beckett's  works  are  uniformly bricolage.   However,  it  seems clear  that  works  such as 
Murphy and Watt  are overtly bricolage.  They do not subscribe to one fixed position, but 
consciously borrow from a variety of sources and offer a text that shifts on the base of its 
influences.  This is the process Beckett uses in these early works, and it will be the method 
of this chapter to examine some of the recurring and key elements of this process, aiming 
at  unpacking  what  this  flagrant  bricolage  reveals  about  Beckett's  own  philosophical 
perspective.  Furthermore, the notion of bricolage need not be confined to what traces we 
can find in the novel.  As well as the influences bleeding into the text, we also have a 
crosscurrent  of thinking with philosophers  such as  Derrida,  whose work Beckett's  pre-
dates.  As in this case of bricolage these understandings can often be the most effective 
way to articulate the essence of the novel.  The aim is to discern if a clear philosophical 
position emerges as we take this bricolage apart and see what holds it together.
Murphy is Beckett’s second attempt at a novel and as one can see from the various forms 
of correspondence and biographical information now available it was a tortured process 
that seemed to drain the life from its author.  In a series of letters to his good friend and 
mentor Thomas McGreevy we can chart the book’s conception, writing and publication 
be the creater of verbe, the verbe itself.  The notion of the engineer who had supposedly broken with all 
forms of bricolage is therefore a theological idea; and since Levi-Strauss tells us elsewhere that bricolage is 
mythopoetic, the odds are that the engineer is a myth produced by the bricoleur.  From the moment that we 
cease to believe in such an engineer and in a discourse breaking with the received historical discourse, as 
soon as it is admitted that every finite discourse is bound by a cenain bricolage, and that the engineer and the 
scientist are also species of bricoleurs then the very idea of bricolage is menaced and the difference in which 
it took on its meaning decomposes.' ‘Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Human Sciences’, pp. 
360-361.
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woes.  Typically self-deprecating, Beckett informs McGreevy:
I have been forcing myself to keep at the book, & it crawls forward.  I have done about 
9000 words.  It is poor stuff and I have no interest in it. 18
It is not necessary to take Beckett’s sentiment too seriously here (he was disparaging about 
nearly all his work).  Yet it is certainly relevant to the picture of an author in transition we 
have already spoken of.  This is a work whose every movement is ambivalent: belonging to 
a  comic  tradition,  it  is  also  in  many ways  an  “anti-novel”  dispensing  with  precedent; 
relying on Western metaphysics for subject matter, it debunks and mocks this source in 
search of a new philosophical end; filled with echoes of advanced education and learning, 
it roots around in the baser elements of life.  These are just some of the polarities Murphy 
shifts  between, often changing position within the break of a paragraph, or most often 
showing an aversion to the definitive completely.
 
Descartes and the Legacy of Rationalism
The abstract and philosophical nature of the book is self-evident, confirmed by its content 
and form, as well as authorial testimony.  Notoriously reticent about his work, Beckett 
would sidestep questions from journalists eager to know exactly who or what Godot was. 
Yet in a time before fame and the hunger for explication, Beckett’s personal interactions 
have  a  frankness  typical  of  the  young,  unsure  writer.   Again  writing  to  his  confidant 
McGreevy, Beckett describes the following epiphany on the nature of his book:
I shall have to go into TCD after Geulincx, as he does not exist in National Library.  I  
suddenly see that Murphy is [a] break down between his: Ubi nihil vales [,] ibi [etiam]  
nihil  velis  (position)  [where you are worth nothing,  you will  wish for  nothing]  and 
Malraux's  Il est difficile à celui qui vit hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les siens  
(negation).  [It is hard for someone who lives outside society not to seek out his own].19
Here, Beckett understands the nature of this novel as a 'break down' between philosophical 
18 Samuel Beckett, The Letters of Samuel Beckett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 277.
19 Damned to Fame, p. 219.  The translations and other additions within brackets in this quotation are from 
Knowlson himself.  As further proof of Beckett as bricoleur, Knowlson also notes ‘he did not finish the entire 
book…’ Damned to Fame, p. 219. This is not a writer engaging in a rigorous philosophical debate, but 
someone who looks for works that oppose, support and augment his evolving position.
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positions, not whole-hearted endorsement of a particular philosophy or indeed philosopher. 
It is useful to think of these early works as Beckett filleting very specific aspects of various 
philosophies, theologies and literary approaches and including them in books like Murphy.  
This is  sometimes because Beckett  seems to find congruence with the aspect,  or often 
because  he  wishes  to  respond  to  it  through  fiction,  but  always  we  can  see  in  these 
inclusions not necessarily the emergence something as fixed as a philosophical position, 
but certainly the beginnings of a methodology.  As in the last quotation one can ascertain 
that a post-Cartesian position is central to the book, coupled with a personal examination 
of the conflicted dualism of one's inner life and interactions with the world.  Many have 
assumed that,  because these philosophers, positions,  and traditions feature in the work, 
they are supported by Beckett.  But although engaging with thinkers such as Geulincx, 
Jung, and Malraux, Beckett does not by simple extension agree with the entirety of their 
thought, something I shall show as played out in the content of the work.  It is also worth 
noting  that  whilst  this  is  a  revealing  assessment  of  Murphy it  is  certainly  not  all-
encompassing or definitive, and in fact can be seen to be more about the method of the 
book, than its end.  This is something we shall return to later. 
However, before we get to the conclusions the book reaches it is worth going back to the 
first thinker Beckett cites.  Geulincx is somewhat unfamiliar to most.  This lost seventeenth 
century occasionalist is one of several philosophers who followed up the rationalism of 
Descartes, expanding upon and modifying his principles to forge original work.  There are 
therefore many similarities and differences between the two, with Beckett most interested 
in the latter.  Before inquiring how Geulincx feeds into Murphy, we need first to consider 
Descartes' influence.
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Descartes was a very early interest of Beckett.20  His first published work was a poem 
entitled Whoroscope (1930), based upon the life and philosophy of the Frenchman.  In this 
poem Beckett manages to comment on Descartes’ philosophy through seemingly trivial 
details of the man's idiosyncrasies and life.  For example, there is a running joke about an 
omelette being offered to the philosopher, and his declining it, saying it can be given to his 
student Gillot.  This is a reference to a real life obsession with eating eggs that had 'hatched 
from  eight  to  ten  days;  shorter  or  longer  under  the  hen  and  the  result,  he  says,  is 
disgusting.'21  Knowledgeable about the philosopher to an encyclopaedic level, the poem 
presents  the detritus  of  his  life.   These minutiae expand outwards  from their  apparent 
trivialities.  Repetition of the joke and Descartes’ insistence on the eggs' age renders him a 
somewhat obsessed figure with a detached commitment to the quotidian.  This is supported 
by the descriptions of his skirmishes with contemporary philosophers, which are worked 
into  the  poem,  alongside  more  serious  issues  relating  to  his  daughter’s  death,  and his 
visions.  The whole piece is in the first person, and in this mode his speech moves at a 
fervent pace, anticipating that of Beckett’s later protagonists, in particular Molloy.  The 
comedy is not satiric, or intended to discredit Cartesianism.  It is a whimsical series of 
playful quips about a philosopher who engaged the youthful Beckett.
In Murphy we see a return to Descartes' life and philosophy, and once again, the eschewing 
of a didactic approach which Beckett would have no doubt found distasteful.22  As with his 
20 Throughout his early life Beckett was complementing his formal education by filling in the gaps in his 
knowledge and looking at subjects in a greater depth than had been afforded by his time at Trinity College, 
Dublin.  Indeed, as one can see throughout Damned to Fame Beckett would become for a time almost 
obsessed by a new interest and devote a great deal of time in understanding its details.
21 Samuel Beckett, Whoroscope (1930); repr. in Samuel Beckett, The Grove Centenary Edition, IV (New 
York: Grove Press, 2006), p. 6.
22 It was only in his youth that Beckett wrote with a critical eye and even then his style is purposeful but 
esoteric.  In the early monograph Proust (1931) there is a serious commitment to the task, points to be made 
but with a grace which avoids hammering a point.  In later life a collection of writings was released, which 
were fragments of his critical work.  Although Beckett did not object to the publication of this collection, he 
did say they were ‘mere products of friendly obligation or economic need.’  Samuel Beckett, Disjecta 
(London: Calder, 1983), p. 7. 
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reluctance to explain the meaning of his work, one has a sense that for Beckett there is an 
extrovert impulse in opening one’s opinions for display.  As we look at each subsequent 
novel  it  will  become clear  that  the  strong positions  Beckett  takes  are  never  explicitly 
reported by a character or narrator.  Instead, we shall find these ideas below the surface, 
manifested by the interplay of form and content.   Given the nature of Beckett's scepticism 
about  truth  propositions  and  their  authority,  these  more  elusive  deployments  of  key 
Cartesian positions seem in character.  As we shall see, these are accessible through works 
such as Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) and the later reflections of Geulincx.  The 
key difference between  Whoroscope  and  Murphy  in  this  matter  is  that,  more than just 
offering witty, revealing quips about the man and his work, we find a greater engagement 
with some central Cartesian notions played out through the content of the novel.
The novel opens upon Murphy who, exploring the mind-body separation in the most literal 
of ways, has attempted to cut himself off from the outside world.  He has done this by 
means of seven scarves (although only six are described), which are used to bind his body 
to a favourite rocking chair.  This allows him the level of physical restraint necessary to 
exist  in  a  state  exclusively  within  his  mind.   Attempts  at  detachment  from  the  base 
physicality  of  the  tangible  world  is  a  central  concern  of  Murphy and  something  that 
appears in various forms and with varying results.  Before going into specific examples it 
is worth turning again to the quotation from Beckett’s letters.  Illuminating the statement, 
'Where you are worth nothing, may you also wish for nothing', we can see this is also a 
reference to the way detachment from the outer world can facilitate a level of peace and 
harmony in the mind.  This is in contrast to the quotation from Malraux, which suggests 
that  a detachment  from the body and from the physicality of  the world is  impossible, 
hampered as it is by the  need to find others who share a set of concerns. 23 
23 This is a concern of Beckett’s that we can see in his earliest work.  In Dream of Fair to Middling Women 
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This again is a central dialectic that will be mediated by various other concerns: from our 
introduction to Murphy, through his relationship with Celia, the gaggle of characters trying 
to track him down, his working in a mental institution, meeting Mr Eldon and his eventual 
death.   All  the  events  in  this  apparently  comic  novel  are  consequences  of  Murphy’s 
constant battle to live within his mind, in spite of the forces (his internal processes and the 
people  around him)  that  make  this  impossible.   We can see  that  the  solution  may be 
presented in Murphy’s rejection of the world in favour of his mind.  This is of course a  
perspective that many critics have discussed, not least Rubin Rabinovitz in his book The 
Development of Samuel Beckett's Fiction.  In the following passage he illustrates the binary 
nature of Murphy's beliefs and how the strength of his conviction in them leads to his 
bizarre admiration for the residents of the institution he comes to work at:
Murphy,  a  dualist  in  the  Cartesian  tradition,  believes  that  reality  has  a  physical 
component  (“the  big  world”)  and  a  mental  component  (“the  little  world”).   After 
arriving at the M.M.M., Murphy persuades himself that insanity is nothing more than 
full-time residence in the little world.  If the inmates at the M.M.M. Seem bizarre, it is  
because they are  being  judged by the  rules  of  a  world  they have  abandoned.   The 
psychiatrists  are  the  only  ones  whose  behaviour  is  irrational:  they  condemn  the 
pleasures of the little world without having sampled them.24
  
Murphy  the C  omedy  
Yet, before we examine this in detail it is worth looking at Murphy's status as comic novel. 
The book does not belong to any obvious or particular tradition, although it certainly takes 
its generic sensibilities from a pre-modernist period.25  From someone as experimental as 
the most intelligible parts of the book are those that revolve around Belaqua’s relationships with three 
women.  In his interaction with these women we find a distaste for sexuality and its encroachment into 
attempts at a life lived in more meaningful pursuits.
24 Rubin Rabinovitz, The Development of Samuel Beckett's Fiction (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1984), p. 85.
25 In A Taste for the Negative Shane Weller makes an excellent case for the novel as a 'work of comically 
grotesque realism', one that reveals the mode to be terminally limited by its inability to express anything 
more than the most basic levels of reality.  He writes that 'Through this disparaging of its own means, 
Murphy points dissonantally towards a literature that would be emancipated from the severe limitations of 
that realistic art which comes in for such harsh criticism in Beckett's critical writings of the 1930s, for being a 
mere transcription of the coherent surface.' Shane Weller, A Taste for the Negative (Oxford: Legenda, 2005), 
p. 73. 
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Beckett, the mode is used in a way alien to the eighteenth and nineteenth century works 
which  are  the  most  representative  examples.   Comedy  has  often  been  a  vehicle  for 
experiment; one only has to leaf through Tristram Shandy  (1759-1767) to see that as far 
back  as  the  eighteenth  century the  comic  novel  was  breaking ground stylistically  and 
conceptually.  Even in Beckett’s time, we have the works of his countryman Flynn O’Brien 
who,  with  such  novels  as  At  Swim-Two-Birds (1939),  was  using  the  mode  to  unravel 
narrative structure and harness the comic power of myth.  These are books that use genre 
for  subversion and parody,  and we can place Beckett's  early work comfortably in  this 
group.  Murphy, and indeed most of the novels use comedy to expose the ridiculous nature 
of both narrative and language itself,  but also those issues at  the heart  of assumptions 
regarding agency, thought and existence.  One only need look to scenes like Murphy’s 
ordering of his biscuits in Hyde Park.  The passage reads:
On  his  knees  now  before  the  five  it  struck  him  for  the  first  time  that  these 
prepossessions reduced to a paltry six the number of ways in which he could make this 
meal.  But this was to violate the very essence of assortment, this was red permanganate 
on the Rima of variety.  Even if he conquered his prejudice against the anonymous, still  
there would be only twenty-four ways in which the biscuits could be eaten.  But were he 
to take the final step and overcome his infatuation with the ginger, then the assortment 
would spring into life before him, dancing the radiant measure of its total permutability, 
edible in a hundred and twenty ways! (MU, pp. 59-60.)
The farcical nature of this episode became typically Beckettian as the author published 
more  work.   In  particular,  when reading this  passage,  one thinks  of  Molloy’s  sucking 
stones.  Similarly, this involves a lengthy, logical debate in the character’s mind as to the 
method of alternating the possibilities of consumables.  The difference in the more evolved 
Molloy will relate to the protagonist, who lives even more in his mind than does Murphy. 
The fact that Molloy sucks a stone rather than eats food already pushes him toward greater 
mental  and  physical  decay,  coupled  with  the  possibilities  and  deliberations  being 
compounded, dealing as he is with the multiple pockets of his greatcoat.
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This  comic  subversion  of  the  novel  occurs  in  other  ways.   Refusing  to  relinquish  an 
episode of farce Beckett purposefully forces the joke to continue, imbuing a scene with a 
sense of tragicomedy intended to discomfit.  Specifically, there is the episode in which 
Wylie, Miss Counihan and Neary finally have their tripartite confrontation and discover the 
treachery of which they have been guilty.  As Neary realises there is no longer any point 
delaying the inevitable, he instructs Miss Counihan:
“The gentleman is locked out,” called Neary.  “Let him in.” 
Wylie strode in much too boldly and Miss Counihan rose.
“Good girl,” said Neary.  “Now lock the door behind the gentleman.”
Wylie and Miss Counihan met face to face, a trying experience for 
them both.
“You cur,” said Miss Counihan, getting her blow in first.
“You bitch,” said Wylie.
They belonged to the same great group.
“You take the tone out of my mouth,” said Neary, “if not the terms.”
“You cur,” said Miss Counihan, making a bid for the last word.
“Before you go any further-” said Neary. (MU, p. 125.)
Firstly,  what  is  notable  about  this  dialogue is  the  narrator’s  tone  which  is  particularly 
knowing, and almost cynical, in describing the speech.  This stylised approach is peculiar 
to the early works in that it operates within genre, whilst playing with generic conventions. 
One is reminded of Wilde's social comedies in this exchange, with a situation reminiscent 
of Lady Windermere's Fan (1893).  In Murphy however, we find only the shell of the genre 
with the characters confused as to what their parts in the scenario require.  They are unsure 
and faltering in their dialogue, which serves to dislocate the mode from the kind of satiric  
specificity we would find in Wilde.  It is not Victorian society, but intelligibility over the 
world itself, which is critiqued and revealed as hollow.  This is the target of the joke in both 
of these examples.  In the ordering of the biscuits we have an early example of the kind of 
exhaustive logical process applied to something inconsequential we shall see much more of 
in  Watt.   By displacing  a  rational  methodology in  this  way it  becomes  ludicrous  and 
illustrates how impossible such a method would be in trying to comprehend the vastness of 
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the world, let alone Murphy's lunch.  The three-way interaction of Miss Counihan, Neary 
and Wylie is perhaps less focussed.  Essentially it presents a comedic situation, but fails to 
fulfil its promise.  Rather than wit, it is confusion which reigns here, with no character 
really sure of what they are supposed to be doing.  In Beckett’s later work the narration 
remains  similarly  self-conscious,  but  instead  of  operating  within  established  modes  it 
forges its own strange, disorienting tone.  In this incident the uncertainty of the characters 
as to how they should approach one another is  mirrored in the reader’s uncertainty in 
approaching this textual moment.  The structure of the incident has become transformed by 
the dialogue and occupies a strange middle ground, in which preconceptions shift  into 
ambiguity and the reader is left with a bad taste over the inadequacies of communication. 
This is both in terms of how the characters interact, but also in how the comedy of the 
scene is portrayed.  One may feel as if they are missing something, as it were, but this is 
another part of how the novel uses comedy to attack intelligibility itself.  
The ends at which these examples aim are similar.  To see any of Beckett’s works as a 
thorough critique of a specific philosophical system is an exaggeration, yet many of the 
works address concepts or traditions which are significant in the history of ideas.  In the 
scene with the biscuits and indeed throughout the novel Beckett makes rationalism a target. 
In a parodic mode of pastiche, the idea of engaging the world in a logically sound way is 
lampooned by association with something as trivial as biscuits.  Beckett's purpose lies at 
the bedrock of his engagement with the philosophical canon.  As will become evident, he is 
deeply  sceptical  of  virtually  all  metaphysical  traditions,  and  sees  any  attempt  to 
conceptualise  the  world  in  prescriptive  or  fixed  terms  as  inadequate.   Murphy’s 
independence of thought  does not  possess the force of Beckett's  later  novels,  rendered 
through the  form and content  of  the  work  itself.   However,  there  is  in  this  and other 
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incidents, such as the chess game between Murphy and Endon, a distinct attempt to disrupt 
and  undermine  not  just  novelistic  convention,  but  also  the  philosophical  principles 
underpinning much accepted thought.  
In the case of the novel it is in subversion of readerly expectation that Beckett is most 
effective.   Murphy  draws  the  reader  in  with  an  engaging  plot  and  accessible  generic 
framework that does not at first appear to harness abstract ideas at a glance.  As already 
mentioned, this is a mere shell Beckett uses for his own ends.  Moments of farce such as  
the biscuits or the chess game are taken to such lengths that we step out of the generic 
frame and are induced to question the purpose of such incidents.  In the case of the chess 
game, where there is a subversion of the conventions and rules of prose writing at a point 
approaching the story’s very climax, we encounter an extended parodic episode.
Functioning without a punchline, such as the dog eating the biscuits in the other example 
we looked at, the game of chess is illustrative of, above all, the lack of meaning we can 
divine from action,  cause and effect.  In this  scene Beckett describes the way Endon’s 
mental detachment means he plays a game that will always end with the pieces back where 
they began.  But he does more; and details every move in turn, an exercise superfluous to 
the story's progress.  This convention of chess literature is imported into the novel form, 
and one cannot escape how uncomfortably it sits.  Once again, this places the conventions 
of the form in suspension, replacing these with a seemingly arbitrary descent into parody. 
Yet, it is not with this aim alone that Beckett includes the moves of the game.  
As much as it is a critique of generic narrative formula and prescriptive rationalism, it is 
also an integral part of Beckett’s own response; the philosophical position he asserts in 
31
Murphy.  Far from representing any sort of affirmative metaphysics, Beckett’s project in 
this early work seems a concerted effort at disavowal of any such system.  We may recall 
the quotation with which we began, regarding negation and reduction as Beckett’s own 
path.  Often this is done by means of illustration, as in the example we are discussing, or 
the astrological predictions by which Murphy lives his life.  Beckett admires games like 
chess, which possess the possibilities of cyclical and deductive thinking in the way the two 
sides face each other down.  Murphy enjoys playing against Endon, because in its fixity 
and completeness, it is the kind of structure the former cannot find in the material world. 
Endon has no wish to win, and in this he fits perfectly into Murphy’s conception of the 
ideal  existence,  one  that  leaves  behind  crude  desire,  replacing  it  with  a  higher  goal, 
devoted to the “little world” of mental abstractions.
In  Shane  Weller's  A Taste  for  the  Negative:  Beckett  and  Nihilism  he  interrogates  the 
idealism Murphy has with regards Mr Endon, offering firstly a position which casts the 
latter as the paradigmatic example the former believes he must follow in order to escape 
the slavery to the material universe he feels:
Mr Endon is taken by Murphy, then, to be the master of negation, for whom the 'outer 
reality' is quite simply nothing, its absence of value having been not only recognised (as 
it is by Murphy himself) but transcended; in other words he is taken to be the antithesis 
of Celia.26
Celia is of course the antithesis because of her status as prostitute, which is to say someone 
who makes a living from her body, but also because of Murphy's emotional attachment to 
her, which drags him back to the surface world of everyday realities.  Weller questions the 
uniformity  of  these  ideas  though  by suggesting  that  'While  Celia  becomes  more  like 
Murphy, practicing an art of negation, Mr Endon is revealed as something other than the 
pure 'autology' that Murphy has taken him to be.'27  Celia is revealed to be more than the 
26 Weller, p. 84.
27 Ibid., p. 88. 
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societal  status  her  job  proffers  and  Mr  Endon's  apparent  disinterest  is  revealed  to  be 
somewhat of an impossibility as Weller goes on to explain,
The experience of absolute value is, it seems, the experience of being without value. 
Even if Murphy is no more than a 'chessy eye' to Mr Endon (M242), this need for an 
eye,  this  need to be seen not  seeing,  makes of Mr Endon something other than the 
antithesis of being without value, something other than the overcoming of the nihilism 
which is experienced as imprisonment within the valuelessness of the 'outer reality'.28
In other words, if Endon is more than just a series of robotic responses, if he has achieved 
the purest  state of detachment from the world Murphy so longs for, then his desire to 
participate in the game, 'to be seen not seeing' as Weller puts it, sweeps him back into the 
maelstrom of worldly interactions with all the wants, needs and requirements this entails. 
Mr Endon has not achieved the pure being without value that Weller discusses as Murphy's 
ideal,  the  'absolute  value'  that  lies  in  that  state.   Much  like  the  'comically  grotesque 
realism'29 Weller sees as essential to the generic structure of Murphy there is a terminally 
unfulfilled aspect in the way Murphy strives to achieve his separation from the world of 
the  body  and  the  novel  is  more  about  this  impasse  than  any  sort  of  solution  to  the 
philosophical problems Murphy presents.
   
Astrology as Replacement Metaphysics
Similarly there is the horoscope Murphy must have cast before he can begin the search for 
employment Celia is desperate he undertakes.  Many have speculated as to its purpose in 
the novel.  It seems an arbitrary part of Murphy’s character, and a relatively weak plot 
device.  In Damned to Fame James Knowlson speaks broadly of preordained events, and 
about the force of its presence as meaning 'it gradually acquires the authority of fatality.'30 
Like most explanations of the place astrology has in the novel this is non-specific.  In 
another of Beckett’s letters to McGreevy he speaks of Jung insisting 'on patients having 
28 Ibid., p. 89.
29 Ibid., p. 73.
30 Damned to Fame, p. 208.
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their horoscopes cast!'31  Beckett is astounded by the decision of an advanced thinker like 
Jung to use a spurious, pseudo-scientific system as part of his psychoanalytic method.  We 
know at the time Beckett wrote the novel he was still regularly seeing a psychoanalyst 
named Bion, and that he had taken a keen interest in Jung and psychoanalysis in general. 
This letter was written after Beckett had been to see Jung deliver a series of lectures.  It  
seems likely that was the genesis of Murphy’s interest in astrology.32
One of the most interesting things revealed by the inclusion of astrology in Murphy, is a 
noteworthy characteristic of Beckett’s writing.  Everything we know about his beliefs, life 
and indeed his astonishment at Jung’s use of the horoscope leads us to conclude that, as a 
system, as a way of understanding the world, it held no credibility for him.  This said, it is  
an essential part of Murphy’s journey, and the catalyst which guides his decision making 
process and thus the novel's progress.  For this reason, one could be forgiven for thinking 
Beckett has some affinity with the practice.  As with so many of his interests, however, he 
includes it in the novel to aid the story's progress and to illustrate his ambivalence about 
definitive metaphysics.  Its inclusion may entail a far greater significance than I am here 
suggesting,  but most likely it forms another part of the bricolage,  adding to an overall 
impression we can only understand by stepping back and taking in its cumulative meaning.
It is of course the question of allegiance to a particular school or thinker which many have 
tried to address.  The wealth of philosophical content within the works has led scholars 
such as John Calder to proclaim them vehicles for Beckett’s philosophy.33  One must be 
wary of this.  The content does not necessarily represent the beliefs of the author, at least 
not literally.  Astrology is Murphy’s choice because for Beckett it is, amongst the myriad of 
31 The Letters of Samuel Beckett, p. 282.
32 Damned to Fame, p. 218
33 John Calder, The Philosophy of Samuel Beckett (London: Calder Publications, 2001), p. 1.
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flawed ways to interpret the world, as good a solution as any.  Systems, philosophical, 
theological or otherwise, all share bedrock flaws in the totalising understanding they try to 
forge and the tools of language they employ.  Beckett’s scepticism would never allow him 
to overcome his prejudices and subscribe to any of these, and this is really the central 
position of Murphy; not a substitute metaphysics, but a critical response to the limitations 
of philosophical, theological and indeed astrological systems.  Murphy's surety in his belief 
that a meaningful existence is to live as much as possible within the confines of one's mind 
is, as Shane Weller suggests, equally suspect and most likely impossible.  In highlighting 
the futility of these approaches Murphy is a questioning, a questioning of where one can 
look for meaning if not through a prescribed or personal systematic understanding of the 
world.
This chapter seeks to understand  Murphy  as a work of bricolage, and more specifically 
bricolage as Derrida conceives it.  However, before going too far with this type of thinking, 
it  should  be  made  clear  that  Murphy,  only  the  second  novel  Beckett  wrote,  is  not 
poststructuralist or deconstructionist in any developed way.  Firstly, we are dealing with 
fiction, not a treatise, and secondly it is as the novels progress that we shall witness the 
birth of Beckett’s symbiosis of form and content, the mode in which his ideas are best 
illustrated.  More accurately, in this instance we have a novel that often seems prescient 
about  certain  poststructuralist  ideas,  specifically  the  method  of  gleaning  more  truthful 
avenues  for  finding  meaning  than  those  that  have  been  suggested  by  the  history  of 
metaphysics.  But it could hardly be said to participate in a movement not yet founded. 
Such hyperbole is unnecessary for work with its own complex philosophical position.
  
Geulincx and the Mind-Body Problem
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We have seen that Beckett is indeed fascinated with the history of philosophy, almost as 
much  as  he  is  interested  in  the  philosophical  concepts.   One  suspects  Geulincx  is 
interesting to Beckett not just because of his approach to Descartes, but also because of his 
historical relegation.  Reading him was at the time something that could only be done in 
the original Latin.  For Beckett, this meant trips to the library of Trinity College, one of the 
only places then to hold copies.  His central work  Metaphysics  (1691), recently (1999) 
translated  into  English  by Martin  Wilson,  is  a  perfect  example  of  a  text  Beckett  was 
intensely interested in despite his disagreement with large parts of it.  One of Geulincx’s 
central  principles  was  that  because  God  had  predetermined  existence,  action  was  in 
essence ineffectual and meaningless.  Some have thought Beckett must have felt an affinity 
with this type of thinking, and not religious himself, believed in a secular version of this 
position.   The  truth,  which  can  be  seen  throughout  Beckett’s  response  to  his  various 
influences, was that he was attracted to a specific part of Geulincx’s philosophy, not the 
whole.  What drew him was the second part of the maxim: the idea that action and thought 
are a fruitless endeavor. Deprived of the religious context essential to Geulincx's deeply 
faith-based philosophy the idea of  meaninglessness,  but  an untethered meaninglessness 
begins with Geulincx but becomes something entirely at conflict with the philosopher's 
position.  If Beckett’s oeuvre can be summarized it must surely be around this lack of 
agency.  Yet, in the preface to Wilson’s translation of Metaphysics he says:
But, with due reverence to Beckett, it seems to me that he misrepresents Geulincx in 
four  distinct  areas.   First,  such  a  response  [Beckett’s  ‘quietism,  passivity,  and  the 
abnegation of will’] takes into account only one part of the human condition.  I may 
cease to will anything concerning my body, but God will not thereby cease to affect me 
through it as an instrument only these affections will not now have any direct relation to 
my will, except of a purely negative kind.  For instance, if I cease to will my body to 
feed itself, I shall not escape the distress consequent upon starvation and thirst.  This 
leads on to the second point that the cessation of will is itself a discretion of my will, 
leaving my body to behave variously according to the laws of motion, or to what God 
deceives for it in the absence of my will.  Third, Geulincx does not condemn the human 
condition as per se miserable, and something from which it is reasonable to seek escape. 
Lastly, it is God, not man, who has dominion over death; so that attempting to quit the  
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human condition by means of mortification of the will is the would-be exercise of a 
power that one does not possess.34
Wilson is simplistic in his assessment of Beckett’s concerns and outlook, but he is broadly 
accurate.   He details  the author’s obsession with one part  of the human condition,  his 
courting  of  inaction  and  negation  of  will,  and  of  course  his  rendering  of  life  as  an 
essentially “miserable” affair.  What he fails to recognize, is that although Beckett does 
make many references to Geulincx he does not attempt to engage with his philosophy, as 
much  as  fillet  an  aspect  of  his  thought  and  transpose  it  entirely  in  its  new  context. 
Beckett’s interest in Geulincx stems from the areas in which their disparate thought seems 
to momentarily meet.  Beckett takes the idea that man is a creature who will eternally fail 
to recognize his own futility in the world, and the aporia parallel to this.  For Geulincx, one 
should not abandon one’s reason because of the existence of God, whereas for Beckett, 
acceptance of the  unknowability we inhabit does not mean inaction is the appropriate form 
of living.  Here Wilson seems to misunderstand Beckett, almost suggesting the writer is 
some sort of advocate of suicide.  When Beckett says he sees Murphy as partly a product of 
Geulincx’s 'where you are worth nothing, may you also wish for nothing',  clearly it  is 
Beckett's reworking of this maxim we should focus upon, and not suppose an engagement 
with  this  kind  of  post-Cartesian  philosophy in  representative  terms.   In  this  quotation 
Beckett affirms his status as bricoleur.  As Edith Kern puts it in  Existential Thought and 
Fictional Technique  (1970) '[Geulincx] is also the source of the philosophical argument 
according to which Murphy lives and dies.'35  It is not a version of his argument Geulincx 
would recognise or  endorse and Beckett  is  interested in  it  only in  so far  as  it  can  be 
augmented to fit his own purposes.
34 Arnold Geulincx, Metaphysics, trans. by Martin Wilson (Cambridgeshire: Christoffel Press, 1999), p. 12-
13.
35 Edith Kern, Existential Thought and Fictional Technique (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1970), p. 167
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Murphy is then an illustration of the key principle in Metaphysics, namely that attempting 
to garner meaning from action is redundant.  For Geulincx, the reason for this is that God 
has pre-determined existence; but for Beckett, the reason has far more to do with a deeper, 
general scepticism about meaning and our understanding of being.  The story of Murphy is 
therefore in part a rendering of this idea.  The notion of human life being worthless, as 
Geulincx puts it, is not necessarily negative, but can be seen as the true awareness in which 
to live.  Beckett's affinity with Geulincx is based on this principle.  Yet, as abstract as 
Beckett can appear,  Murphy is in many ways as radical a treatment as any other of his 
about the problems that arise when ideas encounter the practicalities of living.  For a later  
rationalist like Emmanuel Kant there is a harmony to be found in a balance of empirical  
and rationalist approaches, but Beckett could never accept this type of resolution.  The 
process  of  turning  experience  into  abstraction  through  reason is  implicitly  rejected  by 
Murphy,  suggesting  that  action  is  unknowable,  and  the  tools  of  reason  flimsy  and 
imperfect.  From the very outset Murphy not only shares the narrator's awareness of the 
issues of existence and agency we have been discussing, but does not ignore these, and 
attempts to live a life based upon his metaphysical awakenings.  In the opening paragraph 
of the first chapter he is described as existing in a West Brompton mew 'as though he were 
free.' (MU, p. 3.)  This is a reference not merely to the superficial financial and social woes we 
will see Murphy deal with, but also to how these tie in with the greater consciousness that  
informs his character and guides his actions.  The 'as though he were free' is a joke at 
Murphy's expense.   The surety he feels over his inner and outer world dichotomy will  
gradually be revealed to be misplaced and the cruelty of having him die whilst trying to 
achieve inner harmony, dispatched by the physical desire to be warm in his room is the 
paradigmatic example of this.
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The mind-body problem is  of  course key to  any sort  of  text  drawing so openly upon 
Descartes, who wrote on this several times, most famously in the sixth of his Meditations  
on First Philosophy, where he addresses the problem of moving from the cogito into the 
physical world, an area in which Beckett finds it difficult to agree with him.  At least in 
Descartes' initial meditations Beckett can find congruence with the process of doubting, as 
we see in the extreme scepticism behind Murphy's behaviour.  But a central concern is also 
that of this difference between the little world of the mind and the external world, outside 
the mind.  Beckett does not unequivocally say God does not exist, but his texts and indeed 
his life provide evidence he was a sceptic.  Wherever God becomes the reason behind a 
philosophical maxim, this is a step the author cannot take.  Again, this is bricolage; Beckett 
takes what he can use and discards the rest.  Beckett can identify with the problem itself.  
The solution is too much of a leap of faith for him.
  
Echoes of Schopenhauer
The case is similar with Schopenhauer, renowned for his followers who often focus on the 
peripheries  of  his  work,  whilst  disagreeing  with  his  central  philosophical  system. 
Schopenhauer is not cited by Beckett, but he nonetheless is relevant to our understanding 
of  Murphy.  If the quotation Beckett chose from Geulincx was central to understanding 
Beckett's text, we can see a further convergence of thought in Schopenhauer’s statement:
nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it 
would be better for us not to exist.36
This is typical of Beckett's darker side, a view of life explored in depth in works like The 
Unnamable (1953).  Its desperation accompanies the searching scepticism we have seen 
thus far, and Beckett oscillates between the two attitudes. This emerges often in the form of 
unravelling  what  is  held  to  be  fixed,  which  is  sufficiently  revealing  to  undermine  the 
36 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World As Will and Representation, trans. by E. F. J. Payne, II (New York: 
Dover, 1969), p. 605.
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pessimism embodied in the above quotation.  It is also worth noting that it is again the 
roots of works like The World as Will and Representation (1818-19) that seem to have the 
greatest congruence of ideas with Murphy.  Schopenhauer’s central text outlines his theory 
of the intellect and the will.  This distinction is predicated upon the fact the world can be 
divided into appearance (the intellect) and the thing in itself (the will).  At first, this seems 
to resemble the distinction in Murphy between the big world of the exterior and physical 
and the interiority of the mind.  But it is in the proposed complexities of the will that 
Schopenhauer  often  loses  followers  and  any  similarities  to  Beckett’s  novel  become 
cloudier.  This force Schopenhauer often casts in different lights, and the dualism it creates 
is difficult to sustain as part of a metaphysical system.  What is clear however, is that it is 
the true power that controls our actions and we should at all times do as much as possible 
to  avoid  its  domineering  influence.  This  is  of  course  an  impossibility,  being  as  it  is 
inescapable, and leads Schopenhauer to make statements as previously quoted.  However, 
the impossibility of such a task is that which those who are interested in the thinker most  
often focus upon, finding in the addendums and “lesser” works the most engaging aspects 
of Schopenhauer’s thought. 
In the third book of The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer moves away from 
description of the intellect and the will and into areas where he focuses upon the aesthetic 
as a tool.  The will, he has stated, is largely inescapable.
When, however, an external cause or inward disposition suddenly raises us out of the 
endless stream of willing, and snatches knowledge from the thraldom of the will, the 
attention is now no longer directed to the motives of willing, but comprehends things 
free from their relation to the will.  Thus it considers things without interest, without 
subjectivity, purely objectively[…] Then all at once the peace, always sought but always 
escaping us on that first path of willing, comes to us of its own accord, and all is well  
with us37
This 'external cause' is the aesthetic object which Schopenhauer will contend is among the 
37 Schopenhauer, p. 196. 
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only things that can possibly pull us from full engagement with the will.  But the aesthetic 
object cannot be contemplated in just any manner.  It must be approached from a detached 
and  objective  perspective,  from a  point  of  observation  verging  on  the  meditative  and 
seeking the  disrobing of  selfhood.   One does  not  need to  look far  to  find the link to 
Murphy.  This  novel  begins  with  its  protagonist  strapped  to  an  armchair,  seeking  not 
abandonment, but engagement with the aspects of himself hardest to apprehend.  In this 
earliest example we see not aesthetic contemplation as a means of escaping the will, but 
rather, contemplation of the state of simply being within one’s own consciousness.  Indeed, 
Murphy is not an aesthete at all, and does not appear to share any of his creator’s interests 
in literature, art or music.  The most sustained aesthetic experience he has comes from the 
chess games he shares with Mr Endon, that we have already discussed.  In these, Murphy 
finds detached appreciation; a sense of something greater than the world around him.  In 
the way he lists the moves he almost worships their aesthetic content.  However, can we 
see in this an escape from the entanglements of the world for Murphy?  Do his attempts to 
withdraw from the physical world and his aesthetic appreciation of the chess game and Mr 
Endon himself allow a release from the suffocating nature of living?  Based on what we 
have already said regarding how impossible Murphy's “little world” dream is I think we 
must conclude no.  As Schopenhauer suggests the fragmentary moments of peace outwith 
the  'endless  stream  of  willing'  are  fleeting,  'always  sought  but  always  escaping'  and 
Murphy seems to say as much.  He may achieve a small measure of something beyond the 
incumbent  restrictions  of  living  in  the  world,  but  as  his  death  illustrates,  Murphy and 
indeed everyone is forced at a certain point to reconcile the aspects of living they cannot 
understand.   In  following chapters  on the  post  World  War II  works  we shall  see how 
Beckett's intensified focus on the physical degradations of the body serve to magnify the 
inescapability of this awareness.
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The Significance of Section Six
This dualism of the outer and inner worlds, of the physical or tangible and that which 
exists only in the mind may seem a facile comparison.  It could be argued that to separate 
the two is a fallacy, their nature being interrelated and each relying on the other for its 
existence, in a process of symbioses.  Throughout the book, whenever reference is made to 
this internal state of Murphy’s mind it is usually done with an addendum, which references 
'section six', a part of the book still to come, and which promises to enlighten the reader on 
the precise nature of what is discussed.  Examples litter the novel's early stages.  The first  
is on the second page, where the narrator describes how and why Murphy has strapped 
himself to his chair:
He sat in his chair in this way because it gave him pleasure! First it  gave his body 
pleasure, it appeased his body.  Then it set him free in his mind.  For it was not until his 
body was appeased that he could come alive in his mind, as described in section six. 
And life in his mind gave him pleasure, such pleasure that pleasure was not the word. 
(MU, p. 4.)
The faults in this binary understanding of existence would be obvious to Beckett, given his 
understanding of  metaphysics.   One should  not  confuse  character  or  narrator  with the 
author on this point.  Only a couple of pages later he returns to the purpose of physical 
restraint, stating it is the place 'where he could love himself.' (MU, p. 6.)  Mention is repeatedly 
made to section six, before it appears around a third of the way into the book.  Before 
looking at this section, it is worth noting the tendency in any work on Murphy to have the 
crux of the argument turn on this point.  It therefore seems necessary to say before we turn 
to the description of Murphy’s mind that this part of the novel is not going to be viewed as 
the coda to the whole; Beckett avoids such explanatory episodes in his work.  Indeed, as 
the novels evolve with each publication we shall see more and more a commitment to a 
mode  which  is  sprawling  in  significant  content,  a  resistance  to  micro-analysis  best 
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understood as a tapestry of meaning.  In the turn to French this will become more obvious 
as Beckett  finally finds his  voice; and we will  see in  Molloy  a focus on the vagrant’s 
specifically continuous inner monologue as part of the effort at creating something best 
understood as a whole.  By the time we reach  The Unnamable the technique has been 
further  refined,  no  longer  depending  on  character,  but  using  the  narration  itself  in  a 
cyclically abstracted manner.  This is something to return to, but for the purposes of section 
six it is worth saying that not only is Beckett a writer who firstly would not wholeheartedly 
subscribe to the aforementioned dualism of the inner and outer world that is detailed in 
Murphy, but that furthermore we are dealing here with a comic novel.  We are free to find 
meaning in section six, but must see it as part of a larger whole, invested with the same 
spirit of play as the chess game and the horoscope.  The section  itself is only a few pages 
long and begins with this proviso:
It is most unfortunate, but the point of this story has been reached where a justification 
of the expression “Murphy’s mind” has to be attempted.  Happily we need not concern 
ourselves with this apparatus as it really was – that would be an extravagance and an 
impertinence – but solely with what it felt and pictured itself to be. (MU, p. 67.)
Beckett immediately states that Murphy’s mind is not going to be described, and cannot be 
described, but merely its self-image, a very different proposition.  By making this clear we 
can see that,  as I  have said,  section six is  not  the all-encompassing,  revelatory key to 
Murphy  that one may assume.  We must see it working as part of the novel, and in the 
description that follows one can see how this is necessary.  The narrator begins by saying 
Murphy’s mind imagined itself a closed-off sphere, which assimilated physical and mental 
as phenomena in the same way, but with differing characteristics.  This is to say that the 
physical differs from the purely mental or abstract, but that they are both made sense of, 
and in a sense exist, entirely at the disposal of the mind.  It may now be clear that section 
six is not merely an attempt to explain Murphy’s mind as it saw itself, but also a dialogue 
on the mind-body problem. 
43
Murphy  does  not  present  a  solution,  however.   He  concedes  'he  felt  his  mind  to  be 
bodytight and did not understand through what channel the intercourse was effected nor 
how the two experiences came to overlap.' (MU, p. 68.)  He then speculates as to his knowledge 
of  the  outside  world  being affected  by an  innate  understanding  reminiscent  of  Plato’s 
forms.  In the end he concludes that their working together must be by 'some such process 
of supernatural determination.' (MU, p. 68.)  One gathers this was not Beckett’s view, sceptical 
and ever-questioning as he was.   For Murphy the problem is  not of huge significance 
anyway, in comparison with his instinct that 'his mind was a closed system, subject to no 
principle of change but its own, self-sufficient and impermeable to the vicissitudes of the 
body.' (MU, p. 68.) He admits that any mind-body solution that did not run counter to this was 
sufficient for him.  Which raises the question if there would ever be a situation in which 
Beckett himself could accept the facile resolution Murphy entertains in this paragraph.  I 
think we must conclude no.  By his own admission, Murphy succumbs to the premise that 
living within his mind is the true form of life, and that he will strive for this at every 
juncture.  In  Murphy Beckett writes that 'all the puppets in this book whinge sooner or 
later, except Murphy, who is not a puppet'  (MU, p. 76.), which could be seen as an admission 
Murphy is autobiographical.  No doubt there are similarities between Murphy and Beckett; 
but one can see at this point an arrested development in Murphy’s metaphysical reflections 
that Beckett had already moved beyond.  We could see Murphy,  as a younger version of 
Beckett;  someone  more  likely  to  accept  binary  propositions,  or  to  wilfully  ignore 
irresolvable mind-body problems. 
Concluding the section, Beckett speaks more specifically of the nature of Murphy’s mind 
as he saw it.  He describes it as having a tripartite structure composed of the light, half 
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light, and the dark.  The degree of abstraction and removal from the world runs parallel to 
the extinguishing of light.  This formulation of the mind into three zones is part of the 
narrator's “reluctant” need to describe the interior of Murphy’s mind.  One may assume this 
reticence is based on the artificiality of the section’s placing in the novel, although for 
Beckett such self-consciousness is usually something embraced not avoided.  Perhaps his 
reticence relates to the flaws Beckett would have found in this thinking, and the purposeful 
injection of outdated notions into his prose. In the last stage, that of darkness, Murphy’s 
mind is described as in complete isolation, interacting with a 'flux of forms' (MU, p. 70.), and 
losing even his own selfhood as he becomes part of a greater whole.  As Aude Pichon puts 
it:
Murphy’s striving to reach the third region of his mind, the region in a perpetual state of  
flux, is an attempt to move beyond thought, to experience the irrational and to do so by 
departing from a system of relation.38
He aims to spend as much time as possible here: 'more and more in the dark, in the will-
lessness, a mote in its absolute freedom.' (MU, p. 70.)  The paragraph finishes with the narrator 
concluding: 'This painful duty having now been discharged, no further bulletins will be 
issued.'  (MU, p.  70.)  The pain is of recreating a past awareness one believed total.  Murphy 
believes  he has all  the knowledge he requires,  and is  convinced that  regardless of the 
intricacies of mind-body problems his sureness of his authoritative little world existence 
renders all else unimportant.  However, as already said, this is too convenient and easy a 
resolution.  As Edith Kern suggests, Beckett 
proffers no answers, but his manner of asking places him in the camp of the dualists 
with their division of body and mind, reality and unreality.39
I disagree with this.  At least by the time Beckett comes to write Murphy, the philosophical 
positions of the author and Murphy are at different stages of development.  Section six can 
38 Aude Pichon, ‘A Deleuzian Interpretation of Beckett’s Linguistic Experiments’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of Dundee, 2002), p. 53.
39 Kern, p. 171.
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be thought of as the solution to the philosophical problems the novel addresses.  But if so, 
it  is by way of illustration; of showing a false end point and an opposing open-ended, 
terminally sceptical  position visible  in  the later  works.   In  The Unnamable  (1953) the 
protagonist  says  of  Murphy  that  it  was  clumsily  done  and  that  'you  could  see  the 
ventriloquist.'  (TU,  p.  398.)   This can inform our opinion of  Beckett’s  relation to  Murphy's 
views.  It could be tempting to say that Beckett concedes Murphy was an obvious version 
of the author and that this was a flaw in the work.  Certainly some credence can be given to 
this  idea  based  on  the  aforementioned  description  of  Murphy’s characters  as  puppets. 
However, one could also argue that this idea of the ventriloquist has a much wider meaning 
and relates to the way the novel addresses its central issues.  If we are to compare an early 
work like  Murphy  to something from the middle period such as  Molloy  we can see that 
direct representation of philosophical issues will be avoided almost entirely.  Referencing 
specific metaphysical problems is replaced by a method that seeks a new illustrative mode 
to approach these from a further abstracted, but greater realised position.  I would argue 
therefore that this  ventriloquist  comment is not an admission that Murphy and Beckett 
share the same persona, but that the work and the way it related to the central philosophical 
issues was too straightforward, too obvious and didactic for an artist that would seek to 
tackle his central concerns from the margins as his work evolved.  This is not to dismiss 
the obvious similarities between Beckett and his character.  He freely admitted he was 
displeased that despite his efforts there was still too much of him in Murphy.  However, to 
use this  as a reason for seeing the thoughts and actions of the two as interchangeable 
strikes me as irresponsible considering the rest of the content of the book evinces entirely 
different conclusions.
  
A Balanced Position
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As I began this chapter by saying, Murphy is a transitional piece of work and it is with this 
in  mind  that  we  can  best  draw  conclusions  on  what  the  novel  reveals  about  its 
philosophical import.  At the beginning of this chapter I remarked one must be careful not 
to cast an evolving oeuvre such as Beckett’s as moving in a predetermined way towards an 
inevitable conclusion.   There is no doubt that the inclusion of Descartes and Geulincx 
within  Murphy is a way for Beckett to contextualise and then respond to the methods of 
rationalism,  but  also wider  to  any approach that  seeks  to  impose an  all-encompassing 
explanatory structure on the world.  Beckett not only has affection for these thinkers, but is 
critical  of  any certainty  that  a  rational  approach  to  even  the  smallest  problems  could 
overcome the inherent unintelligibility the world offers.  We can see this illustrated through 
the  comedic  aspects  of  the  book,  such  as  Murphy's  biscuits,  which  ask  the  reader  to 
question the respect we pay to these systems of understanding.  Beginning the project this 
thesis aims to trace, Beckett sets out his concerns, asking through  Murphy what kind of 
approach to finding meaning and living in the world is even possible. 
I have attempted to show that through a thinker like Schopenhauer we can see Beckett's 
awareness  that  seeking  to  grasp  apparently  truthful  methods  of  surmounting  the 
unknowability of the world often ignores the realities of existing in it.  The inclusion of 
astrology as part of the bricolage of sources  Murphy gathers together implicitly places it 
alongside the supposedly more credible  ways to  interpret  the world that  the rationalist 
aspects suggest.  However, as we have seen through Murphy's unfaltering belief in the 
truth of his inner and outer worlds, the cohesion of these methods lies in their assumed 
totality of understanding and this is what the novel seeks to question.  In later chapters we 
shall see Beckett move towards offering an answer but in an early work like Murphy he, 
most likely unknowingly, began a sceptical, questioning project that sought to displace the 
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assumed authority of how we find meaning in the world.  In the next chapter on Watt we 
shall see how this process continues.
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Chapter Two:
Watt   and the Limits of Language 
The  circumstances  under  which  Samuel  Beckett  wrote  his  third  novel  Watt invite  us, 
perhaps more than any of his other works, to examine the meeting place of life and art.  
Unpublished until long after its completion, this is a novel written, in the majority, during 
the cataclysmic events of World War II.  In addition, it was not written in some far-off safe 
haven from which the author  could survey the events  unfolding and use this  detached 
vantage point to comment on what he saw.  Beckett wrote Watt whilst in hiding, working 
with  the  French  resistance  in  the  south  of  his  adopted  nation,  later  characteristically 
downplaying work for  which  he received the  Croix de  Guerre  and the  Médaille  de la 
Résistance.40
The actual circumstances under which the novel was written have been documented by 
James Knowlson in  Damned to Fame,  but like much information on Beckett from this 
period the level of detail is minimal.  We do know that by virtue of his ability to write the 
book  there  must  have  been  extended  periods  of  time  when  life  took  on  a  façade  of 
normality and work could again commence.  This said,  Watt is a novel of war and the 
question forces itself upon us: how far can we detect the events of the conflict, either as 
they personally affected the author, or indeed globally, finding their way into the fabric of 
the story?
Of course it must be as part of Watt’s subtext that we look for the war because the events of 
the book itself do not reflect what was happening in Europe and further afield.  In fact the 
plot of  Watt  is, in its simplicity and detachment from contemporary events, as removed 
40 Beckett referred to his part in sabotaging German occupation of France as 'mere boyscout stuff.' James 
Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 303.
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from what one may imagine a “war novel” to be as possible.  Looking to the previous 
chapter, Watt begins by picking up where Murphy left off.  The body of the novel is framed 
by two chapters which operate within the same type of satirical comedy of manners of the 
previous work.  Opening upon Mr Hackett,  and not Watt,  we join the older man as he 
approaches  a  favourite  bench  only  to  find  a  young  couple  canoodling  on  it.   After 
unsuccessfully trying to get a policeman to arrest them he is met by an older couple named 
Goff and Tetty Nixon.  As Hackett is introduced to Tetty, Watt departs a train from the 
other platform, literally falling into their world from his carriage.  It is at this point that Mr 
Nixon recognises the mystery figure and goes to speak to him about a past debt owed. 
After a moment he returns and is infuriated by the conversation he has had with Watt, a 
situation with which the reader will soon come to empathise.  Being unable to pay back the 
full  amount,  Watt  offers  instead  everything  he  has,  and  it  is  this  disregard  for  self-
preservation that seems to anger his acquaintance.  When Goff is pressed further by Tetty 
and Hackett as to the nature of his relationship with Watt the novel begins to move into the 
territory it will occupy in the majority.  Despite the fact Mr Nixon has known Watt for 
some time he cannot recall the way they met or how they know each other.  Furthermore, 
he cannot recall any specific details about Watt and again pressed he simply replies ‘He 
does not invite mention… there are people like that.' (WA, p. 181.)
This inability to describe Watt in even the most basic physical terms, despite having seen 
him only moments ago, is the first indication of the direction the novel will pursue.  Watt is 
unknowable and Watt is a novel about unknowability.  In this chapter I am going to argue 
that Watt represents not so much strides toward a new innovative method in dealing with 
Beckett’s philosophical preoccupations, but rather a primary concern with the moment of 
awareness  that  leads  to  finding new avenues  of  exploration.   In  this  way we can  see 
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Beckett's  third  novel  as  laying  the  groundwork  for  the  more  overtly  homogeneous 
form/content  experiments  we  find  in  the  novellas  and  furthermore  The  Trilogy.   The 
epiphany is metaphysical and epistemological;  Watt is about the effects on a person once 
they become aware  they have  been  failed  by language,  structure,  logic  and any other 
system that would seek to enclose and explain the totality of existence.  I intend to show 
how  Beckett  achieves  this  within  the  fiction  of  Watt.   In  everything  from  the 
metafictionality  of  the  novel,  the  physicality  of  the  characters,  to  the  purposefully 
antifictional elements,  there is  a  working toward the same awareness.   These elements 
collectively build a picture of a writer dealing with failures in understanding the world and 
about to embark upon work that will try and surmount this obstacle.
From  Murphy   to Mauthner - The Failure of Language 
Watt is a reincarnation of Murphy in much the same way all Beckett's characters are in fact 
the same archetype, honed and made new with each passing work.  Even death cannot 
prevent Murphy reappearing, although the suggestion is always a type of rebirth rather than 
metamorphosis.  Often when a figure appears again he will be the same, but like Stephen 
Connor's  circle41,  made  different  by  the  process  of  repetition;  the  narrator  nods 
significantly toward the two characters' relationship, saying of Watt:  'he had once known 
[the stars] familiarly by name when dying in London.' (WA, p. 40.)  Of course this is a reference 
to Murphy's death, with London and astrology being key aspects of the earlier work.  Since 
his rebirth he has taken on more aspects of the archetype we shall come to know as the 
novels  progress.   Older than Murphy,  with the hat  and greatcoat  that  will  become the 
41 In Repetition, Theory and Text Connor examines Beckett from a poststructuralist vantage, invoking the 
idea of différance: 'Thus our continually renewed belief in the singleness of a text like Watt, our belief that is 
has a centre, is questioned by the various kinds of repetition which are essential to it.  Watt seems neither to 
be original, the centre of its own circle, or secondary, the reproduction of some other, earlier text (Sam's, or 
Watt's, 'actual words'), the circle produced from some other centre.  What is original, as Derrida has argued, 
seems to be the fact of repetition itself, and the sense of lack which comes from it.' Stephen Connor, 
Repetition, Theory and Text (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 39.
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hallmark of Beckett's tramp-like figure, it  is noted that Watt is actually a creature with 
good hygiene.  This is something that will be phased out in the postwar works, where the 
physical infirmities of Beckett's character extend into the failed maintenance of bodily self-
respect.  In personality the two figures share many similarities, including an aversion to the 
social spheres of the world.  However, the sense we get of Watt being so detached from 
society  he  is  like  a  stranger  looking  in  dwarfs  the  duality  of  Murphy's  longing  for 
separation/seeking  the  company  of  others.   The  second  maxim  of  Beckett's  in 
understanding Murphy was Malraux's 'Il est difficile à celui qui vit hors du monde de ne  
pas rechercher les siens (negation).  [It is hard for someone who lives outside society not 
to seek out his own].'42 Watt is truly a figure alone and the few interactions he does have 
with  Sam,  Arsene  and Mr Nixon serve  only to  further  our  opinion that  he has  found 
himself, through his pilgrimage, separated from the world of men.  Later, we shall look 
closer at the most serious manifestation of this in the loss of language Watt suffers, forcing 
the narrator to translate his syntactical reversals back into something intelligible.
Of course what unites the two protagonists, and indeed all of Beckett's characters is their 
embodiment of the search for answers to the questions of existence.  Both Murphy and 
Watt are on a quest to find meaning in the world, and yet a key difference between the two 
are the levels of awareness they have over systems of understanding already available. 
Murphy lives a recognisable life, embroiled as he is in a web of relationships, despite often 
trying not to be.  Watt on the other hand spends the entire novel on an ultimately unfulfilled 
existential pilgrimage, the last bastion of hope that he can find any salvation in a structure, 
system or being that can order his world.  The reasons or knowledge that have led him 
toward the house of Mr. Knott are, like so much in the novel, obscured from the reader. 
42 Damned to Fame, p. 219. The translations and other additions within brackets in this quotation are from 
Knowlson himself.
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We instead get a sense that he is simply drawn there.  Drawn on the promise of resolution, 
of answers provided not necessarily by Mr. Knott, but by being in his house, working in 
the role Watt has assumed.  In the end of course the conclusion he reaches is the same he 
had already come to before starting his journey.  As John Fletcher notes,
Watt indeed reaches the plenitude of his exile from the world of men only after his stay 
with Mr. Knott, which destroys for him the world of objects, of logic, and of names, and 
which takes him a step further in the dolorous calvary that is the way of the Beckettian 
hero from Belaqua's Dublin to the muddy netherworld of Pim. 43
Perhaps it was simply the final nail in the coffin needed to engineer his new life in the 
sanatorium.  He tells Sam in the variation of speech in which he reverses the order of 
sentences, 
Of Nought.  To the source.  To the teacher.  To the temple.  To him I brought.  This 
emptied heart.  These emptied hands.  This mind ignoring.  This body homeless.  To 
love him my little reviled.  My little rejected to have him.  My little to learn him forgot.  
Abandoned my little to find him. (WA, p. 303)
Put in the correct order the paragraph reads like this:
Abandoned my little to find him.  My little to learn him forgot.  My little rejected to 
have him.  To love him my little reviled.  This body homeless.  This mind ignoring. 
These emptied hands.  This emptied heart.  To him I brought.  To the temple.  To the 
teacher.  To the source.  Of Nought.
This is probably the most candid admission within the novel of Watt's purpose in seeking 
out Mr. Knott's household.  Fletcher notes that 'Watt's syntax breaks down under the strain 
when he tries to tell Sam of his master, who appears as a negative god, the great Nothing of 
which nothing can be predicted.'44 We understand that it is, in effect, his last chance.  The 
last  chance for  order,  for  answers  that  will  resolve  the  doubts  he has  about  language, 
structure, society and existence.  Of course in the end he leaves and in his only show of 
emotion weeps.  The reason for this is not given but it seems clear enough the cause is the 
failure of Mr. Knott to bring him back from the edge.  Daniel Katz argues that 
The singularity of Watt in Beckett's oeuvre lies precisely in its interrogation of group or 
43 John Fletcher, The Novels of Samuel Beckett (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), p. 79.
44 Fletcher, p. 86.
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communal  structures,  and  the  mechanisms  by  which  the  sense  of  belonging  or 
estrangement is built.45
I think we can see this in the response to leaving the house of Mr. Knott,  in how this 
distance, even from a master like Mr. Knott who seems to manifest many of the same 
concerns as Watt and the succession of caretakers within which he is part of a strange 
social recycling, that he remains more alone than ever.  These “communal structures” that 
Katz describes are evident everywhere, in the estrangement Watt feels from larger society 
as seen in the framing chapters, but most acutely in the smaller world of Mr. Knott's house. 
As important  an aspect  as this  is  to the novel one could be forgiven for thinking that 
Beckett was describing as essential in understanding Watt and not Murphy Malraux's 'Il est  
difficile à celui qui vit hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les siens (negation).  [It is hard 
for someone who lives outside society not to seek out his own].'46 As Katz suggests, Watt is 
the keenest of Beckett's novels regarding the estrangement of the individual from different 
social structures and Watt's tears are emblematic of the tragedy this presents.
It is from this point onwards Watt experiences an even greater loosening of his grip on the 
world.  He of course ends up institutionalized, periodically inverting and destroying his 
language not so much out of choice, but seemingly rather as a by-product of his collapsed 
belief  in  the  systems  he  used  to  order  existence.   Matthew Feldman's  2006  Beckett's  
Books: A Cultural History of the Interwar Notes  has repositioned our understanding of 
Murphy  and  Watt's  critique of language.   It  had long been established that these early 
works were an engagement with Cartesianism and Geulincx in particular, but in the chapter 
''Myself I Cannot Save': Geulincx, Mauthner, Beckett' Feldman argues that Fritz Mauthner 
should be regarded as equally important in understanding them.  
45 Daniel Katz, Saying “I” No More (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p. 66.
46 Damned to Fame, p. 219. The translations and other additions within brackets in this quotation are from 
Knowlson himself.
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Feldman  summarises  key  Mauthnerian  propositions  illustrating  Beckett's  position  as 
resting
somewhere  between  Geulincx's  spiritual  tabula  rasa  already  cited  in  discussion  of 
Murphy  – exemplified  by  his  ethical  maxims,  'It  is  a  requirement  of  Humility  to 
compromise its own despicable negation'  (TCD MS 10971/6/13.1) – and Mauthner's 
linguistic scepticism, which paradoxically points toward ineffability over three immense 
volumes of erudition finally signalling that the 'critique of language alone can unlock 
these gates [of truth] and show with friendly resignation that they lead from the world 
and thought into the void.'47
Ineffability  is  the  key  term  in  Feldman's  assessment  of  the  meeting  place  between 
Mauthner and Beckett.  As I have said, Watt is a novel about the realisation that language is 
unfit for purpose and that only by pulling apart its structure can we conceive of something 
greater.  Looking again at Beckett's letter to Axel Kaun we examined in the introduction to 
the thesis the exact nature of this something else is somewhat of an unknown quantity. 
Beckett  says  of  the  writer's  duty  to  question  established  modes  of  understanding  like 
language,
As we cannot eliminate language all at once, we should at least leave nothing undone 
that might contribute to its falling into disrepute.  To bore one hole after another in it, 
until what lurks behind it – be it something or nothing – begins to seep through; I cannot 
imagine a higher goal for a writer today.48
Feldman re-explores a supposedly dead avenue in Beckett's reading of Mauthner, looking 
again to the archive and finding new evidence that conclusively proves he encountered 
Mauthner's  Kritik  (1901-1903) in 1938.  However, rather than arguing this reading is the 
definitive  key in  understanding  Watt  he instead  opts  for  a  far  more  nuanced  position, 
saying
Despite the remarkable correspondences between the two, it would be hasty to conclude 
that a decisive 'turn' in Beckett's approach to literature simply occurred upon reading 
Fritz Mauthner in 1938.  Instead, such an evolving shift in focus had been cultivated 
47 Matthew Feldman, Beckett's Books: A Cultural History of the Interwar Notes (London: Continuum 
International Publishing, 2006), p. 117.
48 Samuel Beckett, 'German Letter of 1937' in Disjecta (London: John Calder, 1983), p. 172.
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through Beckett's reading and notes for more than a decade.49  
As this thesis will attempt to demonstrate Beckett is a writer working with a core set of  
ideas that develop alongside advancements in his thinking which are then reflected in the 
work.  Feldman illustrates this perfectly in the case of Mauthner, calling not for absolutes 
in our conception of Beckett's oeuvre, but rather for a tableau of influence and reflection 
that reifies, yet also evolves as the works progress.  In the case of Watt older assessments 
of the importance of Mauthner take on a new authority once combined with Feldman's 
specific placing of Beckett's reading in '38.  He asserts 
Watt  unmistakeably  betrays  Beckett's  reading  of  the  Kritik.   Here,  [Jennie]  Skerl's 
suggestion 30 years ago remains apt: 'The philosophical background of  Watt  must be 
reevaluated, placing Mauthner in the position of a dominant and informing influence 
whose “critique of language” provides the meaning of Watt's quest, struggle and failure.' 
70 Moreover, Skerl's neglected reading bears reaffirming: Watt is a wholly Mauthnerian 
exercise,  one  largely  recasting  Beckett's  earlier  scepticism and  angst  into  linguistic 
terms;  indeed,  'Watt  could  be seen as  an illustration of  the  inability of  language to 
describe or explain reality and the inevitable failure of one who attempts to know truth 
through language. 71'50
It is this ineffability Feldman stresses and, as he says, once one has acknowledged Watt's  
preoccupation with it then we can see the entire novel as about the crisis this presents.  It is  
a realisation that plagues Watt and one the work shows to be of course endemic.  As Paul 
Stewart emphasizes in Zone of Evaporation: Beckett's Disjunctions 'It is at Knott's house 
and in his service that Watt gradually feels reality to be slipping away from him as he 
desperately attempts to define and know phenomena through language.'51  Throughout the 
rest of the chapter we will look at further examples of the way this is manifested in the 
novel  and  furthermore  if  the  conclusions  it  draws  allow  us  to  agree  with  Feldman's 
admission  that  'the  temptation  to  categorize  Beckett  as  a  Mauthnerian  is  virtually 
irresistible.'52
49 Feldman, p. 145.
50 Ibid., p. 138.
51 Paul Stewart, Zone of Evaporation: Samuel Beckett's Disjunctions (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006), 
p. 72.
52 Feldman, p. 125.
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What we can garner is that despite the direction Watt's revelations take him toward, the 
truth or lack of truth uncovered is something Beckett understood all too well, and sought to 
render explicitly through his character and the book.  Watt was finished during Beckett's 
experience of The Second World War, but it was of course a work harvested from a much 
larger manuscript he had been working on for some years.  Although it would be the end of 
the war and a return to Dublin which would provide the time and location of the author's 
revelation in the storm53, it is clear from this kind of extreme editing (the original  Watt 
notebooks are over fifteen hundred pages long) that Beckett was already approaching a 
point where he saw reduction, the minimal and so forth as essential to his new process. 
This is something we shall explore in greater depth later but as Andrew Gibson writes in 
his essay 'Beckett and Badiou', 'The development of the work from at least Watt onwards 
can be plausibly described as involving a progressive diminution or elimination of artistic 
resources.'54
The Symbiosis of Form and Content
In terms of the protracted composition of Watt though, the novel is dealing with somewhat 
old material for Beckett by the time he completed it.  It is of course a progression from 
Murphy and especially More Pricks Than Kicks, however it is no where near as radical a 
departure from what has come before than the novellas, which we shall explore in the next 
chapter.  This  noted,  it does  not  mean  the  revelation  the  book  addresses  is  any  less 
important.  Indeed, it is an essential part of the process that leads the writer towards his 
53 This is the storm which lead to the already quoted epiphany, we have examined in the introduction. 
Namely that, 'I realised that Joyce had gone as far as one could in the direction of knowing more, [being] in 
control of one’s material.  He was always adding to it; you only have to look at his proofs to see that.  I 
realised my own way was in impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in taking away, in subtracting rather 
than adding.' Damned to Fame, p. 134.
54 Andrew Gibson, 'Beckett and Badiou' in Beckett and Philosophy (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
p. 95.
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later work.  Beckett has always stressed that in order for a work to reach its full potential it 
had to use form and content in a symbiotic manner, each working for the other.  This can 
be manifested in several ways, from an illustrative relationship to a method in which the 
two  are  oppositional  and  their  divergence  creates  new  meaning  altogether.   The 
experimentation  of  Beckett's  previous  two  novels  has  been  well  documented,  and  in 
particular Dream of Fair to Middling Women  had a distinctly Joycean approach to form in 
the way it shifted with great frequency between various technical and stylistic devices. 
However, it is with Watt that we see the first committed attempt at making form work for 
the content and also be exemplary of the meaning the work is trying to instil.
Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of formal innovation within Watt is through the 
various ways the book overtly plays upon its  own technical devices.   Unlike the early 
modernists Beckett is not experimentally “breaking ground” and already has an immediate 
history of radical formal innovation to draw from and react against.55 It is because of this 
history that Watt's refusal to take pains to suspend reader disbelief and attempt to create a 
bubble of artificiality for the work to exist within seems almost de rigueur.  Considering 
the two previous novels Beckett had completed we take it as read that Watt will work, in 
everything from the knowing mode of narration, through to the characters and the settings 
of the work, at declaring itself a book and nothing more.  Even a cursory survey of the 
novel's  structure  shows  us  two  framing  chapters  that  enclose  the  abstracted,  wilfully 
artificial story of Watt.  This wrapping of a traditional mode such as social comedy around 
55 An emblematic example of the kind of rupture in established literary modes I refer to here would be the 
development of the stream-of-consciousness first-person mode of narration.  This was developed by many 
writers of the early twentieth century, including Virginia Woolf in Mrs Dalloway, but perhaps the most 
famous examples come from James Joyce's Ulysses.  One could easily choose paradigmatic passages from 
Leopold Bloom or Stephen Dedalus, but the oft-quoted ending of the novel, in which we are offered passage 
inside the mind of Molly Bloom is an excellent example of the stylistic experimentation Beckett tries to 
follow.  Joyce concludes his novel with '…shall I wear a red rose yes and how he kissed me under the 
Moorish wall and I thought well as well him as another and then I asked him with my eyes to ask again yes 
and then he asked me would I yes to day yes my mountain flower and first I put my arms around him yes and 
drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I 
said yes I will Yes.' James Joyce, Ulysses (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 732.    
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an equally artificial core of work helps to illustrate what we will look at in greater depth 
later,  namely that despite their  apparently variable levels of realism these forms are in 
essence both just examples of the distance fiction sits from anything fixed, truthful or real 
about the world.56  In addition to this we also have the addenda at the close of the book. 
This material is a joke about the idea of a coda to what has just occurred, something that 
can centre and give definition to the ambiguities of the story.  It is of course merely another 
set  of questions for any of the answers one may discern in its pages.  Furthermore its 
appearance and the footnote, 'The following precious and illuminating material should be 
carefully studied.  Only fatigue and disgust prevented its incorporation.' (WA, p. 373.), suggest 
Watt is deliberately unfinished.  It is a fragmentary piece that, like many twentieth century 
works is designed to feel it could go on indefinitely.  This is something we shall return to 
later in the chapter when looking at Kafka's The Castle (1926).
The  effect  of  these  choices  of  narration  is  a  general  unsettling  of  modes  and  ideas 
fundamental to what we collectively understand by “the novel.”57  Rather than trying to 
proffer the illusion of reality,  attain the suspension of disbelief  and assert  an objective 
power in the writer-reader relationship, Watt willingly undermines these, the novel being a 
series of fragments and powerless, subjective narratives.  Collectively these point towards 
the content of the work: that truth, a fixed and unfaltering message explaining even the 
smallest  aspect  of  existence  is  impossible,  and  the  world  is  in  fact  ineffable.   More 
specifically in terms of content there are various examples that can be broadly brought 
under an “antifictional” banner.  This is to say that in their execution they purposefully 
56 Stephen Connor argues in Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory and Text that following on from Murphy 
this opening chapter of Watt is so much in the vein of the former work that it is almost a “writing out” 
necessary before Beckett can take on the new mode Watt consists of in the main.
57 Again it is wilfully ignorant to argue there are a shared set of assumptions that work as a base for all 
examples of the novel written in the English language.  However, as true as this is, there are still a number of 
aspects of prose writing we can identify as being, by virtue of their frequent reappearances, central to a 
shared understanding of what one may expect from a novel.  It is these safe assumptions that Beckett most 
often undermines through the aspects I go on to cite.
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disrupt the fictional pretences that the novel suggests and to a limited extent works within. 
For example, we can look at an early part of the novel after Watt has departed the train and 
is on his way to Knott’s.  We find him resting in a ditch, fatigued and ill, and listening to a 
choir in the distance.  He recounts, not by way of text alone, but by insertion of musical 
notation, the entire song he heard.  The inclusion of not just the lyrics to the song, but also 
the accompanying music can best be described as purposefully unnecessary.  There is a 
similar incident further on when Watt recalls the croaking made by some frogs.  In that 
case the recounting is even more banal and adds less to the unfolding of the book than does 
the choir.  These examples are sabotage of fiction.  They disrupt not only our expectations 
of what a book should seek to accomplish and the message or meaning to be derived from 
it,  but  also  in  a  wider  context  the  very notion  of  fixed  truth  itself.   Seen as  isolated 
examples the effect  of these devices  may be debatable to the extent I  have suggested. 
However, as we shall see (especially in the books to come) Beckett’s work is a tapestry of 
meaning.   Pulling  out  individual  examples  often  leaves  their  meaning  illusory  or 
unconvincing, but when placed together with the rest of the text one can ascertain a much 
greater understanding of the accumulative effect the novel reaches.  
John Pilling makes a very interesting point regarding the place of time within this snowball 
effect:
For Watt, Molloy, Moran, Malone, time has become more of a continuum, a kind of 
vacuum in  which  incidents  occasionally  happen,  but  so  rarely  that  they  cannot  be 
satisfactorily related one to another.  It  is as if time has been lengthened; events of 
accepted importance happen with greater infrequency, throwing emphasis on events of 
lesser importance.58
Those things we hold as most fixed and tangible in a novel, such as the importance of 
event are destabilised.  Time becomes unstuck and whilst the novel follows a relatively 
linear path, it jumps from one moment in time to another, without an attempt being made 
58 John Pilling, Samuel Beckett (London: Routledge, 1976), p. 30.
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to situate  the reader.  The events we focus upon are,  as Pilling notes,  those one would 
expect  to  be of  the  least  importance,  elevated  to  a  position  of  dominance.   The most 
notable of examples is surely that of the piano tuners who visit Mr. Knott's house whilst 
Watt is working there.  In this episode Watt plays host to the father and son Gall, who 'are 
come, what is more, all the way from town, to choon the piano.' (WA, p. 223.)  Watt is surprised 
to find on returning to the piano room with a tray of refreshments that the elder, blind 
piano  tuner  is  standing  in  the  middle  of  the  room,  whilst  the  son  sits  at  the  piano 
undertaking the task at hand.  Sam describes this as 'perhaps the principal incident of Watt's 
early days in Mr. Knott's house.' (WA, p. 225.)  The only indication that this incident is of greater 
significance  than  is  suggested  by  the  bareness  of  the  prose  is  the  following  dialogue 
between the tuners:
The piano is doomed, in my opinion, said the younger.
The piano-tuner also, said the elder.
The pianist also, said the younger. (WA, p. 225.)
And yet, even this teasingly symbolic dialogue is so at odds with the detached, plain prose 
that it becomes almost comic; lines rehearsed for another book, that instead of containing 
subtextual meaning are again merely folded into the fabric of play and meaninglessness 
Watt  addresses.  In the chapter of his book which explores the comic within  Watt  Paul 
Stewart notes that
It  is  not that the comic undermines the more philosophical  possibilities...  but rather 
there is an aligning of the comic with the philosophical, an amalgam of the profound 
and the inane, a knotting of these two strands.59
This example of the piano tuners seems to be emblematic of this recontextualising of the 
philosophical as comic and vice-versa.  It is the principle incident of Watt's time at the 
house as it is essentially a meaningless encounter, with all the promise of fulfilment.  Not 
only in the sense of the small false expectation the blind tuner will be working at the piano, 
but  also  their  overly  dramatic  dialogue,  which  is  invested  with  a  false  gravitas  that 
59 Paul Stewart, p. 74.
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becomes in its meaninglessness comic, as Stewart suggests.  It is another example of the 
effect  Knott's  house  has  on  Watt,  the  unravelling  of  his  already  fragile  mind  by  the 
reinforcement he knows nothing and cannot ever know anything.
Further to this are the more explicitly metafictional elements of the book.  Not only is Watt  
self-destructive through the range of devices it employs, but it is also highly self-aware, 
again using form and content together to shatter the illusion of a self-contained fictional 
world.  As early as the first few pages a footnote indicates ‘Much valuable space has been 
saved, in this work, that would otherwise have been lost, by avoidance of the plethoric 
reflexive pronoun after say.' (WA, p. 172.)  Firstly, the inclusion of a footnote is relevant because 
like the examples we have looked at already, it displaces the fictional context of the novel 
form and brings in a type of reference usually reserved for non-fictional work.  Then the 
content of the footnote, which refers to 'this work', immediately shattering the fictional 
bubble and drawing attention to the artifice of the work.  Another key example in this 
regard are some of the typographical anomalies which plague the novel.  At many points 
there will simply be a question mark where the next part of the story should have been. 
These  gaps  in  the  manuscript  occur  sporadically  and  of  course  declare  themselves  as 
fiction even more so than the regular text of the book.  We can see in an example from 
around two thirds of the way through Watt that Beckett is in fact flagrant about the way this 
supposed intervention into the illusion of reality disrupts fictional pretence.  Rather than 
just the single question mark we have seen before, on this occasion we have four question 
marks over two lines and arranged in a pattern for no reason other than to play upon the 
concepts of “created reality” and “fictional truth”.  These oxymoronic terms are indicative 
of  the  language  one  is  forced  into  using  when  describing  the  effect  Beckett's  formal 
devices have.  
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On  a  wider  level,  by  the  sheer  wealth  of  material  we  are  dealing  with  these  formal 
innovations suggest that the very act of trying to comprehend and explain the world is to 
create  or  falsify  reality.   In  this  way  it  could  be  argued  the  book  is  in  fact  proto-
deconstructionist in methodology, as rather than posit a new equally artificial means to 
make sense of existence, its final position is illustrative in revealing all truth to be fictional. 
Here Mauthner again seems relevant.  Feldman addresses truth very directly when he notes 
of  Mauthner's  philosophy  'Put  simply,  language  is  intrinsically  metaphorical,  and  in 
consequence  cannot  describe  experiences  or  states  of  affairs  with  accuracy;  that  is, 
language is capable of saying nothing about lived experience, but only about itself.'60  By 
making even the idea of the manuscript Sam is writing an object to be incorporated into the 
frivolity of fictional pretence Beckett is completely availing himself of any responsibility 
to the layering of objective realities within the text.  Paul Stewart notes this process is part 
of what he calls “narrative disjunctions”, which is to say the various techniques of the 
novel that seem to offer narrative fulfilment, only to deny the reader any certainty.  He 
argues that Sam as narrator is part of a destabilising hierarchy that rises right the way up to 
the historical figure of Beckett himself:
However, the presence of Sam as narrator increases throughout the novel, until he is 
finally revealed in the third chapter, thereby complicating any simple identification of 
the narrative voice with that of the author, Beckett.61
  
One  can  see  that  in  Watt  all  areas,  even  those  he  initially  creates  as  hierarchically 
emboldening a greater degree of truth than another will become equally valid for play.
In addition to these metafictional elements of the novel we also have the heavily featured 
possibility lists.62  These were also present in Murphy but are taken much further in Watt, 
60 Feldman, p. 139.
61 Paul Stewart, p. 85. 
62 These 'possibility lists' as I have labelled them are a collective term for the parts of Beckett's novels in 
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with an appearance almost every few pages.  Of all the technical innovations the novel 
employs these are surely the most notable due to both their audaciousness and their ability 
to frustrate.   An early example of this  listing occurs when Watt first arrives at Knott’s 
house and is perplexed by the back door suddenly being open.  The narrator recounts that 
Watt was surprised to find the back door, so lately locked, now open.  Two explanations 
of this occurred to him.  The first was this, that his science of the locked door, so seldom 
at fault, had been so on this occasion, and that the back door, when he had found it 
locked, had in effect been locked, but had subsequently been opened, from within, or 
without, by some person, while he Watt had been employed in going, to and fro, from 
the back to the front door, and from the front door to the back door. (WA, p. 197.)
This, one of the first occurrences, is relatively brief in comparison to the possibility lists 
we find further into the novel.  Towards the end of Watt these lists become a real disruption 
to  the  book's  progress,  often  spanning  several  pages  and  filled  with  repetitive  and 
sometimes redundant content.63  We have for example in Arthur’s telling of the story of Mr 
Louit  and  the  supposedly  mathematically  savant  Mr  Nackybal  the  exchange  of  looks 
between members of the university board, which over several pages traces the minutiae of 
their crossed glances.  Perhaps the pinnacle of the device, in terms of absolute redundancy 
to  the semblance  of  plot  the  novel  engenders  occurs  later  when the  narrator  describes 
firstly Mr. Knott’s movement in his room and then the re-arrangement of furniture within 
said room.  If we take merely a few lines from this part of the book the effect of these lists  
is clear enough: ‘…from the bed to the window; from the window to the bed; from the bed 
to the fire; from the fire to the door; from the door to the fire.'  (WA, p. 335.) and so forth.  In 
Saying I  No More  Daniel  Katz defines  his  own reading as encompassing some of  the 
elements we have already discussed, but as being primarily concerned with the role of the 
which he examines a usually very simple or trivial proposition through an examination of its constituent 
elements.  They are not a uniformly homogeneous group and they address a variety of subjects through 
differing level of exhaustiveness, however they are bound by the way they disrupt the text, usually presenting 
the reader with purposefully banal and repetitive detail one would expect to be summarised.  Again, there is 
variety in their purpose, but they are broadly aimed at a mocking of systems that would seek to explain and 
understand the world through fixed structures, such as language.
63 This is a claim that one hesitates to make, and does not in any way constitute a criticism of Watt.  The 
device is of course designed to create an overly repetitive effect, and one which frustrates and undermines 
reader expectation in equal measure.
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individual within the world. He argues,
The book is neither a simple critique of Cartesian “rationalism” nor an anthropological 
inquiry into cultural practice, patriarchy, and the foundation of law, but rather an attempt 
to think subjectivity as ritual, ritual as method, and method as neurosis, in a chain which 
would refuse to label neurosis as simply a rhetorical response to desire.64
   
If  we  look  at  these  previous  examples  from  Katz's  perspective  we  can  see  in  these 
possibility  lists  attempts  to  try  and  understand  one's  own  existence  by  processing 
experiences in a rigorous and methodological manner.  The chain he mentions is interesting 
because it suggests a process that explains the seemingly arbitrary acts Watt, Knott and 
some of the other characters engage in and a final, psychological manifestation that he is 
keen for  us  not  to  dismiss.   The  neurosis  comes  from an awareness  we have  already 
discussed, that of an absence of meaning that seems to become, for Watt, more and more 
pervasive in his thought and actions as the novel progresses.  Katz articulates this whilst 
looking at the example of the piano tuners, which we have already touched upon. He notes 
that:
Thus, the general process for which the Galls provide the model and which is also the 
model for most processes generally undertaken by Watt, might be called gallicization – 
that is, the need to foist a meaning where there is none through the creation of a ritual 
narrative.65
We can see then that the neurosis that manifests itself, that indeed pushes Watt towards Mr. 
Knott's house, before pushing him into an asylum and seemingly breaking his mind and 
body is born from an awareness that a final, complete knowledge of even the smallest  
aspect of one's existence is an impossibility.  In Watt the process is seen through the prism 
of agency, as in the actions these characters try and complete to assert meaning to their  
subjectivity.  It is also mirrored in the language which in its repetitions describes these and 
forms the content of the book.
64 Daniel Katz, p. 49.
65 Ibid., p. 58.
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Again one is reminded of Mauthner and a note Beckett took on the Kritik.  He says 
I would like to hold on to the basic idea of this book.  It raises the question whether a 
language is more or less suited to allow its speaker to recognise the world.  On this 
point, of course all the results of comparative linguistics sink to the level of a game 
children play with coloured pebbles.66
As I have tried to show, Watt can often feel very prescient of poststructuralist concerns and 
nowhere  is  this  more  evident  than  in  the  reaction  to  the  inadequacies  of  language. 
Language's  sacrosanct  state  is  undermined,  not  with  rhetoric,  but  with  the  kind  of 
deconstructionist play we shall examine as key to later Beckett works.  How far this goes 
and how far we are willing to take it is open to debate.  Paul Stewart suggests that
By so  straining  the  language  through comic  disjunction  and  displacement,  there  is, 
perhaps, an brief glimpse of the joyous horror which lies beyond language and beyond 
life; that indefinable something which may be indefinable nothing. Through the comic, 
Watt may almost succeed in effing the ineffable.67
This may perhaps be a step too far. The suggestion that in Watt's method Beckett manages 
to go beyond language as it were is appealing, but most likely stretching the scope of the 
book's  achievement.   It  seems  to  me  that  what  is  poststructuralist  about  Watt  is  the 
relentlessness of the attempts to break down and show as hollow the very idea of meaning 
through  language.   To  then  go  further  and  say  that  it  manages  to  begin  articulating 
something beyond language is an exaggeration at this point, but something which we shall 
examine in later chapters as the works develop and evolve.  
These  possibility lists  share  the  same characteristics  in  a  focus  on  banal,  unnecessary 
information, a commitment to unrelenting thoroughness of eliminating possibilities and of 
course their collective effect which is usually a halt to any sort of momentum the story had 
been  building.   Stephen  Connor  in  a  somewhat  ironic  fashion  actually  formalises  the 
varying  forms  of  these  possibility  lists,  noting  that  on  the  one  hand  there  are  finite 
66 Feldman, p. 141.
67 Paul Stewart, p. 96.
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permutations, in which the number of possibilities is  restricted: 'structure predominates 
over sequence'68, and then those which allows limitless possibilities (such as the sequence 
of servants in Knott's house) or Arsene's 'praise of the earth, which has been his mother and 
his father's and his mother's mother's...'69  Here 'sequence asserts itself beyond the control 
of structure.'70  Connor suggests that what this leads to is a novel that seems impossible to 
enclose or finish  as is suggested by Beckett's use of the addenda section.
These  lists  consciously  or  unconsciously  echo  a  similar  device  found  in  Kafka's  The 
Castle.  In Kafka's novel, K, the protagonist, is an Everyman who we follow into deeper 
and deeper spheres of confusion as he tries to understand and live on the fringes of the 
castle.  In the following quotation we find K discussing his situation with one of the many 
bureaucrats who make up the administration of the castle and the village:
'Oh, Superintendent,' said K., 'now again you're taking far too simple a view of the case. 
I'll enumerate for your benefit a few of the things that keep me here: the sacrifice I made 
in leaving my home, the long and difficult journey, the well-grounded hopes I built on 
my engagement here, my complete lack of means, the impossibility after this of finding 
some other suitable job at home, and last but not least my fiancée, who lives here.'71 
In The Castle  there are many examples like this where K will separate his problems into 
their  constituent  parts,  addressing  his  interlocutor  and the  reader  simultaneously.   The 
effect  though is  an emphasis  of  the  relative simplicity we find  in  understanding these 
situations, in contrast to the ever spiralling maelstrom of bureaucracy and misinformation 
that greets K at every juncture.  This opposition of the intelligible and the unintelligible 
does not exist in  Watt.  Rather, the protagonist has fallen victim to the world.  From the 
very start  he mirrors  the unknowability and attendant  confusion of  the world with the 
symptoms  he  displays  of  this  condition  worsening  as  the  chronology  of  the  novel 
68 Connor, p. 31.
69 Ibid., p. 30.
70 Ibid., p. 31.
71 Franz Kafka, The Castle (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 75.
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progresses.   For  Beckett  intelligibility  is  non-existent.   He does  not  even  tolerate  the 
illusion and instead has Watt as a different kind of Everyman;  an Everyman representative 
of  the  true  state  in  which  we live,  unable  to  transcend  the  limitations  of  our  meagre 
understanding and disabled by this, whether we realise it or not.  This is to say we are all 
Watt in the sense we have all been failed by the systems that profess to enclose and explain 
the world.  We may not suffer the tragic effects this dawning awareness has on Watt, but 
we are all hampered from attaining any sort of truth whilst we approach the world through 
the tools of language and structure these early novels seek to disarm of power.
A Response to Logical Positivism?
As stated earlier  Watt  is an exercise in illustration.  Beckett rarely approaches a didactic 
register throughout the novels and despite the emergence of the “Beckett and philosophy” 
field of studies the appearance of a direct reference to a specific writer or argument are 
noteworthy due to their infrequency.  Beckett instead uses a method in which the choices 
he  makes  over  everything from character,  narrative  presentation  to  generic  convention 
work to illustrate the novel's response to fundamental ideas of how we interpret the world, 
and the philosophical traditions that have shaped that interpretation.  These possibility lists 
are  one  of  the  strongest  examples  within  the  tapestry  of  effect  that  is  created  and 
demonstrate the dawning epiphany that the multifarious ways we interpret the world are 
equally and irreparably flawed by their  shared  base.   However,  it  is  also within these 
possibility lists we can see the strongest evidence of a charge often aimed specifically at 
Beckett’s third novel; namely, that it is specifically a critique of logical positivism.  This 
now marginalised philosophical movement originated in the nineteen-twenties and thirties 
through a group of thinkers known as the Vienna circle, who formulated a new doctrine in 
opposition  to  metaphysics.   Oswald  Hanfling  summarises  the  foundations  of  the 
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philosophy  by  describing  the  fundamental  belief  that  'all  genuine  questions  must  be 
capable  of  scientific  treatment,  and  all  genuine  knowledge  part  of  a  single  system of 
science.'72  Indeed,  logical  positivism was  the  name  coined,  but  many,  including  key 
proponent Rudolf Carnap, preferred the term 'logical empiricism' due to the more central 
emphasis this placed on observable phenomena.  The backbone of the movement was the 
verification theory of meaning 'according to which the meaning of a proposition is the 
method of its verification.'73  In this sense then abstracted terms or that in language which 
does not have observable, tangible links to “the real world” are dismissed as nonsensical 
and  the  meaning  of  something  is  entirely  dependent  on  its  ability  to  be  verified  by 
scientific methodology.  This notion was borrowed and modified from Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus  (1921), a work whose author the movement would come to be associated 
with despite his minor, fringe involvement.  In later years Ludwig Wittgenstein would in 
fact distance himself from the movement, unhappy not only with its inflexibility, but also 
with the arrogant, self-righteous manner it asserted itself as the solution to the problem of 
metaphysics.
For its claim to provide a solution to the problems of metaphysical speculation alone one 
can see why Beckett would take an interest in the movement and of course, as we have 
seen thus far, his scepticism was increased by its reliance on formulations based around 
empirical observation.  In his book Samuel Beckett: A New Approach, G.C. Bernard notes 
the history of critics who have seen Beckett's novel specifically in this light, writing 'some 
readings of Watt tend to see it as an expression of the failure of logical positivism, or as an 
exploration of the implications of the structuralist  tenet that  reality is  linguistic.'74  He 
draws specifically from Levy citing the following key idea: 'Watt's predicament as a kind 
72 Oswald Hanfling, Logical Positivism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), p. 2.
73 Hanfling, p. 4.
74 G.C. Bernard, Samuel Beckett: A New Approach (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1970), p. 91.
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of post-structuralist yearning for a place where naive faith in the power of language to 
explain  external  phenomenon  can  once  more  be  satisfied.'75  The  concurrence  with 
Feldman's suggestion of Beckett as a Mauthnerian is again apparent.  As I have suggested 
the completion of the book was long after Beckett's dispensing with the kind of structural 
model logical positivism is an example of, but as Levy notes the author is still wounded 
from the realisation.  He has Watt unable to find a solution to fill the vacuum left by their 
failure and hopelessly turning backwards, seeking resolution where none exists.  Of course 
logical  positivism is  a  movement  that  has  been  in  decline  for  many decades,  but  for 
Beckett one can see why this type of contemporary solution would frustrate him.  Watt is 
therefore distinct from  Dream  and  Murphy, which are often critical of the metaphysical 
tradition and yet operate within a type of reverent mode towards the thinking that shaped 
Beckett’s own.  In Watt he expresses just how scornful he is of a movement which would 
attempt to replace the failures in metaphysics with a regressive empiricism.  Returning to 
the text, it is these possibility lists which would seem to be the kind of aspect that has lead 
critics to focus upon logical positivism as the novel's most direct critique.  They operate as 
pastiche, or more specifically a gentle ribbing of the idea that linguistics and logic, that 
eliminating numeric possibilities can be an effective way to ascertain truth.  By applying 
these stringent methods to the mundane, to that which does not demand attention or that 
which is base and crude Beckett signals his intent.  Watt  is an exercise in scepticism; its 
playful nature is in fact a grim plea for a form which does not assume the hierarchical 
power of language, mathematics, dry logic and empirical observation.  This is, as its core, 
the driving force of the book.  Although it will be in subsequent works Beckett truly forges 
his own means of writing within the chaos of understanding, this work is the declaration of 
dissatisfaction; the rendering of a moment in which what has come before is over and over 
berated for its insufficiency and inaccuracy.  As we have said, the completion of Watt was a 
75 Bernard, p. 91.
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process of extreme editing rather than addition.  Beckett turned what could have been a 
sprawling  epic  into  something  altogether  more  simple  and  emblematic  of  the  central 
realisation which allows him to move into new fertile territory in the future.
It is therefore a process of replacement we see repeated in the novel.  Watt and indeed the 
reader  are  again  and  again  confronted  with  the  failure  of  logic  and  structure  and  the 
subsequent surfacing of unknowability.  As John Keller writes ‘Central to the book is the 
‘unknowability’  of  Knott,  and  ‘unknowability’  permeates  the  work  itself,  creating 
confusion within the reader that reflects  the emotional and cognitive state  of the main 
character.’76  Keller highlights the way Watt, and vicariously the reader, are assaulted by 
this expanse of unknowability: an absence of  answers, a mocking of the systems that try to 
fix  the  world  in  place  and  the  meaninglessness  of  that  which  is  observable.   James 
Williams writes that 'in noting a repeated pattern of signs the structuralist scientist hopes to 
arrive at some secure understanding.'77  This could be a description of  Watt's possibility 
lists.   They  express  the  satirical  imitation  of  logical  positivism  that  comes  from  the 
frustration over the limitations of structural philosophy. 
Watt's stay at Mr. Knott's is a constant barrage of reaffirmation.  At every juncture he faces 
absurd logic, events that defy meaning, hidden answers and hidden questions.  Watt faces 
this unintelligibility head-on, expecting nothing more from the world.  We can see this in 
his  decision  to  simply sit  and listen  to  Arsene's  speech when he  arrives  at  the  house. 
Throughout this thirty page spiel of sometimes unintelligible advice (prefaced by the wry 
comment 'Before leaving he made the following short statement.' (WA, p. 199.)) our protagonist 
remains  the  perpetual  observer,  disinclined  to  intercede  and  question  the  manner  of 
76 John Keller, Samuel Beckett and the Primacy of Love (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 
90.
77 James Williams, Understanding Poststructuralism (Chesham: Acumen, 2005), p. 2.
71
meaning in Arsene's  “short  statement”.   Of the information revealed one of the pieces 
emblematic  of  the  absurd  logic  which  governs  the  world  of  Mr.  Knott's  house  is  the 
description of the rotational method of employment within it.  As we will have confirmed 
later the house always has three occupants: 'the master, whom as you well know we call  
Mr. Knott; a senior retainer named Vincent, I believe; and a junior, only in the sense that he 
was of more recent acquisition, named, if I am not mistaken, Walter.' (WA, p. 213.)  Arsene 
then explains that Mr. Knott is fixed and permanent, whilst the two employees will be 
rotated,  with the new arrival  heralding both the leaving of  the senior  retainer  and the 
promotion  of  the  junior  retainer  to  the  senior  post.   This  process  seemingly  has  no 
authoritative basis in that Mr. Knott does not dismiss or hire anyone.  Indeed, there is no 
discussion at all of money or employment between Knott and his “retainers” as they are 
called.  It is as if the men are simply drawn to the house, to consume some time and then 
with the arrival of a new resident they willingly leave, understanding their time is up.  In 
examples such as these Beckett is striking blows against comfortable notions of structure; 
of a world which ideas such as the verifiability principle could encompass and explain. 
Mauthner refutes the ambition of this kind of philosophy arguing that all philosophy can 
aspire to is language criticism.  On the other hand the arbitrary logic of Watt's world is a 
pastiche of the incomplete methods we have to comprehend the world, and yet it is not a 
dismissal of the notion of comprehension in its entirety.  Beckett is sceptical, but he is not 
dismissive.  Like the deconstruction movement to come the work seems to suggest that 
through the method of dismantling established structure a defogging of the glass through 
which we view the world can be achieved.  The book does not offer answers, but through 
its method a direction can be ascertained.  Beckett's later works will vastly expand upon 
these notions, but Watt is the first to move into these areas and show the path to follow.
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Philosophy as a Physical Concern
Examples such as this litter the work.  In the description of the disposal of Mr. Knott's 
unwanted food we are given the story of the dog employed to undertake the task and the 
brutal family history of Art and Con, the two men who own the animal.  Kate, as the dog 
has been named, is the sixth Kate employed for that purpose and again in the precision of 
the  system used for  ensuring  the  trivial  task  of  disposing  Mr.  Knott's  food we find  a 
mocking of logic, its attention turned towards something cruel, pointless and based on a 
wish we are never even sure Mr. Knott has expressed.  Beckett lowers logic into the grime 
of the world, and does not allow it to be clean in the way it needs to be in order to function. 
Instead  it  is  forced  to  face the  ways it  misunderstands the  universe and only partially 
recognises how things work.  In the end this confirmation of the failure of any system, 
metaphysical or otherwise turns Watt into a creature plagued by their insufficiencies.  Sam 
describes the way he and Watt met, interned within different wings of a psychiatric hospital 
and  exchanging  conversation  in  the  garden  when  their  differing  tastes  in  weather 
overlapped.  By this stage Watt has drifted even further from his flimsy hold on patterns of 
behaviour, language, and interaction than when he left Mr. Knott's house.  Sam is forced to 
translate Watt's speech from the various inverted forms it takes.  Furthermore, Watt has 
taken  to  dressing  himself  back-to-front  and  walking  backwards  everywhere.   He  has 
become a reversed man, not so much holding a new faith over systems made opposite, but 
rather broken by his awareness of an incomprehensible world and the time spent thinking 
he understood it.
Indeed, all of the characters within Watt's world seem broken in one way or another.  In  
most  this  spiritual  or  emotional  disintegration is  mirrored in  physical  deformity.   This 
aspect of Watt bleeds from the central chapters of the novel out into the framing device of 
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the opening and closing.  Mr Hackett is the first figure we encounter and one could be 
forgiven for thinking they are encountering the novel's protagonist,  characterised in the 
archetypal Beckettian manner, by his agitated walk and poor health.  However, if Hackett 
has a strange manner of progression then Watt himself must have a series of movements 
that trumps this.  Early on Beckett takes time to describe
Watt's way of advancing due east, for example, was to turn his bust as far as possible 
towards  the earth and at  the same time to fling out  his  right  leg as  far  as  possible 
towards the south, and then to turn his bust as far as possible towards the south and at 
the same time to fling out his left leg as far as possible towards the north, and so on, 
over and over again, many many times, until he reached his destination, and could sit 
down. (WA, p. 191.)
This incredibly protracted way of walking is, as we shall find out later, not unusual for 
Watt  and  seemingly  a  reflection  of  the  mental  preoccupations  of  his  character.   The 
question of choice is not addressed but if we look to the scenes of Watt and Sam in the 
garden it seems that the former is often unaware of the strange way his speech has mutated. 
Even if  he is  aware that turning around and walking forwards would stop him hurting 
himself or, in this example we are looking at, that to walk normally would allow him to 
reach his destination much more efficiently, it is as if he is compelled to move in this way. 
One gets the sense that the hopeless search for a halt to the awareness deteriorating his 
faith in the possibility of action within the world has manifested itself physically.   So, for 
Watt,  it  is not a question of choice in his walking this way, but rather he simply must. 
Watt's despair at never being able to fully trust his understanding of the world means that 
even the empirical assumption he could perambulate normally is laced with uncertainty. 
Watt is a tragicomedy of a man broken by his awareness of unknowability.  The weight of 
it ensures his most basic assumptions, to the extent of his ability to walk in a straight line,  
one foot in front of another, pain him.
Watt is not an abstract vehicle for indulgent philosophical questioning.  It attempts to show 
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that these issues effect the most real and tangible of our interactions and we can see this 
reinforced at every stage of the novel.  Directly after leaving the train station Watt, first 
assaulted by Lady Mcann, feels weak and takes refuge in a ditch beside the road.  There is 
no direct reflection but here he vomits before moving on.  It is as if the crumbling of his 
mind is being matched by his body.  This base physicality of his character is described on 
several occasions with one of the most notable examples coming later in the novel in the 
lengthy description of the preparation of Mr. Knott's food.  The description of the cooking 
suggests something of Watt is passing directly into Mr. Knott:
This was a task that taxed Watt's powers, both of mind and body, to the utmost, it was so 
delicate, and rude.  And in warm weather it sometimes happened, as he mixed, stripped 
to the waist, and plying with both hands the great iron rod, that tears would fall, tears of 
mental fatigue, from his face, into the pot, and from his chest, and out from under his 
arms, beads of moisture, provoked by his exertions, into the pot also. (WA, p. 238.)
Beckett's novel consistently creates this mirroring of the physical and the mental.  At times 
it seems he is simply reinforcing the idea that the metaphysical degeneration the novel 
addresses is as real and worrying as the physical deterioration it sits alongside.  The most 
extended example of the detailing of physicality and the more base aspects of life surely 
comes in the form of Art and Con's family, the Lynches.  If we are just to take a small  
section from the description we find in the novel one can see a pattern emerging:
There  was  Tom Lynch,  widower,  aged  eighty-five  years,  confined  to  his  bed  with 
constant undiagnosed pains in the caecum, and his three surviving boys Joe, aged sixty-
five years, a rheumatic cripple, and Jim, aged sixty-four years, a hunchback inebriate, 
and Bill, widower, aged sixty-three years, greatly hampered in his movements by the 
loss of both legs as the result of a slip... (WA, p. 249.)
This listing of each family member and their respective ailments does not suggest everyone 
is aware of the crisis of confidence that has befallen Watt, but rather that this inability to 
know anything assuredly is fundamental to all and in the world of the novel has found 
expression through their physicality.  
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Returning to Watt's preparation of Knott's food and his entering Knott's body through his 
sweat, one can again see a physical expression of a philosophical concern.  Beckett has 
Watt physicalise the central question of the novel their relationship represents.  Watt is of 
course representative of a general “what?”, an asking not of the “big questions”, but the 
possibilities of asking these questions in the first place.  Throughout this he will be faced 
with the impenetrable wall of Mr. Knott's “not”.  Again and again Watt will search for the 
possibility of structure, of meaning to the chaos of existence and the answer will ring out 
the same.  Beckett makes this physical in the episode with Watt's sweat entering Knott's  
body.  As always it will be indifference that meets Watt's plea.  Despite the variety in these 
physical episodes the illustrative point is the same.  There is the tragedy of Watt in the 
incapability of unknowability which finally breaks him, physically and mentally.   Then 
there is the broader finality of the fact we must all live in a perpetual state of ignorance for 
as  long  as  we  seek  definitive  answers  using  the  structures  of  language  and  accepted 
philosophy that have failed us.  In the novel Beckett has these physical spread out from 
Watt as an endemic condition we all must face and suggests that if we are to insist on futile  
attempts at totalising systems of knowledge we may as well focus them open the sweat, the 
stink and the infirmities of the body.
 
Religion as Replacement Metaphysics
If Watt can find no solace in the possibility of structure he equally finds none in the idea of  
religion as replacement.  This novel is Beckett's most explicit in terms of its critiquing of 
religion.  This is not pursued in a straightforward, descriptive way; no doubt something 
Beckett would have found distasteful or clichéd.  Rather it is achieved via the techniques of 
allegory and allusion.  Watt as a novel is not whole-heartedly committed to either of these, 
but at various points it does aim a barb at religion, signalling that the absence of meaning is 
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not a space to be filled with faith, but often showing the journey for salvation to be as 
fraught with difficulties as any other.   In the broadest sense this can be seen in Watt's 
journey to Knott, which many have recognised as a kind of existential pilgrimage.78  This 
journey is done for the sake of Watt's salvation, for the hope that at the end of it he can find 
a greater connection to the system governing the world.  One can see the similarities to a 
religious pilgrimage, but of course for Watt there is the difference in that he has already, to 
a degree, convinced himself of the absence of meaning and to the futility of his journey.  
When Watt and Sam later meet in the garden, there is a distinctly biblical feeling to the 
events.  Firstly, the setting is important.  Beckett chooses to have Watt and Sam meet in the 
expansive garden of the institute they occupy.  The author is of course aware that any 
mention of a garden within a work of fiction has certain connotations, but it is the activities 
the two engage in that confirms the allusion.  Sam describes their interactions with the 
animals of the garden:
Birds of every kind abounded, and these it was our delight to pursue, with stones and 
clods of earth.  Robins, in particular,  thanks to their  confidingness, we destroyed in 
great numbers.  And larks' nests, laden with eggs still warm from the mother's breast, we 
ground into  fragments,  under  our  feet,  with  peculiar  satisfaction,  at  the  appropriate 
season, of the year. (WA, p. 294.)
Sam then goes on to describe how he and Watt would take small pieces of food, birds' eggs 
and small  animals and feed them to the rats  of the garden.  He ends by recalling this 
particular act of cruelty:
Or seizing suddenly a plump young rat, resting in our bosom after its repast, we would 
feed it to its mother, or its father, or its brother, or its sister, or to some less fortunate 
relative.  It was on these occasions, we agreed, after an exchange of views, that we came 
closest to God. (WA, p. 295.)
Firstly,  the  tone  of  these  sections  is  important.   Much like  in  Murphy  Beckett  enjoys 
subverting reader  response with a  disjunction of  tone and content.   An event,  like the 
78 In Samuel Beckett and the Primacy of Love John Keller notes that Watt's pilgrimage yields no salvation, 
but only 'the impossibility of knowledge.' Keller, p. 91.
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destruction of birds'  nests or the feeding of animals to each another, strikes one as the 
actions of a sociopath, done as it is purely for self-gratification.  However, rather than 
present this in a condemning manner, Beckett chooses to tell it as a warm, jovial episode. 
We are with Sam throughout and like Watt he is not a detached, enigmatic narrator.  He is  
entirely subjective, and part of the confusing, often brutal world of Watt, playing an active 
roll through his narration and his actions.  The way that the section ends is also significant.  
Describing their activities as the closest they come to God is as explicit as Beckett gets 
regarding the Biblical overtones of the episode.  He is essentially portraying an inverted 
Garden of  Eden,  a  post-lapsarian  garden in  which  two menacing,  bizarre  men replace 
Adam and Eve.  Instead of living in harmony with the animals they crush them underfoot 
and aid in their cannibalisation.  There is an allegorical purpose behind this.  Despite the 
knowing  cruelty  played  upon  by the  mismatched  tone,  the  two  men  are  not  actually 
disrupting the natural order in the way one may initially think.  In a Darwinian, survival of 
the fittest sense, the animal kingdom is determined as much by cruelty and cannibalism as 
the nurturing of the young.  Beckett presents us with an ideal in order to discredit it and in 
this case the ideal is the Book of Genesis, the first of the Old Testament.  He shows that 
any structure,  any fixed way of  understanding will  inevitably be made to look foolish 
simply by the arbitrary and chaotic nature of the world.  In this instance the system is even 
easier to attack as it first posits a scene of structural bliss before a rupture that brought into 
place the world as we know it.  For Beckett this is not just hopeful, but foolishly so.  He is  
equally sceptical of the notion that we can ignore the numerous holes in how we presently 
structure the world by virtue of a higher power.  Though this theological system is different 
to more philosophical targets by virtue of its reliance on faith for example, the two are 
united in Watt as prescribed solutions for the unresolvable questions of existence. 
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These ideas are again brought to the fore a few pages later.  Again Sam and Watt meet, 
although this  time Watt has taken to doing everything inverted and so arrives, walking 
backwards, injured from the numerous falls he has taken.  Sam notes,
His face was bloody, his head also, and thorns were in his scalp. (His resemblance, at 
that moment, to the Christ beloved by Bosch, then hanging in Trafalgar Square, was so 
striking, that I remarked it.) (WA, p. 298.)
In  this  instance  Beckett  invokes  the  New Testament,  aligning  Watt  with  Jesus  Christ. 
Again, the very idea that the physically deformed, morally bankrupt, detached figure of 
Watt  could be a modern saviour  is  one that  works  perfectly as part  of  the tapestry of 
inversions and corruptions comprising the novel.  We have the idea of the second coming 
but of the saviour as the man who is the most truthful for his time, unashamed by his lack 
of knowledge and in fact promoting a kind of fruitless search for a system he knows does 
not exist and a replacement he doubts even the possibility of.  Following this description of 
Watt, Sam goes on to say that the two facing each other, fence dividing them into their 
separate parts of the garden and pavilions are mirror images.  He directly echoes how he 
has just described Watt: 'For if anyone, at that time, could be truly said not to resemble the 
Christ supposed by Bosch, then hanging in Trafalgar Square, I flatter myself it was I.' (WA, p. 
298.)  This identification of himself with the Christ-like appearance of Watt is intriguing as it  
both suggests we are all truly in the absence of structure that so plagues him, and yet also 
connotes that we may be so without appearing that way.
This religious symbolism is evident throughout the novel and explicit enough to infer a 
good deal of significance.  Outwith the examples from the garden the most intriguing is 
from the period in which Watt first arrives at the house of Mr. Knott near the beginning of 
the novel.   The following description illustrates the importance of religious imagery to 
Beckett during this time and indeed throughout his work:
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He set down his bags beside him, on the beautiful red floor, and he took off his hat, for 
he had reached his destination, discovering his scant red hair, and laid it on the table 
beside him.  And a pretty picture they made, Watt's scalp and red-grey tufts, and the 
floor burning up, from below. (WA, p. 198.)
This hellish imagery is startling, presented as it is in the typically Beckettian fashion as 
something light-hearted.   We first  have  Watt's  red  hair,  which  in  and of  itself  has  no 
specific connotations.  However, when the red floor is associated with it by virtue of  it 
'burning up, from below' we get an entirely different idea.  It is as if Watt has arrived in 
hell, as if the floor has opened up and revealed its true nature to him.  In fact, we get the 
impression  his  scalp  is  ablaze,  consumed  by  the  fire  rising  from  the  floor.   Yet  the 
invocation of hell is not actually the biblical idea Watt's time at Mr. Knott's most readily 
invokes.  This period of transition, of necessary time served before progression, is in fact 
more reminiscent of Purgatory, another place that has long been associated with fire but in 
a different manner.  Watt is not in his final location, so we can assume Mr. Knott's house is  
not hell.  The process of purgatory is that of a painful, suffering cleansing in which one is 
purged of the sins of life in order to be admitted to the Kingdom of Heaven.  Watt's time at 
Mr. Knott's is certainly transitory, one in which he attempts to free himself of that he has 
come to know in order to attain a measure of peace and understanding.  However, as one 
would  expect  of  Beckett,  the  purgatorial  analogy shifts  in  the  outcome.   Rather  than 
ridding himself of sin, Watt sheds the last of his belief in knowledge and the possibilities of 
understanding, losing his grip on reality and being institutionalised.  If we are thinking in 
terms of influence here the most obvious work is  Dante Alighieri's  The Divine Comedy. 
There  is  no  doubt  this  imagery  takes  much  from the  middle  volume  Purgatory.   In 
forthcoming chapters we shall examine Beckett's relationship with Dante in greater detail 
including this early example from Watt.
If  Watt  is  a  novel  concerned  with  the  moment  one  realises  that  no  matter  how well-
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structured a system is for making sense of the world, it is doomed by virtue of its own 
nature, then the following quotation by John Pilling exemplifies the ways in which Beckett 
chooses to illustrate his point:
Watt's rationalism is really 'solution clapped on problem like a snuffer on a candle': the 
book suffers from being too clear,  too allegorical;  far  from there being no symbols 
where none intended', there are symbols everywhere inviting us, like Watt, to explain 
and exorcize.79
Pilling is not suggesting that Beckett is ignorant of the multitude of symbolic content we 
find within Watt, but rather that the phrase 'no symbols where none intended' is as much of 
a joke as the description of Arsene's “short statement” we have already discussed.  Again, it 
is to illustrate this central awareness of unknowability that is the prerequisite for events 
devoid of meaning, logical positivism applied to that which is tedious and mundane, and 
symbols that shift from their apparent meaning.  All of these promise fulfilment and yet 
reveal themselves as something entirely at odds with the initial preconception.
An Unknowable Meaning
If we have so far been discussing the substance of Watt, that which the material throws at 
us time and time again, then is this also the conclusion the novel draws?  Unknowability is 
something we have mentioned in passing, but requires elaboration to understand how it 
works in relation to the novel's final message, if a work by Beckett could so neatly be 
summarised.  We do not have to wait until the closing pages to find the endpoint Watt 
reaches  in  his  stay  with  Mr.  Knott.   Relatively  early  there  is  a  moment  of  narrative 
intervention in which Sam lets the reader know that
Watt learned towards the end of his stay in Mr. Knott's house to accept that nothing had 
happened, that a nothing had happened, learned to bear it and even, in a shy way, to like 
it.  But then it was too late. (WA, p. 231.)
This  idea  of  not  just  nothing happening,  but  “a  nothing”,  an  event  that  occurs  but  is 
79 Pilling, p. 35.
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resistant to explanation is of course what we have been looking at already.  Eventually Watt 
will be driven mad by his inability to move past this stage and achieve a greater degree of  
understanding, but is unknowability the endpoint in terms of the novel?  As John Pilling 
notes Watt's development is arrested and 'The broken, backward-talking figure of the end is 
the same genuine figure of pathos he was at the beginning.'80  We may feel sorry for Watt 
and note that the crumbling of his psyche is tragic. However as I have mentioned there is  
no catharsis  for  him,  no moment in  which he attains  a  greater  awareness  or  even the 
possibility of greater awareness.  Yet, the book itself does not share in this despair.  Watt is 
a novel about acute frustration over an awareness that the myriad ways which we can 
organise the chaos of existence are equally flawed by their very nature.  Yet, the book is 
not  simply  an  exercise  in  hopelessness;  it  points  towards  the  possibility  of  radically 
different methods and can be seen as proto-poststructuralist in two key ways.
In  his  book  Understanding  Poststructuralism  James  Williams  speaks  of  the 
poststructuralist idea of the limit and the core.  He notes
the  claim  is  that  the  limit  is  the  core[...]  No  poststructuralist  defines  the  limit  as 
something  knowable  (it  would  merely  become  another  core).   Rather,  each 
poststructuralist thinker defines the limit as a version of pure difference, in the sense of 
something that defies identification.81
If  we compare this  notion to  the structure of  Watt  we can see distinct similarities.   In 
Beckett's novel one may assume the core is the central part of the novel, which deals with 
Watt's time at Mr. Knott's and the issues of existence most directly.  This would make the 
limits the pieces of social comedy that frame the core, but even this is an inversion of a 
traditional textual hierarchy, with the established, more realist sections being forced to the 
margins.   However,  a  simple  reversal  of  core  and  limit  presupposes  the  core  and  as 
Williams notes 'the limit  is the core'.   In  Watt  neither of these types of writing has an 
80 Pilling, p. 34.
81 Williams, p. 2.
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authoritative predominance,  but  instead they are both equally unknowable and exist  as 
defining each other and as both in fact unsettled and sitting on the limit.  One thinks of the 
deconstructionist notion of the endless chain of absent signification, with “pure difference” 
prevailing over a tangible core.  It can of course be argued that this type of thinking leads 
to  either  relativism or  nihilism,  two forms that  are  seemingly undesirable  due to  their 
distance from any sort of solution.  However, I think we are not stretching too far to see 
Watt  as an early example of a work that seeks to disrupt accepted belief to the end of 
exposing its  insufficiencies and in this methodology gain a greater insight as to which 
direction we should be progressing.  As Williams highlights,
Poststructuralism is  not  against  this  and  for  that  –  once  and  for  all.   It  is  for  the 
affirmation  of  an  inexhaustible  productive  power  of  limits.   It  is  for  the  resulting 
positive disruption of settled oppositions.82
The relationship between Beckett's work and Jacques Derrida is something that will be 
explored fully in later chapters.  However, even in this early work, we can see why Derrida 
would resist  deconstructing Beckett's  work on the grounds of its  ability to deconstruct 
itself.83  Ideas such as the opening up of presence, the 'point when a text finds its most pure 
truth'84 are there in the predominance of minor occurrences, the prevalence of the limit as 
the mode in which the book operates and the fully-fledged disruption of fictional pretence. 
The  second  distinctly  poststructuralist  aspect  of  Watt  is  the  idea  of  “play”  we  have 
examined.  As revolutionary and experimental a novel as it is, it still remains recognisable 
as  conforming to certain  prerequisites  of  the  form.   Prerequisites  such as  approximate 
length, prose content and a beginning, middle and end (literally, if not philosophically). 
Deconstruction works not autonomously, but from the inside out, exploring and exposing 
the inherent traces the work already possesses.  Rather than being something we must 
82 Ibid., p. 4.
83 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 61.
84 Williams, p. 32.
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detect within Watt,  along the lines of Williams' suggestion that 'there is always already a 
“supplement” within any given text, a point where play can begin.'85, the novel is in fact so 
open and self-aware in the processes of structural insufficiencies that it exhibits itself as 
such.  If 'the term “play” is used by Derrida to show how structures have a looseness and 
openness at their  very heart'86 then we can see Beckett  employing this technique in an 
embryonic form, in everything from the pastiche of logical positivism, right through to the 
suggestion of endless spheres of possible meaning in the structuring of the book.
Despite this, Watt does not reach the potential its strongest aspects strive for.  It is in many 
respects  limited  by  its  reliance  on  accepted  forms  of  writing  and  has  yet  to  find  the 
originality and synergy of form and content we shall see in the forthcoming chapters.  It is 
not a poststructuralist work, although it does contain aspects which can most appropriately 
fall  under  the  banner.   Specifically  in  its  dissatisfaction  with  language  we  must 
acknowledge that to an extent Watt, if not Beckett is Mauthnerian.  Again, these modes will 
be picked up and vastly enlarged in the works to come.  As will the symbioses of form and 
content we have explored,  with the former coming to dominate more and more as the 
works  progress.   We  shall  see  in  the  following  chapter  the  physical  expression  of 
philosophical concern taken to its zenith and a shedding of any sustained specific attacks 
on a particular theology or philosophy as can arguably be found in Watt.  It is also at this 
point one gets a sense Beckett has gone as far as he currently can with the novel form as he 
knows it.  Overly familiar and ill-fitting for his goals it is in the next works we shall look  
at, the 1946 novellas, that Beckett has dispensed with the novel as written in his native 
tongue and employs the French language for its lack of associations and ability to harness 
the  minimal  style  he  seeks.   If  Watt  is  the  moment  of  realisation  and  its  terrifying 
85 Ibid., p. 35.
86 Ibid., p. 34.
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consequences,  with  furtive  explorations  of  possible  solutions,  it  is  in  the  forthcoming 
works we shall find these solutions fully explored and pulled apart.
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Chapter Three:
Reassessing the 1946 Novellas
Having finished the protracted composition of Watt whilst spending a brief period of time 
in Ireland, Samuel Beckett returned to France in 1946 and proceeded to write the novel 
Mercier and Camier, as well as four novellas.  Within Beckett criticism it has so often been 
the case that The Trilogy is cited as the point at which several major shifts occur in the 
author's  fiction.   These  shifts  are  usually  identified  as,  primarily:  French  as  the  new 
language of composition; the creation of a partially stream-of-consciousness, first-person 
mode  of  speech identifiable  as  uniquely Beckettian;  and  the  replacement  in  form and 
content of overt erudition and wit with a stripped, functional and descriptive approach. 
Since Deirdre Bair mistakenly conflated Krapp87 and Beckett's visions it has been all too 
convenient to imagine the latter as the tortured artist, battered by the elements at the end of 
the pier, inspired by the revelation there to immediately pen Molloy.  Even in his correcting 
of the vision myth James Knowlson finds little to say about four works written in 1946, yet 
containing prototypical and even finished versions of the new approaches just outlined. 
During this immediate post-war 'frenzy of writing'88, as Beckett put it, he completed the 
story  The End89 (middle of February to  May),  the novel  Mercier and Camier  (July to 
October) as well as three further short works entitled The Expelled (October),  First Love 
(October  to  December)  and  The Calmative  (December).   As we have thus  far  focused 
exclusively  on  Beckett's  novels  the  turning  to  these  novellas  requires  a  degree  of 
explanation.  Whilst focussing on Mercier and Camier may seem the logical choice, it is in 
fact a much more useful work to examine in the light of the drama that will popularise 
87 As in the only character to appear within, what is generally accepted to be Beckett's most autobiographical 
play, Krapp's Last Tape (1958); repr. in Samuel Beckett, The Grove Centenary Edition, III (New York: Grove 
Press, 2006)  Deirdre Bair's biography Samuel Beckett: A Biography (1978) has been factually corrected in 
many aspects since its publication, with this example one amongst many that James Knowlson rectifies in 
Damned to Fame (1996) 
88 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 358.
89 Although began in English as Suite.
86
Beckett and also come from this middle period of his output.  We can see in the third-
person depiction of the relationship between two tramp-like figures and their often loving, 
often abusive relationship Badiou's notion of the typically Beckettian 'TWO'90.  This is the 
two of Vladimir and Estragon, of Winnie and Willie,  of Ham and Clov.  If  this  novel 
contains the seeds of the plays to come then it could equally be said that the novellas, 
written the same year, offer us real insight into the intention and mechanics of the post-war 
novels.  Furthermore, this chapter will make the case that an error has been made in the 
neglect of these works and their relative marginalisation91 in our understanding of Beckett's 
canon.  The novellas are both essential to understanding the four novels that follow them, 
but also important works independently, presenting us with a mixture of lasting Beckettian 
motifs and original form and content not to be seen in the same guise throughout the rest of 
the oeuvre.92
 
Death; A Reflection of Life
Thematically these works are far more cohesive than anything Beckett had yet produced. 
They begin to demand the type of reading which rewards attention to the sprawling and 
idiosyncratic narrative and allows the interconnectivity of the themes to rise to the surface. 
Presiding over all others at this time, and indeed one could argue in Beckett's subsequent 
prose, is the spectre of death.  In previous work death has of course played a part, most 
90 In the next chapter this is discussed in greater detail regarding some of the relationships within Molloy, but 
for now it is worth looking to the following quotation which neatly summarizes the duality of the 
relationships we shall see so fully explored within Beckett's drama: 'The two of love is a hazardous and 
chance-laden mediation for alterity in general.  It elicits a rupture or severance of the cogito's One; by virtue 
of this very fact, however, it can hardly stand on its own, opening instead onto the limitless multiple of 
Being.' Alain Badiou, On Beckett (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2003), p. 28.
91 This is not to ignore works such as Julia Kristeva's essay 'The Father, Love and Banishment' in Desire in 
Language:A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (London: Basil Blackwell, 1980).  Here she employs 
psychoanalytical and poststructuralist techniques to reassess assumptions we may make of the meanings to be 
taken from First Love.
92 Amongst the few that have argued for a greater degree of reverence to be paid to these novellas P.J. 
Murphy may be one of the most fervent, arguing that 'The Calmative deserves recognition as a central work 
in the Beckett canon because[...] it is the cradle of future fictions.' P.J. Murphy, Reconstructing Beckett 
(Toronto; London: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 23.
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spectacularly in cutting short the life of Murphy, overly fond of his ill-advised, home-made 
gas heating solution.  Beginning with the forebodingly titled The End however, we have a 
series of works that are meditations  on the afterlife from the perspective of characters 
implied dead and speaking from beyond the grave.  The degree to which these new kind of 
protagonists  can  be  defined  as  separate  entities  at  all  is  something  we  shall  look  at 
momentarily but so similar are they that statements can comfortably be made about one 
that will often apply to them all.  This is the emergence of the Beckettian hero, something 
we have traced the evolution of in the previous two chapters.   Moving away from the 
young men of  Murphy,  Watt and going back even further  Dream of  Fair  to  Middling  
Women and  More Pricks Than Kicks we are now placed inside the crumbling minds of 
geriatric men occupying a place on the outer fringes of society.  These new creatures are 
the roots of a loosely homogeneous group of central characters that we can start to define 
and  recognise  by  virtue  of  their  detached,  sometimes  sociopathic  mindset  and  their 
dishevelled physical appearance with numerously pocketed greatcoat and rimmed hat a 
regular feature.  This, however, is merely one example amongst many of the strides these 
four 1946 novellas make towards the realisation of a more complete form of prose writing 
we see in the later works.  I also intend to examine other striking aspects, including the 
shift to a first-person mode of narration, the journey of the exiled hero, time as a subjective 
concept, life as a kind of hell-space or purgatory, the importance of the base and physical 
in metaphysical illustration, and finally the idea of love as a potential solution to the chasm 
of death.   This is  not to detract from the overall  aim of the thesis,  which remains the 
examination of the novels'  engagement with philosophy and emergence as philosophies 
themselves.  The radical shifts these works hold will be shown as essential to this evolution 
and brought out by the idea of death as it umbrellas the other themes already outlined.
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In Autopsia: Self, Death, and God after Kierkegaard and Derrida (2008) Marius Timmann 
Mjaaland summarises Soren Kierkegaard's  position in  his  work  At A Graveside  (1845) 
writing that 'It is rather death that breaks up the unambiguous understanding of being, and 
continuously  breaks  up  the  images  and  notions  used  to  describe  it.'93  This  is  the 
perspective he takes throughout the work, arguing that rather than being a possible point of 
explanation, death is in fact an area of destabilisation, existing as an unknown which in our 
trying to understand it merely reflects our own anxieties and partiality back at us.  What 
follows life is 'indefinable – the only certainty, and the only thing about which nothing is 
certain.'94 and so he asserts that 'Death is not given any definitive meaning.  Where death is 
concerned, one's own death, there is no direct connection between the signifier and the 
signified.'95  This is as strong a way to make his point as possible.  Kierkegaard argues that 
death is so unknowable that its actual existence and the language we use to describe it bear 
no relation to each other.  In making this assertion Kierkegaard is not only describing his 
own position,  but in fact speaking of a whole history of philosophy and theology that 
would try to reduce death by describing it in a language of abstractions.  Indeed, we can 
see in ideas such as this the type of revolutionary personality that would come to attack the 
church for deluding the masses.  Looking at the first of the Mjaaland quotations cited we 
can see that Kierkegaard argues it would be more honest to admit what we know of death 
to be what we know of ourselves.  As Kierkegaard himself puts it 'this inexplicableness 
certainly needs an explanation.  But the earnestness lies in just this, that the explanation 
does not explain death but discloses the state of the explainer's own innermost being.'96 
This attempt to reposit our understanding inwards, to align death with the subjective and 
personal  as a way to reach a  more honest  understanding of our limits  is  exactly what 
93 Marius Timmann Mjaaland, Autopsia: Self, Death, and God after Kierkegaard and Derrida (Berlin; New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), p. 100.
94 Soren Kierkegaard, Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions (Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 
2009), p. 91.
95 Mjaaland, p. 95.
96 Kierkegaard, p. 97.
89
Beckett  explores  within the novellas.   Eric  Levy suggests  that  'we can only marvel  at 
Samuel Beckett who, through his beleaguered narrator, pushes even closer to expressing 
the  coincidence  of  two  impossible  contraries:  Being  and  Nothing.'97  Levy  describes 
Beckett's method very well; his characters are not mouthpieces for didactic repetition on 
the fallacy of understanding death.  Rather, through bearing witness to their journeys, the 
way they conduct themselves and the thoughts that do and do not motivate them to action 
the tension between death and the myriad ways it is reflected in everyday living is vividly 
illustrated. 
It could be argued that speaking of these characters in this manner is to overly homogenise 
them and that such inclusive and sweeping statements ignore the clear differences between 
the four.  However, it seems that in order to truly understand the effect of these novellas, 
not only in terms of their collective meaning, but also insofar as they relate to the evolution 
of Beckett's work in general, we must view them as forming part of a whole.  It is again 
Levy who puts this well, commenting on these four novellas and two later examples he 
notes that they 'are better considered as an indefinite series than as wholly independent 
narrations.'98  Indeed, one could take this even further and argue that within the prose it is 
possible to conceive of Beckett as a career-long re-drafter.  He essentially writes the same 
character repeatedly, although realised differently within each work; subsequent examples 
an attempt to better reflect and illustrate his ideas.  This evolution is something we have 
seen in the preceding chapters, both in terms of the move towards the archetypal hero of 
Beckett's prose and the functionality of the character as illustrative example.  However, it 
is here, in these four novellas, that we shall see great strides made toward a more complete 
definition of the character in every respect.  By the time Beckett begins Molloy he already 
97 Eric P. Levy, Beckett and the Voice of Species: A Study of The Prose Fiction (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 
1980), p. 117.
98 Levy, p. 106.
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has his template and alters it  by various degrees to fit  his  purpose.   Selecting specific 
examples can therefore be difficult, as once this point has been made the degree to which 
an incident or character trait can be read as uniformly intratextual varies a good deal.  Yet, 
despite this caveat, it is the intention of this chapter to examine the theme of death as it is 
collectively expressed through the works, so if for each specific example a complimentary 
instance  cannot  be  found within  another  story,  it  is  usually  a  by-product  of  Beckett's 
methodology.  As I have said, ideas emerge and bubble to the surface through a process of 
dense  suggestion  and  implication  whilst  quotable  incidents  are  often  nomadic  and 
supported by a great degree of less identifiable material.
However, it would be a mistake to think of these as subtle or elusive works with regards to 
expressing their central theme.  Before moving onto concerns that feed into death and its 
philosophical  ramifications it  is  worth emphasising the directness Beckett  offers in the 
novellas.   This  includes  relatively benign examples  as  in  The End  where  the  narrator 
requests a crocus bulb from his landlord so as he can nurture it on his windowsill.  When 
he tries to water it with his own urine its life is expectedly cut short.  He is asked if he 
would like another bulb to try growing the plant once more, but declines the offer without a 
thought, giving the impression he was only attempting to grow the plant out of a half-
forgotten habit, removed from his almost somnambulist existence.  This kind of episode is 
typical of the way Beckett includes death as incidental and yet invested in the main plot of 
the story.  It is never allowed to slip from focus and even in the moments the characters are 
not directly concerned with their impending end there are reminders everywhere that living 
is also waiting for death.  
Initially  First Love  may seem to stand separate from the other three novellas.  It has a 
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young man as a protagonist, still at odds with the world, but functioning within society to a 
much greater extent than the bedraggled old men we find in the other works.  Despite this, 
it  also  shares  many  of  the  same  concerns,  and  shows  us  they  are  conditions  of  life, 
sharpened and inescapable in old age, but not caused by it.  It is debatable whether the 
narrators of  The End, The Calmative  and  The Expelled  are even still  living when they 
recount the experiences of the stories.  In  The Calmative  the narrator bluntly offers the 
opinion 'It is not my wish to labour these antinomies, for we are needless to say in a skull.'  
(TC, p. 269.)  If we have the incidental and the plain inclusion of death in these two types of 
examples, then it is in  The Expelled  we find one of the rarer types of content from the 
novellas.  The ending of the story is both unusually poetic and abstract, with the narrator 
concluding 
When I am abroad in the morning I go to meet the sun, and in the evening, when I am 
abroad, I follow it, till I am down among the dead.  I don’t know why I told this story, I 
could just as well have told another.  Perhaps some other time I’ll be able to tell another. 
Living souls, you will see how alike they all are. (TEX, p. 259.)
Passages like these lead one to believe, like Malone Dies, that there is a strong suggestion 
the distended sense of time, the freakishly inhabited world, and the endlessly wandering 
characters are actually just symptomatic of the character being, if not dead, then not fully 
alive: in final moments of existence recalling scattered incidents of a life.  
What is the implication of this shift for Beckett’s work?  In Murphy and Watt the characters 
were outcasts from society, skirting the margins in search of a greater depth of knowledge 
than the world was capable of offering them, but still living and breathing, blessed with a 
degree of agency.  In these novellas it is suggested the characters are speaking from a point 
past the end of life.  There is a suggestion in the quote from The Calmative that we are ‘in a 
skull’ as it were and that we have moved beyond one of the biggest metaphysical debates 
over the centuries, that of mind-body separation.  In keeping with Beckett’s attention to, 
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and lack of faith in, philosophical speculation displayed in his previous work it could be 
argued  that  this  is  an  extension  of  the  new  path  he  takes  following  his  vision.   As 
Kierkegaard suggests, all we really gain from speculation on death is a greater knowledge 
of ourselves as the idea we could understand the afterlife is merely a reflection of the way 
we assign meaning to existence.  In these new works Beckett suggests a state of unease and 
scepticism over never truly knowing the extent of mind-body connectivity and equates it 
with death.  The implication, as we shall explore in greater depth later, is that life is already 
a kind of death, at least in the terms we could understand it.  The separation of speculation 
and knowledge is  so great as to render meaning in permanent flux; the sum-total  of a 
maelstrom of not knowing, which mirrors the meaning we designate death.
The Body in Decay
Returning to the passage that concludes The Expelled we can also see very clearly the type 
of internalisation possible with Beckett making the shift from the third to first-person mode 
of narration.  This is a very different voice to the narrator of Beckett's earlier novels and 
yet not so distinct that we cannot identify in its genesis a process of evolution.  Generally, 
in  terms of  form, the changes  that  occur  from  Dream  to  Watt  are indeed great  and in 
previous  chapters  we have  looked at  the  discarding  of  the  flourishes  in  language  and 
witticisms that characterise Beckett's formative writing style.  It is really in Watt we see the 
author  turn  his  focus  away  from  central  characters  similar  in  age,  temperament  and 
experience  to  himself  and  toward  men  on  the  fringes  of  society,  new  homeless  and 
deformed creatures, filled with bewilderment and a painful awareness of humankind's fated 
ignorance of complete knowledge.  Yet, it is with the novellas, which are the first truly 
reflective work accomplished by Beckett after his experiences in The Second World War99, 
99 Watt was written during World War II and the extent which it can be deemed a “war novel” is highly 
debatable due to its content and Beckett's insistence that it was merely an exercise to keep his mind active 
whilst he was in hiding.  The novellas examined in this chapter also bear no immediate tangible link to the 
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that the process of evolution is drastically accelerated.  As mentioned earlier, Beckett was 
the recipient of a life-changing, but seemingly non-religious vision, which both galvanised 
the steps  he had taken in recent  work and furthermore offered new insights  he would 
employ throughout  the  rest  of  his  career.   It  is  probably as  a  result  of  Deirdre  Bair's 
misunderstanding of the level of autobiographical content within  Krapp's Last Tape  that 
Beckett was unusually candid in offering James Knowlson an explanation, saying 'Krapp's 
vision was on the pier at Dún Laoghaire; mine was in my mother's room.  Make that clear 
once  and for  all.'100  This  clarification  aside  Krapp's  vision is  certainly a  rendering  of 
Beckett's own and gives us an insight into the magnitude of the discovery for this character 
and his creator.  In the play Krapp is, for the majority, hunched over his tape recorder, 
listening to recordings he made as a younger man.  There is one particular fragment of 
audio that angers Krapp however, or seems to stir up emotions in him too strong to bear. 
He fast-forwards through this retelling of his visionary revelation with the audience only 
hearing the words '...clear to me at last that the dark I have always struggled to keep under 
is  in  reality my most...'101  It  was subsequently revealed to Knowlson that the missing 
words  were  'in  reality  my most  precious  ally.'102  In  the  far  more  domestic  setting  of 
Beckett's vision he
realised that Joyce had gone as far as one could in the direction of knowing more, 
[being] in control of one's material.  He was always adding to it; you only have to look 
at his proofs to see that.  I realised that my own way was in impoverishment, in lack of 
knowledge and in taking away, in subtracting rather than adding.103
This extract is  the most quoted and probably succinct part  of Beckett's retelling of his 
revelation.  In words to friends and at other points, however, Beckett intimated that the 
war, but they are the first works he completed following its end.  Considering the illustrative manner in 
which I am arguing Beckett approached more abstract issues, it is also worth considering how this relates to 
his dealing with history and his part in it. 
100 Knowlson, p. 352.  Beckett's was an artistic revelation; a 'recognition of his own stupidity, ('Molloy and 
the others came to me the day I became aware of my own folly.  Only then did I begin to write the things I 
feel.)' Knowlson, p. 352.
101 Krapp's Last Tape, p. 226.
102 Knowlson, p. 352.
103 Ibid.
94
vision was wider in scope, including more specific details  of how 'In future,  his  work 
would focus on poverty, failure, exile and loss; as he put it as a 'non-knower' and as a 'non-
can-er' [i.e. someone who cannot].'104  In the novellas we will see this manifested in both 
form and content.  The former we shall examine later, but it is worth looking at the more 
overt changes in content we find in these works.  Following on from what has already been 
said regarding Beckett's new focus on issues that could be broadly placed under the banner 
of “negation” Knowlson asserts that this change is in large part a result of the effect of 
Beckett's wartime experiences: 
Metaphysical Angst, he had learned, could be profoundly disquieting or depressing.  But 
it was seldom life-threatening[...] Many of the features of his later prose and plays arise 
directly from his experiences of radical uncertainty, disorientation, exile, hunger and 
need.'105
To an extent we can see how this awareness was already present in Beckett's work, in the 
propensity to turn to the physical as the most potent way to express unknowability that we 
have examined in the previous chapter on  Watt.  The intention of this chapter is not to 
debate the degree of influence Beckett's experiences during The Second World War had on 
his work, but what is clear enough is the definitive shift after its conclusion to an entirely 
new type of content.  Again, it is Knowlson who suggests this:
More revealing still of the changes that occurred in Beckett's writing since the war is the 
way in which, instead of displaying his erudition as overtly as much of his pre-war 
prose and poetry used to do, Beckett draws on it in passing, as a relic of a former wide-
ranging education, or uses it in a comic parody of learning or as an invocation of 
ignorance, confusion and bewilderment.106
The latter states described in both of these Knowlson extracts are the ground the novellas 
try and tread.  In a work like  Murphy there are many episodes that would have seemed 
somewhat lowbrow for Beckett's contemporary audience; prostitution, promiscuity and the 
blackly comic death of the eponymous hero for example.  The novellas on the other hand 
104 Ibid., p. 353.
105 Ibid., p. 351.
106 Ibid., p. 374.
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exist  entirely outwith  the  usual  boundaries  of  taste  and decency,  with  a  great  deal  of 
content  describing  functions  and  afflictions  of  the  body  in  a  purposefully  crass  and 
discomforting manner.  This is a template we will see employed in Molloy only a few years 
later, although by that time the content will be incorporated more fully into the fabric of the 
text.   In  its  initial  use  in  these  short  works  the  examples  we  find  are  purposefully 
conspicuous by virtue of their frequency, length and depravity.  If we take just a few from 
The End the effect is clear.  To begin with the narrator speaks of his genitals, rectum and 
skull which, like the narrators of all the novellas are a point of intense interest and more 
often than not personal discomfort.  In The End it is made explicit that the narrator's skull 
is damaged or in the grip of some disfiguring ailment.  He says 'I treated my crablice with 
salt water and seaweed, but a lot of nits must have survived.  I put a compress of seaweed 
on my skull, which gave me great relief, but not for long.' (TE, p. 284.)  This type of description 
is  typical,  as  is  the  frankly  stomach-churning  episode  in  which  the  narrator  becomes 
physically disabled during his stay at a cabin in the wilderness.  The setting is described 
thus:
The vilest acts had been committed on the ground and against the walls.  The floor was 
strewn with excrements, both human and animal, with condoms and vomit[...] In a 
cowpad a heart had been traced, pierced by an arrow.  And yet there was nothing to 
attract tourists. (TE, p. 285.)
This is the type of blackly comic scene that Beckett critics tend to avoid, presumably for 
the reason it  does not appear to relate  directly to  the supposedly loftier  themes of the 
works.  The character's escape is the most grisly part with a cow having wandered into the 
cabin: 
I tried to suck her, without much success.  Her udder was covered with dung.  I took off 
my hat and, summing all my energy, began to milk her into it.  The milk fell to the 
ground and was lost, but I said to myself, No matter, it's free.  She dragged me across 
the floor, stopping from time to time only to kick me. (TE, p. 285.)
This episode is a necessary part of the progress the character must make in returning to the 
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city and the level of crass detailing is a choice we shall discuss briefly.  However,  the most 
bizarre of these base descriptions are those that do not even bear an ostensible relation to 
exposition or plot development.  There is a category which could be better defined as a 
mutated form of internal reflection.  Rather than an interior monologue on the external 
events occurring within the story, or even some more abstract concern, what we receive is a 
series of meticulous descriptions of the most sordid physical acts the narrator engages in. 
Shane Weller notes the progress the protagonists of the novellas have made from the levels 
of  mental  abstraction  earlier  characters  seemed  capable  of.   Whether  or  not  that  was 
illusory,  these characters seem at times exclusively capable of concern for their  failing 
bodies.  He writes that
Not only are  the vagabond narrators  of the  Novellas  estranged from the world into 
which they find themselves expelled, but any withdrawal from the 'outer reality' of the 
kind achieved in Dream and Murphy has become all but impossible.107 
Again, it is the narrator of The End who tells us 
I unbuttoned my trousers discreetly to scratch myself.  I scratched myself in an upward 
direction, with four nails.  I pulled on the hairs, to get relief[...] It was in the arse I had 
the most pleasure, I stuck in my forefinger up to the knuckle.  Later, if I had to shit, the 
pain was atrocious.  But I hardly ever shat any more. (TE, p. 288.)
This episode in particular reminds one of Murphy's arranging of biscuits in Hyde park, 
with the application of a method akin to logical positivism applied to the seemingly banal 
variations with which one can eat a selection of biscuits.  In  The End  he is not working 
through a methodology in the same manner, but is reflecting upon the relative virtues of 
scratching different parts of his body with a seriousness befitting a topic of philosophical 
concern.  Daniela Caselli argues persuasively that the importance of these passages lies in 
their  function  as  critique  of  the  value  attributed  to  certain  kinds  of  literature  and  its 
canonical importance. She notes in the following quotation, which focuses on the aligning 
of these scatological passages with a writer like Dante in the original French version of 
107 Shane Weller, A Taste for the Negative (Oxford: Legenda, 2005), p. 96.
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The End:
But  what  appears  to  be  a  mere  dismissal  of  authorities  by  mockingly  raising  the 
scatological  matter  to  the  heights  of  great  literature  [by  placing  bodily  references 
amongst canonical reference], highlights how ephemeral and variable is the 'value' of 
words, while also placing the text within the canon. The alleged lack of value of the text 
is foregrounded in order to reclaim its own status of literature while commenting on the 
processes of attributing value to literature.108     
I agree with Caselli but would go further.  I would contend that Beckett frequently employs 
these graphic and disturbing descriptions as not only a critique of the worth and place 
certain kinds of writing occupies, but as a critique of the approach these writings take 
towards the issues which are their concern.  Although this thesis is concerned with the 
place of philosophy in Beckett's work, this is in some respects simply an effective lens with 
which to view the various ideas fundamental to these works and which have most often 
been  taken  up by philosophical  writers.   Of  course  a  writer  like  Dante  is  far  more  a 
theologian  than  a  philosopher,  although  the  content  of  his  work  has  undeniable 
philosophical import.  What the novellas do is to dislocate these questions of life and death 
and of  the meaning in  both from the rhetorical,  literary and theological  contexts  from 
within which they are so commonly dealt with.  By realigning these issues with the cruel, 
the bodily, the sexual and the scatological Beckett asks us to re-examine how we have been 
addressing these issues and if we should not be employing other means.  This is indeed the 
purpose of these base passages.  They are of course not an end in themselves but best 
thought of as contributing to the tapestry of meaning Beckett constructs within his work by 
this  point.   If we are to recall  his revelation,  that he must not try and emulate Joyce's 
totality of content and meaning, then the intent becomes clear.  These works, like those that 
have come before, are concerned with the most fundamental questions of existence: the 
limits of language, the existence of God and unknowability.  By the time we reach Watt we 
108 Daniela Caselli, Beckett's Dantes: Intertextuality in the Fiction and Criticism (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), p. 122. The content within the square brackets in this quotation are from Caselli 
herself.
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have a writer fully aware of the precarious nature of engaging with a metaphysical tradition 
and trying to stake one's own place within this area.  Indeed the novel is a tragedy of the 
realisation such abstracted and lofty thinking is in fact illusory.  
A major shift with the novellas is the evolution of the illustrative method we have already 
examined in the previous two chapters on Murphy and Watt.  This is a technique that offers 
a series of pictures contributing to an overall impression upon the reader.  If we look to 
The Expelled we find the narrator under very similar physical duress to that of  The End. 
This is a point we need not labour, but much like the duality of identity we are to find with  
Molloy and Moran,  the  narrators  of  the  novellas  are  implied  one  and the  same.   For 
example  the  following  excerpt  is  strikingly  similar  in  content  to  that  which  we  have 
already seen in The End:
I had then the deplorable habit, having pissed my trousers, or shat there, which I did 
fairly regularly early in the morning, about ten or half past ten, of persisting in going on 
and finishing my day as if nothing had happened.  The very idea of changing my 
trousers, or of confiding in mother, who goodness knows asked nothing better than to 
help me, was unbearable, I don't know why, and till bedtime I dragged on with burning 
and stinking between my little thighs or sticking to my bottom, the result of 
incontinence. (TEX, p. 251.)
We can see in this recollection from childhood the first attempts at the rambling, fervent 
style which will become so recognisable as Molloy's manner of speaking.  The dizzying 
proliferation of clauses creating very long run-on sentences is an essential part of Beckett's 
illustrative  method.   It  is  a  process  of  subversion  by which  something  so  seemingly 
inconsequential and base is discussed in detail, through a style that conveys desperation to 
relinquish the information the narrator holds.  This desperation is a kind of plugging the 
gap,  a  futile  attempt  to  fill  the  chasm of  unknowability  with  language;  a  mode  these 
characters are all too aware is wholly insufficient.  Further to this, we also find that the  
narrator  shares  problems  with  his  skull.   After  being  invited  to  stay  the  night  in  the 
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coachman’s  barn,  the  host  and his  wife  are  taken aback when they catch  sight  of  the 
narrator’s  exposed head.   The narrator  notes  that  ‘He drew his  wife’s  attention  to  the 
postule on top of my skull, for I had removed my hat out of civility.  He should have that 
removed, she said.' (TEX, pp. 257-258.) Again, we can infer a number of different meanings from 
this particular physical complaint.  Firstly we could say that it is just one of the many signs 
these characters' bodies are in decay, with the consequent thematic links to Beckett’s new 
focus on negation, lack of knowledge and so forth.  We could also identify the symbolism 
of the skull being broken alongside the aforementioned references paid to the mind-body 
problem.  We could think of these broken heads as metaphors for the fragility of the mind. 
If  Beckett’s  work suggests an impossible  resolution to the question of the relationship 
between the internal and external then these could be warnings of the delicate state we 
share if our mind is all we can rely upon.  Lastly we could see these as indicators of the 
world the narrators' consciousness occupies.  These narratives describe a distorted dream-
like city in which the psyche of the protagonists seems to spill over into the physical world 
and one could focus  upon these  damaged skulls  as  symbols  of  a  physical  violence or 
trauma, one that has produced a state of coma or, as is heavily implied, death.
This pattern is continued in The Calmative, a story that progresses in the same vein as the 
two Beckett had already penned in '46.  We are again given the impression of a body in 
decay,  shutting down in old age and infirmity,  becoming more and more victim to its 
physical limitations.  In a description of simply turning about we find echoes of Watt’s 
extraordinary walk and prescience of Molloy on his bicycle.  The narrator tells us ‘When I 
say turned about I mean I wheeled round in a wide semi-circle without slowing down, for I 
was afraid if I stopped of not being able to start again…' (TC, pp. 268-269.)  Through his prose 
Beckett creates a palimpsestic effect, with the refinement of content and form in each work 
100
adding to an overall impression that urges us to see, through the current incarnation of a 
character  for  example,  the  many predecessors  that  have  shaped  his  design.   With  the 
publication of each work we find a growing number of these tropes, but the novellas are 
notable for the wealth of examples they create or solidify in our idea of the Beckettian 
hero.  In another example from The Calmative the narrator tells us ‘I was wearing my long 
green greatcoat with the velvet collar, such as motorists wore about 1900, my father’s, but 
that day it was sleeveless, a vast cloak.'  (TC,  p.  264.)  The greatcoat is one of the key visual 
signifiers  that  makes  up  the  uniform for  Beckett’s  tramp-like  men.   In  this  particular 
example the coat has no sleeves and again a degree of symbolism can be inferred.  The 
absence of arms on the coat would certainly be an apposite metaphor for the absence of 
action and agency which these characters suffer from.  The physical is dominant in these 
works  because  of  its  tangibility  and  opposition  to  the  abstracted  affirming  knowledge 
Beckett is writing against.  However, we can see in this example that it is cradled as the 
lesser  of  two evils;  a  simpler,  more immediate  form of  knowledge and yet  in  the end 
harbouring just as much uncertainty as the mind and even further from possible answers to 
the questions of meaning and existence.  In the previous chapter on  Watt  we discussed 
differing  explanations  for  Beckett's  focus  on  the  physical  as  a  way  of  expressing 
philosophical  concerns.   We can  see  here  a  continuation  in  particular  of  the  idea  the 
protagonists  and  the  worlds  they  occupy  are  physical  expressions  of  problems  in 
affirmative metaphysical speculation.  As I have already said there is the sustained focus in 
the novellas on problems the narrators have with their  skulls,  which suggest a kind of 
metonymical relationship in which this stands for problems of the mind we can see these 
characters  develop from Watt  onwards.   In  both  Watt  and the  novellas  we have  these 
wandering protagonists, searching for solutions to their  confusion in understanding and 
interpreting the world, but finding none.  In the novellas there is an ever greater aligning of 
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the internal state of the protagonists with the world in general, largely achieved by the 
switch to a first-person mode of narration in which both the inner and outer worlds are 
presented  to  us  through  the  lens  of  these  consciousnesses.   As  Weller  suggests,  these 
narrators are both exiled from their own societies and from the world of internal reflection 
Murphy and Watt  seek  refuge  in.109  There  are  very few abstract  reflections  from the 
narrators of these novellas.  Beckett has begun to implement the reduction and negation he 
saw as essential to his work at this time.  It is as if all concerns have been brought down to 
a series of crude reflections on the world and one's place in it as any wider meaning to 
existence is impossible to ascertain.      
One may query how far we may therefore associate First Love with the rest of these stories 
in this area, considering it has a younger narrator, not yet riddled with bodily decrepitude 
and base fascination.  It seems clear however that the physical is just as important in this 
story, although it is dealt with in a slightly different manner.  This protagonist may be in 
better health and not possessed of the vile habits of the other characters, but he is already 
well aware and indeed disgusted by the functions of the body.  This story displays the 
Beckett hero at a stage of development where he still holds himself apart from the tide of 
physicality and is  in  fact  disgusted  by the  living and breathing of  people.   In  fact  he 
expresses a fondness for dead flesh over that of his fellow citizens, noting that the smell of 
corpses is ‘a trifle heady, but how infinitely preferable to what the living emit, their feet,  
teeth, armpits, arses, sticky foreskins and frustrated ovules.' (FL, pp. 229-230.)  Again, the disgust 
he feels is sexualised, as in the other examples we have seen.  One gets the sense later in 
the story that he is engaging in a relationship with a woman, not out of true desire, but out 
of  an irresistible  compulsion of the body.   Furthermore,  he shares a  cruelty both with 
Watt110 and with his fellow narrators of the novellas, such as  The Expelled  in which the 
109 Weller, p. 96.
110 Who we discussed in the previous chapter taking pleasure in the abuse of animals.
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character expresses his sincere wish to harm a child.  The irony of the title First Love need 
not be drawn out, it is flaunted in the following quotation in which the narrator describes 
one  of  the  early  encounters  in  their  “courtship”:  ‘She  began  stroking  my  ankles.   I 
considered kicking her in the cunt.' (FL, p. 234.)  There is a shared purpose and intent in these 
vivid  and  often  disturbing  descriptions.   It  is  the  casual  way  the  narrative  slips  into 
unexpectedly lurid detail, often at great length and frequency, illustrating their importance 
as more than simply an aspect of the milieu of the world Beckett creates.  Having already 
moved  towards  a  more  illustrative  approach  in  his  last  novel,  alongside  a  systematic 
eradication of the stylised language, generic parody and Joycean derivation of his early 
work, these physical descriptions bear a greater weight than may initially seem the case. 
The novellas look out on the world from a pinhole perspective of subjectivity.  We are 
given  consciousnesses  which  consistently  question  their  truth  and  validity  and  seek  a 
greater  degree  of  stability  through  a  barrage  of  vulgar  and  base  descriptions.   In  the 
absence of truth within metaphysical speculation it is only our defecating, decaying bodies 
and the world they occupy that can offer a reprieve and even then a reprieve only by virtue  
of its immediate and apparent force.   Kierkegaard writes 'Finally, it must be said of death's 
decision that it is inexplicable.  That is, whether or not people find an explanation, death 
itself explains nothing.'111  If these novellas represent the start of a more sustained focus on 
death, or how death, as Kierkegaard argues, is really only our own thinking on the meaning 
of  life,  then  what  this  extended focus  on the  body illustrates  is  the utter  falsehood of 
hoping to achieve truth through abstracted speculation.  
Beckett said that his revelation was about finding his own method in opposition to Joyce’s 
totality of understanding.  We can see in this new content one of Beckett’s first attempts at 
finding areas of negation and “not-knowing” as he would put it.  From conclusions like this 
111 Kierkegaard, p. 96.
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one can see why Beckett is so often labelled a nihilist and one who finds more in the  
absence of meaning than actually contributing to its fulfilment.  In many respects this is the 
same  type  of  criticism  aimed  at  practitioners  of  deconstruction;  a  movement  that’s 
proximity  to  Beckett’s  work  has  been  mentioned  in  previous  chapters  and  shall  be 
discussed in later chapters.  I would also offer a rebuttal drawn from deconstruction and 
argue that rather than assuming the endpoint of this kind of thinking is an endlessly self-
negating process leading to an arrested,  inactive position,  what we actually have is  an 
attempt to strip away centuries of metaphysical speculation.  This is an attempt to look 
inward at the most fundamental tools of reason and understanding, examine their flaws, 
and in a very positive way seek improvements or alternative methods of progression.
The Legacy of Dante
If we are to look at the history of death within the major movements of Western philosophy 
it has been, broadly speaking, an attempt to employ the tools of reason, metaphysical and 
theological speculation to divine the truth of what happens when life ceases.  Through 
allusions in Beckett’s early work, his education, the content of his letters and biography it 
is clear he was steeped in these types of knowledge from a young age and further that he 
aimed to continue  in  a  tradition  of  fiction  that  examined and participated  in  the  most 
fundamental questions of religion and being.  The most significant writer for Beckett in 
terms of theological influence was Dante Alighieri.  The Divine Comedy is a trilogy that 
appears throughout the prose in both subtle and overt references.  This has perhaps been 
elucidated  most  clearly  in  the  Daniela  Caselli's  aforementioned  Beckett's  Dantes:  
Intertextuality in the Fiction and Criticism.  She asserts that
Various intertextually connoted terms, different textual places from the Comedy, most of 
which  are  by  now  textual  commonplaces  in  the  Beckett  canon,  and  a  number  of 
quotations, make Dante part of the flickering, unavoidable, non-coinciding memory of 
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the voice who says 'I'.112
      
Her contention, that Dante is an essential and formative part of the Beckettian archetype 
evolving towards the subjective consciousness we see most clearly in the post-war prose, is 
certainly a compelling one.113  It  strikes me that in the relationship between death and 
physicality displayed in the novellas we find echoes of the descriptions contained within 
Dante’s Inferno and a specific manifestation of the intertextuality Caselli highlights.  
In this first volume of the comedy Dante describes his descent into hell, led by the guide 
Virgil.  The epic poem is essentially an extended description of the underworld; its interior 
imagined in a very literal  way, encompassing multiple levels and forms of punishment 
matching the severity of the sinner.  In his bid to escape the underworld Dante is forced to 
travel deeper and deeper, through increasingly brutal holdings as he makes his way toward 
Satan  himself,  and the  exit.   It  is  not  the  volume of  sins  committed  that  dictates  the 
separation of each level, but rather the gravity of the sin according to Catholicism or at 
least Dante’s take on Catholic dogma.  In most editions one will find a plan of hell, and 
having the layout so clearly presented may be surprised at the ordering of sins, with groups 
such as the ‘intellectually dishonest’ occupying a much lower level than those who have 
committed ‘violence against others.’114  It seems that this example in particular arises from 
Dante in his capacity as a poet, and not as a theologian.  That said, the work generally 
attempts at  an objective,  didactic purpose,  in a manner John Milton will  adapt several 
hundred years later.  Dante tries to render as accurately as he can the intricacies of hell and 
the many levels as a macrocosm of society,  with the concept of sin as the hierarchical 
principle.  
112 Caselli, p. 120.
113 As well as the more oblique references Caselli cites from within the novellas, she also looks at more 
direct textual traces such as a passage in the French version of The End which explicitly mentions Dante, but 
then is excised in Beckett's English translation. Caselli, pp. 121-122.
114 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy I: Inferno (London: Penguin, 2006), Plan of Hell
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The  physical  punishment  of  the  lost  souls  is  played  out  over  and  over  in  Dante’s 
descriptions of seared flesh and endless servitude as one would expect from a tradition of 
epic  religious  poetry  that  equates  physical  debasement  with  didactic  intent.115  One 
example among many comes from canto eighteen of  Inferno.  In this part of the journey 
Dante and Virgil have reached the fringes of Rottenpockets, a ridged structure built into a 
cliff with a well at its bottom.  As per Dante's vision of hell these ten levels hold even more 
diabolical forms of punishment than that which they have already witnessed.  This area is a 
home for those who have committed 'Sins of deceit against those who have no cause to 
trust.'  with  the  first  level,  or  pocket,  having  a  population  of  'pimps  and  seducers'.116 
Recognising someone he knows (in  spite  of the man's  beaten and charred appearance) 
Dante questions  the man on his sins and learns that in life he had arranged the sexual 
relationship  of  his  sister  and  a  marquis  for  personal  gain.117  The  punishment  for 
transgressions of this kind is described in the following example:
Then, to my right, I saw fresh suffering:
new whips, new torments and new torturers,
and Pocket One, with these, was all a-flutter.
Down in those depths, stark naked, there were sinners...
there were (I saw them!) horny demons lashing,
lashing the rear with their vicious scourges.118
We find in an example like this a possible source for the type of physical punishment and 
debasement  the  characters  of  the  novellas  undergo  almost  continuously,  exiled  and 
journeying toward more of the same.  Dante's  vision is not a portrayal of the afterlife 
Beckett adopts literally within his own work119, but instead reflects within the lives of his 
115 Again one could look to Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667) or even Sir Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie 
Queene (1590-1596) for further examples of this.  In Spenser’s poem it is the righteous and often brutal 
slayings of dragons and demons that represent quashing of Catholic forces in opposition to Queen Elizabeth 
I's Protestant reign.
116 Alighieri, Plan of Hell
117 Ibid., p. 155.
118 Ibid., pp. 153-155.
119 By this point in his work Beckett's references are usually embedded in the fabric of the work.  We find 
one clear nod to Dante within the novellas in the form of the following quotation, which echoes the 
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characters, suggesting a conception of death that looks toward current experience and the 
limitations of our own existence.  The punishment the body undergoes in the novellas is a 
product, not of divine retribution, but of decay, decrepitude and human cruelty.  In the end 
this intense focus on the body mirrors Dante's vision of hell, re-positing it as merely the 
state  of  living  we share,  devoid  of  moralistic  notions  of  justice  and coming to  us  all  
regardless  of  circumstance.   Caselli  notes  of  the  place  Beckett  finds  for  Dante  in  the 
novellas  that  'The journey of  the  Comedy cannot  function as  a  source,  but  is  rather  a 
literary  space  towards  which  the  text  intermittently  gestures,  while  refusing  to  be 
assimilated.'120  Not only is this gesturing an excellent way of describing Beckett's novels' 
interactions  with  their  influences  and  inspirations121 more  generally,  but  helps  us 
understand how Beckett could reconfigure an influence like the Comedy to reflect his own 
world-view.  As we have noted, Beckett's new-found direction is away from abstraction, 
affirmation and knowledge and towards the base and tangible, the not-knowing and not-
doing.   This  reductive  method  of  stripping  away  the  layers  of  meaning  ascribed  to 
abstracted processes is primarily a surrendering of false notions such as the idea we can 
ever  know more than  the hellish nature  of  living.   Dante's  Comedy is  invoked but  its 
tripartite  nature  is  snubbed  in  the  world  of  the  novellas.  These  characters  suffer  in  a 
continual process that suggests whether living or dead this is as much as they can expect, 
that the possibility of salvation, of paradise, is never on offer.  
Even though it is  The Inferno  which seems the most likely inspiration for the physical 
descriptions of the novellas, the actual state of life Beckett conceives often has more in 
description of the entrance to hell from the start of The Inferno: '… it was nothing, mere speechlessness due 
to long silence, as in the wood that darkens the mouth of hell, do you remember, I only just.' TC, p. 265.
120 Caselli, p. 126.
121 Indeed, Caselli is trying to categorise the process outwith a simple process of influencer and influenced 
that we attempted to get at in chapter one of this thesis.  The relationship she describes the novellas and the 
three novels having with the Comedy has similarities to the process of bricolage I sought to characterise 
within Murphy.
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common with Purgatory.  In this second volume of The Divine Comedy Dante leaves Hell 
and arrives at the foot of Mount Purgatory.  Ascending to the summit over three days and 
nights he encounters many who are serving a penal sentence, imposed as a punishment 
before they are allowed to enter Heaven.  Of course Beckett's vision of purgatory occurs 
before death, with these series of narrators replaying various moments in their life amongst 
some of the more hellish imagery previously described.  The most telling aspect in terms of 
our understanding of Beckett is that no salvation is offered to his characters.  We are never 
allowed to see farther than the enclosed skulls and memories, the constant looking back 
with no promise of a forwards.  For the characters life is a purgatory that is only broken by 
death,  but death holds no other meaning than the end to both their  suffering and their 
existence.  This is something we have already seen in Watt's existence within Mr. Knott's 
house.  In this earlier example the same thing is happening.  Rather than the purgatory 
being a time served that will allow Watt to pass into Heaven, which is to say the pinnacle 
of understanding, he instead realises there is no resolution to his purgatory.  It is simply the 
state of existence we all must share and it is this which makes him lose his mind.  The 
character of Dante within The Divine Comedy is not an Everyman figure in the literal sense 
and of course the work is not supposed to represent all our journeys after death.  Indeed, as 
much as the three constituent parts of the trilogy are theological narratives they are also 
heavily  coloured  by  domestic  Italian  politics  of  the  time.122  Despite  this  there  is  a 
universality in the message to be taken from the works.  We are united in that we will be 
judged and subsequently see out the rest of eternity in heaven or hell.  Yet, for Beckett we 
are under the same conditions to an even greater extent.  We stand together as creatures 
who attempt to ascribe meaning and purpose to life and a belief in knowing what will 
occur after it ends.  However, what the arbitrary and unforgiving nature of Beckett's world 
122 Reflected in many of the discussions Dante has with the inhabitants of hell and purgatory is the 
Florentine politics that he and his family were so heavily involved with.  We see through his own position the 
voracity of his beliefs and the consequent danger he faced at various points in his life.
108
illustrates is that we are all at the whim of chance, with aporia and lack of meaning the true 
defining abstractions of our existence and the crumbling of our physical bodies one of the 
few truths to hold on to.  It is these inescapable conditions that bind us together with the 
doppelgänger narrators of the novellas, eroding the idea of agency over fate.
Intratextuality and Reflection
The level of intratextuality within the novellas and Beckett's work in general is an issue 
that raises many more questions however.  With these 1946 works the similarity in traits, 
habits,  inclinations  and  physicality  of  the  narrators  creates  a  sphere  for  an  ongoing 
dialogue in which the approach Beckett finds to discussing his central issues can be added 
to, modified and looked back upon.  The concern here is not that the various narrators may 
in fact be the same character and this type of resolvable conclusion is not a possibility 
Beckett offers.  Rather, what we have is the creation of an archetype; a figure who through 
various incarnations becomes shorthand for a set of behaviours and linked concerns central 
to the prose.  We can see in various examples from the novellas how this continuity of 
attributes is built into the characters.  In  The Expelled  the narrator notes of the carriage 
driver, who is letting the former stay in his house overnight, that 
I would only have confused him by saying that I could tolerate no furniture in my room 
except the bed, and that all the other pieces, and even the night-table, had to be removed 
before I would consent to set foot in it. (TEX, p. 256.)
In First Love the narrator is, as discussed, a very different figure from those of the other 
three works and yet also cannot abide furniture in a room he occupies.  On agreeing to live 
with his variously-named lover he instructs her of the requisite requirements for such an 
arrangement123, which include a separate room he proceeds to empty of its contents, out 
into  the  hall.   The  pervading sense  of  negation  and subtraction  within  these  works  is 
123 This occurs over several pages, the narrator requesting a series of arbitrary things, as in the following 
example: 'I asked her if it would not be possible, now and then, to have a parsnip. A parsnip! She cried, as if I 
had asked for a dish of sucking Jew.' TEX, pp. 244-245.
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purposefully overbearing.  Furthermore, the almost ghostly world we find in the novellas is 
a  key component  in  binding these characters.   Often Beckett  brings  together  opposing 
sentiments and by a process of repetition creates new associations.  In The End we see, as 
part of the scatological nature of the works, one example of Beckett's associating faeces 
and love.  Again looking to the episode in which the narrator travels to a remote cabin in 
the wilderness the narrator enters and takes note that 'In a cowpad a heart had been traced, 
pierced by an arrow.  And yet there was nothing to attract tourists.'  (TE,  p.  285.)  The bleak 
humour of this episode is echoed in First Love  in which the narrator speaks of 'inscribing 
the letters of Lulu [his love's name] in an old heifer pat.' (FL, p. 237.)  These are signposts of the 
collective nature of the novellas' world and the characters who occupy it, but it is from the 
content of the narratives that unfold and the overt aspects of the protagonists appearance 
these impressions are solidified.  Physicality is again elevated above any assumed context 
of  dismissal  as  one  of  the least  significant  aspects  of  humanity.   These characters  are 
covered in visual signifiers, specifically the rotting skulls already discussed but also the 
hats which cover them and particularly their greatcoats, which will become synonymous 
with  the  Beckettian hero.   The effect  of  these visual  motifs  is  to  bring  the  characters  
together as illustrative examples of men in decline, of beings unable to accept the fragility 
of their understanding, who are battered and bruised into awareness, reduced to husks of a 
suggested past existence.  
As I have already noted there are infrequent moments in these works that break from the 
strictly  descriptive  aspects  discussed  thus  far.   It  is  due  to  the  sparseness  of  their 
appearances within the novellas that they carry a greater weight than they may have in 
Beckett's earlier work.  Due to the sprawling style he brings to the fore at this point, it is  
difficult to isolate specific examples, but in the following instance one can see the stark 
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contrast created.  Breaking into the narrative with a metafictional interjection the character 
of The End comments 'That's all a pack of lies I feel.' (TE, p. 278.)  Levy comments on this kind 
of intrusion saying 'The narrator knows full well that, despite their convincing attention to 
concrete  detail,  his  stories  are  mere  illusions,  and so  he  often  balks  at  continuing the 
ruse...'124  There are a few examples of this blatant disregard for maintaining the illusion of 
reality within  the  work that  was  so dominant  in  Beckett's  prose  prior  to  the  novellas. 
However, in general the novels will no longer include this type of interjection.  It could be 
argued by this point in both Beckett's career and in literature in general the fracture in 
narrative as a straightforward tool of mimesis was so pronounced to be self-evident.  What 
are more striking are the moments in which the characters reflect upon and give insight 
into their own situations.  Again these will be phased out over time, but in the four novellas 
they offer a great degree of insight into the purpose of the works.  As I will go on to discuss 
these men are all to various degrees exiles in their own homes.  They live among others in 
an  apparitional  Dublin125,  but  they  are  so  removed  in  their  interactions  to  seem  like 
spectators looking in.  At one point in The End the narrator comments 
One day I caught sight of my son.  He was striding along with a briefcase under his arm. 
He took off his hat and bowed and I saw he was as bald as a coot.  I was almost certain 
it was he.  I turned round to gaze after him.  He went bustling along on his duck feet, 
bowing and scraping and flourishing his hat left and right.  The insufferable son of a 
bitch. (TE, p. 283.)
This incident is recounted as if the narrator is both there and not there, stuck in a kind of 
limbo in which he is forced to view episodes of a past life.  At some points it is as if what's  
suggested is a kind of ultra-awareness of the mind-body separation which would of course 
124 Levy, pp. 109-110.
125 Gerry Dukes notes in his introduction to another edition of the novellas that 'Irish readers need no further 
clues as to the settings of the novellas: mountains to the south, a great bay with flashing beacons and a 
lightship, a city – with two canals – built at the mouth of a river.  The inevitable conclusion is that the events, 
in general, are set in Dublin and environs.' Samuel Beckett, First Love and Other Novellas (London: 
Penguin, 2000), pp. 2-3.  It is also noted by Dukes however that there are suggestions of an infusion of 
Beckett's new home of Paris, helping to make the city both familiar and unfamiliar to readers.  This is 
supported by the following quotation from The End: 'In the street I was lost.  I had not set foot in this part of 
the city for a long time and it seemed greatly changed.  Whole buildings had disappeared, the palings had 
changed positions, and on all sides I saw, in great letters, the names of tradesmen I had never seen before and 
would have been at a loss to pronounce.' TE, p. 278.
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be very in keeping with the rationalist preoccupations of previously discussed works.126 
Again,  it  is  in  The  End  we find  one  of  the  most  significant  disruptions  of  the  strict 
descriptive approach the works follow for their majority.  Beckett said that with English it 
was too easy to veer into the poetic and I think we can see with this example how the 
transition to French did not empty his work of poetic language, but allowed it to rise from 
the strange convergence of the mundane and the speculative which these works contain on 
occasion.  The narrator reflects that
To know I had a being, however faint and false, outside of me, had once had the power 
to stir my heart.  You become unsociable, it's inevitable.  It's enough to make you 
wonder sometimes if you are on the right planet.  Even the words desert you, it's as bad 
as that.  Perhaps it's the moment when the vessels stop communicating, you know, the 
vessels.  There you are still between the two murmurs, it must be the same old song as 
ever, but Christ you wouldn't think so. (TE, p. 291.)
Here we find a great deal of ambiguity as to what is actually being discussed, but the  
typically  playful  and  disruptive  Beckettian  humour  in  'You  become  unsociable,  it's 
inevitable' cuts through the context of lofty abstraction and refuses to allow the reader a 
measure  of  reassurance  that  this  is  the  serious  moment,  and  one  we  should  treat 
accordingly.  There is another intratextual call-back to Watt, with the admission that in the 
absence  of  certainty  and  sure  knowledge  language  can  no  longer  find  a  home  in  the 
narrator's mind and mouth.  The vessels may be a reference to the mind-body issue, but it  
could  just  as  easily  be  the  loosened  consciousness  of  the  dead,  looking  back  on  the 
transition  from life  to  its  current  state.   Certainly Caselli  sees  the  possibility  that  the 
protagonist of The End's 'voice comes from beyond the grave.'127  There is nothing explicit 
in the idea of these now uncommunicative vessels to suggest death, but in the unreal world 
Beckett creates in the story, the mentioning of a person's 'being' and the suggestion all of 
this happened at a distant time and place, a context is certainly created.  So 'vessels' begins 
to suggest bodies, which is to say vessels for consciousness or even the soul, depending on 
126 This can be seen in the first two chapters of this thesis in particular, which deal with Murphy and Watt.
127 Caselli, p. 121.
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how far one wishes to take the theological import we have just been discussing. The end of 
their  communication  could  be  another  way of  describing  the  moment  one  is  literally 
removed from the world of people and the 'two murmurs' could be read as life and death, 
with the character trapped in some sort of limbo between the two.
Later in the story, after swallowing the calmative, the narrator again breaks into a more 
abstract and poetic form of speaking and gives us the clearest indication he has already 
died:
The sea, the sky, the mountains and the islands closed in and crushed me in a mighty 
systole, then scattered to the the utmost confines of space.  The memory came faint and 
cold of the story I might have told, a story in the likeness of my life, I mean without the 
courage to end or the strength to go on. (TE, p. 293.)
This first sentence seems to bring the narrative we have been told back to its origins in 
time.  It is as if what has thus far been said has simply been a replaying of the character's 
life up until the point he imbibes the sedative and embraces death.  There are echoes of the 
purgatorial  state  he seems to occupy when he says  'without  the courage to  end or the 
strength to go on.'  Looking again at the ending of The Expelled  it is so strikingly similar 
one could imagine the conclusions of the stories being interchangeable.  Again it is the 
self-conscious awareness of the subjective fiction of the narrative and its insignificance as 
part of death which is most striking:
When I am abroad in the morning I go to meet the sun, and in the evening, when I am 
abroad, I follow it, till I am down among the dead.  I don't know why I told this story.  I 
could just as well have told another.  Perhaps some other time I'll be able to tell another.  
Living souls, you will see how alike they are. (TEX, p. 259.)
It  must surely be  The Calmative  that speculates on the mortality of the narrators most 
overtly.   Commenting both on the artificial  nature of  storytelling itself,  as  well  as the 
multiplicity  of  constructed  narratives  within  the  novellas  the  narrator  supplements  the 
reflections we see within The End and The Expelled, saying 
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So I'll tell myself a story, I'll try and tell myself another story, to try and calm myself, 
and it's there I feel I'll be old, old, even older than the day I fell, calling for help, and it 
came.  Or is it possible that in this story I have come back to life, after my death? No, 
it's not like me to come back to life, after my death. (TC, p. 261.)
Again, with the final sentence of the quotation the bleak humour of Beckett punctures the 
seriousness  of  the  sentiment  being  expressed.   We  have  direct  reference  paid  to  the 
possibility these stories may be told from an entity already dead.  This type of conception 
adds much to the notion the characters are in a kind of hell or purgatory.  
Returning to the idea of the novellas as tales of an Everyman figure then the most telling 
quotation is the following self-examination: 'I'll tell my story in the past none the less, as 
though it were a myth, or an old fable, for this evening I need another age, that age to 
become another age in which I become what I was.'  (TC,  p.  262.)  This idea of the novellas 
being fables of course adds to the previous discussion of how much each story can be seen 
as driven by a didactic purpose.  It is particularly interesting to view  First Love  in this 
light, being of course at a certain distance from the other works as well as drawn to them 
by  previously  discussed  character  traits  and  thematic  concerns.   We  can  see  by  the 
undeniably strange and unrecognisable version of love that the title of the story is not 
without  a  degree  of  irony.   Due  to  its  isolation  from  the  other  novellas  but  more 
importantly the universality of its main theme it is First Love that appears most clearly to 
fall into the realms of fable.  The notion of these novellas as fables does seem particularly 
apposite considering the unreal, semi-formed worlds they portray.  The significance of this 
and Beckett repeatedly stressing these are stories, particularly at their conclusion, leads one 
to think of what kind of message or moral we can take from them.  When the narrator of  
The Expelled  notes 'I  don't know why I told this story.   I  could just as well  have told 
another.'  (TEX,  p.  259.) Beckett  comes  closest  to  revealing  the  import  of  these  admissions. 
There is, in this focus upon the fiction of what the narrators have to tell us, a destabilising 
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of  narrative  authority  that  suggests  no  matter  what  story  was  being  told  it  would  be 
insufficient to deal with the issues that are the novellas' concern.  A focus such as this, 
across intratextual links, suggests narratives that are part of an indefinite series expressing 
an insurmountable ineffability.  One can see in the focus on death, the focus on debased, 
crumbling  bodies  and  the  allusions  to  Dante  we  have  discussed  an  illustration  of  the 
difficulties inherent in trying to understand the world and respond to it.  This is of course a 
concern we have seen Beckett explore to varying extents within  Murphy  and  Watt,  but 
perhaps  the  difference  in  these  novellas  is  the  almost  mythic,  fable-like  nature  of  the 
stories. This shift signals moves towards modes that do not just comment on unknowability 
and ineffability, but through the creation of the Beckettian archetype and worlds that are 
ragged,  unfinished  and  often  implied,  rather  than  detailed  the  greater  possibility  of 
response.  These are issues we shall explore in much greater depth in following chapters on 
The Trilogy, but we can see in the novellas the seeds of a prose form that will run through 
the  twin-narratives  of  Molloy,  the  fixation  on  storytelling  of  Malone  Dies,  and  the 
terminally open-ended world of The Unnamable.
  
Beckett's Love
In terms of  how these stories  conclude nothing is  more universal  than  death  and  The 
Expelled, The Calmative and The End focus on a concern we all share for what comes after 
life  and  how  to  approach  its  impending  arrival.   Yet,  the  subject  of  First  Love  are 
experiences far more palpable to a readership embroiled in the fabric of life and not its 
often  ignored  end.   As already discussed  it  is  Badiou  who most  acutely theorises  the 
conception of love within Beckett, arguing for the existence of the Beckettian TWO; the 
coupling both sexual and non-sexual that dominates much of his work.  Again, I would say 
that this more tangible form of love is something we see played out with greater regularity 
115
within Beckett's theatre pieces.  Of the postwar fiction the greatest example of THE TWO 
may in fact be Mercier and Camier, but it seems clear that following this work Beckett saw 
drama as a more appropriate vehicle for this particular form of relationship.  Indeed, on 
reading  Mercier and Camier  one feels a sense of distance or abstraction from the issues 
that are actually under the microscope.  In the plays Beckett does not surprise us by having 
his characters as mouthpieces for his beliefs about the nature of the love between two 
individuals.  Rather, he uses dialogue as a mechanism in which little is said directly about 
the nature of a relationship and yet often through what is left unsaid insight is offered.  The 
novellas on the other hand, in the same manner as much of the late fiction, do not deal with 
prolonged pairings.  First Love is the exception and in the interactions between the narrator 
and his love we find the genesis for the twos to follow in The Trilogy.  
In this novella we have an unusual love story in that the protagonist is one of Beckett's 
detached, socially inept heroes, wandering through life in a stupor, confused by the world 
but with a crushing awareness that confusion is the most one can hope for.  If it can be 
called falling in love then the object of the narrator's affections is a prostitute with whom 
he drifts into a relationship, rather than through any sort of desire.  Throughout the story 
the narrator reflects on the kind of love he feels for Lulu, or Anna as he later decides to 
name her.  This forgetting her name does nothing but add to the sense of unintentional and 
purposeless companionship and further,  like the other stories,  seems a memory from a 
distant past,  resurrected from fractured details,  and certainly not the perspective of the 
narrator as he now exists.  He will often speak of a pure love, a love abstract and not 
embroiled with the base and physical preoccupations we have seen as so central to these 
characters.  He remarks 
Yes, I loved her, it's the name I gave, still give alas, to what I was doing then.  I had 
nothing to go by, having never loved before, but of course had heard of the thing, at 
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home, in school, in brothels and at church, and read romances, in prose and verse, under 
the guidance of my tutor, in six or seven languages, both dead and living, in which it 
was handled at length. (FL, pp. 236-237.)
There  is  the  mention  of  a  brothel  which  adds  to  our  understanding  of  the  character's 
experience of love, but the other examples present an idealised version taken from years of 
education on love in its loftier forms.  Later in the story we have the questioning of such an 
idea, particularly in contrast to the carnal desires he feels.  He asks 'Are we to infer from 
this I loved her with that intellectual love which drew from me such drivel, in another 
place?  Somehow I think not.' (FL, p. 238.)  There is a suggestion here of an older or alternative 
narration in which the character may have felt more inclined to platitudes of perfect love. 
One could also read this as a reference to Beckett's earlier work and in particular Dream of 
Fair to Middling Women  which is certainly a cynical work, but one that draws on all of 
Beckett's learning in its descriptions of the protagonist's affairs.  
The love Beckett envisions in the novellas is oppositional.  He is writing against a tradition 
which has sought to place love on a hierarchical system with a pure love at the pinnacle,  
untainted  by desire.   Of course  the  influence  of  the Catholic  church on the  collective 
consciousness of his native Ireland cannot be underestimated.  We can see in the legacy left 
by thinkers  like  Joyce's  favourite  Thomas Aquinas,  the restrictions  placed on the love 
between two people and its distance from the honourable and purest form, the love of God. 
Aquinas would have it that passion and desire are animalistic and something part of our 
nature we must try and overcome.  He writes 'The appetitive power associated with sensory 
cognition is one we share with nonhuman animals – a cluster of inclinations (passions) to 
which we are subject (passive) by nature.'128  This is a view with a genesis stretching back 
to Socratic philosophy.  In Plato's most overt dialogue on the subject, The Symposium, it is 
128 The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. by Norman Kretzmann & Eleonare Stump (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 145.
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the love of wisdom which is seen as the pinnacle of the emotion.  In the work Socrates and 
several friends present arguments on the nature of love.  Socrates argues in favour of what 
he was told by the seer Diotima, that love of wisdom is the highest form and that analogous 
to the procreation of new life is a higher form in which the lover of wisdom gives birth to 
intellectual children, who will not diminish but instead achieve an immortality greater than 
humanity.  
This is the legacy the novellas respond to, delineating their own ideas on love in sharp 
contrast.  We find this most overtly in the interactions the narrator of First Love has with 
Lulu.  They meet by chance whilst sharing a bench and during one of their first encounters 
there is a moment of physical contact we have already looked at.  The narrator notes 'She 
began stroking my ankles.  I considered kicking her in the cunt.' (FL, p. 234.)  As Badiou notes 
'Love as a matter of  truth (and not of opinion) depends upon a pure event: an encounter 
whose strength radically exceeds both sentimentality and sexuality.'129  “Pure” is not the 
most appropriate term for the love of the narrator, but the ground of simultaneous longing 
and disgust he feels certainly seems to hold power by subverting all 'sentimentality and 
sexuality'.   It  is  Beckett's  method to mock love,  dragging it  down from any perceived 
hierarchical height down into the reality of life with his cutting humour.  It is a twisted,  
uneven  love  between  two  differing  but  equally  lost  individuals  Beckett  uses  for  this 
comedy, with the narrator asking the reader things like 'would I have been tracing my name 
in old cowshit if my love had been pure and disinterested?'  (FL, p. 237.)  In the wake of their 
sexual encounter he says 'I looked at my member.  If only it could have spoken!  Enough of 
that.  It was my night of love.' (FL, p. 243.)  We can see in examples like this that despite his 
differing age and circumstances the narrator of this novella is cut from the same cloth as 
the other three.  He is a variation of the archetype, still disgusted entirely with humanity 
129 Badiou, p. 28.
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but also inextricably drawn toward it.  This is the attitude he is to take into the relationship 
he embarks upon with his prostitute lover and we get the sense of an even greater disgust 
with himself in that he is, by virtue of his humanity, a victim of this physically compelled 
process of coupling.   This is the inevitability Aquinas discusses, but the difference for 
Beckett's characters is that there is no possibility of lifting themselves out of their baser 
instincts, towards a higher form of love.  In fact, as they achieve greater awareness they 
become more and more attached to the slender comfort they find in focus on the body.  
In the end the work's perspective on love, and the abandoning of his lover and their new-
born babe by the protagonist, is made clear by a symbol as clear as any in Beckett's work. 
Examining the gravestone of his father he notes the date of his death is the same as his  
marriage.   If  we need a  stronger  symbol  of  the  continuity of  experience  between  the 
younger narrator of First Love and the other dying men then this will suffice.  The story 
conceives love as not occupying a distance from the base and the physical, but instead as 
emblematic of the true ground these concepts must fight upon.  If they are to be examined 
as  having  any true  meaning  then  they  cannot  be  abstracted  in  the  way literature  and 
philosophy have historically done.  The association between love and death is again one 
forced by Beckett, suggesting love is another example of our desire to romanticise death. 
Rather than a love of God, it is the emotionally and physically unfulfilling relationship 
between these two examples of societal detachment that is the most we can expect.  Again, 
as Kierkegaard writes 'Death has no need of explanation and certainly has never requested 
any thinker to be of assistance.  But the living need the explantaion – and why?  In order to 
live accordingly.'130  They need a higher power and the suggestion of an afterlife, but of 
course this merely reflects their lives, and life in the novellas is a vulgar and hopeless 
affair.  Despite First Love having the greatest amount of content in terms of a discussion of 
130 Kierkegaard, p. 99.
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love we need to turn to the other three novellas to get a sense of love at its broadest and 
most inclusive level.  
It is an absence of love that is most felt by these characters.  This is not in the sense they do 
not have partners or even companions, but a much more basic lack of self-love, the true 
tragedy of their  condition.   These men will  often hint at  a past  life or earlier  stage of  
development in which, rather than being on the margins of society, they were participants 
in life in a fuller sense.  We can take the narrator of The End who we have already seen has 
a son, indicating not only his age, but also letting us know that he has come to be distanced 
from a life that would entail a family and relationships with others.  These characters are 
haunted  by an  awareness  that  will  plague  all  of  Beckett's  late  protagonists.   It  is  the 
knowledge  of  his  vision,  both  revelatory  and  damning.   This  awareness  that  a  total 
understanding,  a  certainty of  even the most  rudimentary elements  of  the universe  will 
always be out of reach is a burden too heavy to bear.  They become so unsettled by the  
knowledge  that  to  continue  to  live  in  the  same  way is  simply  an  impossibility.   We 
encounter them in the final stages of their lives and by this time they are not even self-
interested enough to maintain their health and hygiene.  Basic relations with fellow human 
beings have become devoid of meaning.  They are suffering from a tragic lack of self-love, 
brought on by an awareness of the apparent meaninglessness of self-love.  On the space 
Kierkegaard's  writing  on  love  opens  up  for  future  artists,  Rick  Anthony  Furtak 
hypothesises 'it would have to be one [a form or writing] that allows us to come to terms 
with the predicament of a situated human being, rather than abstracting the human being 
away from his or her connections with the world.'131  I would argue this is precisely the 
reins Beckett's novellas of 1946 take up.
131 Rick Anthony Furtak, 'Natural and Commanded Love'; repr. in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard: 
philosophical engagements, ed. by Edward F. Mooney (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2008), p. 68.
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Exile
Arising  from  this  absence  of  love  is  a  sense  of  not  belonging,  of  homelessness  the 
characters embody.  As we have seen there are indications within the works that these men 
were once part of the society they now find themselves isolated from.  The idea of exile is 
one  not  peculiar  to  these  four  novellas  but  indeed  is  the  condition  of  many  Beckett 
characters and as the works progress this theme will come to be central and recurring. 
Many critics132 have speculated that the reason for its prominence may have had as much to 
do with Beckett's own circumstances as any existential concern.133  Like his mentor Joyce, 
Beckett  felt  a  great  deal  of  restriction and hostility in  his  native  Ireland.   Aside from 
visiting his family and occasional trips home to receive honours Beckett remained in self-
imposed exile for the majority of his adult life.  Yet, the setting of his works is almost 
always identifiable as Dublin and environs.  He became part of a tradition of writers living 
outside Ireland and yet  still  writing of it.   What differs in the novellas in terms of the 
content  of  exile  compared  to  earlier  works  is  not  the  attitude  of  the  author,  but  the 
technique he uses to render the idea behind its self-imposed nature and its necessity.  
Of course  The End  and  The Expelled begin with the narrators being evicted from their 
respective homes and trying to find new lodgings, but these are merely the most obvious 
examples of narratives of exile we can see through the works.  The characters are again 
united in that they occupy positions on the fringes of society, as aliens in their communities 
who share fleeting interactions with fellow citizens that only confirm their distance from 
others.  Through them Beckett personifies the most extreme version of this type of exile. 
132 As in David Lloyd, who in Anomalous States: Irish Writing and the Post-Colonial Moment (Dublin: 
Lilliput, 1993) offers a post-colonial reading of First Love, looking at similar issues as I have explored in this 
chapter.  Issues such as bodily degradation are examined from the entirely different perspective of the legacy 
of colonialism as it weaves its way into Beckett's writing. 
133 Both John Fletcher and Linda Ben-Zvi write extensively on this in their works The Novels of Samuel 
Beckett and Samuel Beckett respectively.
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There is a tracing of a process that continues from what has been discussed in the previous 
chapter on  Watt.  We have here characters that begin life much like any other, but at a 
certain  stage  reach  a  level  of  awareness  over  the  failure  of  not  only  the  established 
institutions of religion and state but also at a much more fundamental level of the building 
blocks of interaction.   With the collapse of this  assuredness over language they,  unlike 
Beckett, remain in their homeland but are driven to a level of detachment and madness by 
the  unsettling effect  their  awareness  has  brought  them.  We can see  in  First  Love  for 
example a character much more able to engage with the world and its  inhabitants.   In 
contrast to this by the time of the other stories the characters have so detached themselves 
from the thinking world they are only concerned with the physical ailments that arrest their 
attention.  We are allowed an insight into this process in fleeting moments of recollection 
within stories such as The Expelled.  The narrator comments 'But I still knew how to act at 
this period, when it was absolutely necessary.' (TEX, p. 250.)  In the present however he is at the 
mercy of a controlling disorientation and sense of living within someone else's body.  His 
surroundings also have an uncanny feel, noting of the Dublin-like city 'I did not know the 
town very well, scene of my birth and of my first steps in this world, and then of all the 
others, so many that I thought all trace of me was lost, but I was wrong.' (TEX, p. 250.)  Despite 
the fact this has been his home his entire life it still feels unfamiliar to him, another part of 
the distance from a suggested past existence.  The narrator of  The Calmative  says, in a 
revealing remark 'there was never any city but the one.' (TC, p. 261.)  In the novellas there are 
moments when we can feel the influence of Paris in the reminiscence of the narrator, but in 
general it is the sense of loss at being in Dublin but also excluded from it that so perplexes,  
exhausts and destabilises the narrators.  Again we have a problem of love.  In this case it is  
the loss of fraternity, of being part of one's home and the inability to surmount or ignore the 
burden of knowledge.
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Stylistically these stories employ a variety of techniques in order to render and compliment 
this theme of exile and isolation, but the most significant is the change from the third to the 
first-person mode of narration.  As discussed these four novellas are the work Beckett sets 
about following his revelation that the mode of writing most appropriate for his own needs 
would seek to explore negation and absence.  It seems that with the switch to French he 
was able  to  free  himself  from the  shackles  of  his  native  tongue.   In  addition  Beckett 
changes  from the  third-person,  which has  been his  preferred  mode in  previous  works, 
obviously feeling that the first-person offers the chance to render the particular voice of 
these characters in a far more idiosyncratic manner.  Furthermore it allows the reader an 
insight into the level of distance the characters feel from both the events and the people 
that  they  come  into  contact  with.   Beckett's  previous  prose  efforts  are  by  no  means 
exercises  in  realism,  but  these  new  works  have  a  dream-like  quality,  a  new  level  of 
subjective reality ideally suited to the ambiguity of the world he creates.  Beckett sought to 
write  'without  style'134 during  this  time,  and by this  we can  infer  he  meant  outwith  a 
recognisable tradition which would detract from the isolated feel of the world he creates. 
The question of  whether  these characters  are  dead is  not  one that  we need to try and 
resolve.  Death is so heavily involved in the content of the novellas because, as we have 
seen,  it  is  their  primary concern.   Beckett  moves  us  inside  the  mind  of  these  further 
evolved archetypes, allowing a new level of subjectivity in which he manipulates time, 
setting and speech to create a hellish world reflecting their inner state.
The emphasis is on an exaggerated illustration of the reality that the state of death, as 
Kierkegaard argues, merely reflects our state of living and that in order to understand the 
former we must reject a history of attempts to abstract and formalise it.  On more than one 
134 Knowlson, p. 357.
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occasion within At A Graveside he will describe the “earnest person”, which is to say he 
who truly seeks  knowledge  of  death,  but  in  the  end  concludes  his  investigations  will 
always mirror what he believes to be the character of life: 'Earnestness, then, understands 
the same thing about death, that it is indefinable by inequality, that no age or circumstance 
or life situation is a safeguard against it, but thereupon the earnest person understands it in 
another way and understands himself.'135  Beckett suggests that if we wish to find new 
avenues  of  exploration  then  the  place  to  start  is  with  the  very  opposite  of  abstract 
reflection; with the cruel, the lustful and the repulsive.  These post-war novellas represent 
the  start  of  Beckett  writing  prose that  rather  than  merely commenting  on a  history of 
philosophy and theology aims to produce a new kind of philosophical enterprise through 
fiction.  In the forthcoming chapter on Molloy we shall see how this is developed from a 
form that acts in opposition to a metaphysical tradition to one that begins forging original 
answers to the most fundamental questions.
135 Kierkegaard, p. 93.
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Chapter Four:
Molloy   – An Endpoint in Beckett's Prose? 
In  the  previous  chapter  I  attempted  to  demonstrate  the  undervalued  significance  of 
Beckett's 1946 novellas in an appreciation of the author's philosophical position and work 
in general.  If these works were laying the foundations of repetitive concerns in form and 
content, then it is with the seminal Trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable that 
these concerns were built upon and taken to their endpoint.
Molloy  came out of a period of intense creativity, but also poverty.  Although the 1946 
works were a significant progression from Beckett's English language efforts, they were 
not well received and in some cases unpublished for years to come.  Nevertheless these 
works 'marked the beginning of an extraordinarily fertile period during which he produced 
four stories, four novels and two plays, all written in French...'136  Finding a publisher that 
would accept  Molloy and the other two works of The Trilogy was a lengthy task, mostly 
undertaken by Beckett's wife Suzanne, who had an unfaltering belief in the worth of her 
husband's work.  Eventually her persistence paid off and alongside  Waiting for Godot  it 
was the works from this period which established Beckett's reputation and that many still 
consider his best.
Bearing in mind what we have established in previous chapters we will look at Molloy as 
another developmental work, but one that reaches a zenith in terms of the fusion of form 
and content.   I  am going to  look at  a  variety of  areas  we have  thus  far  discussed  as 
prototypical, from narrative technique and language, through to genre and more abstract 
concerns such as time.  The issue now is that, if Beckett has by this point found the ideal 
136 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 358.
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vehicle for his ideas, can we identify and formalise these and should that be our principal 
concern?
 
A New First-Person Mode
The first thing to note about Molloy's mode of first person narration is that it is not so much 
an evolution of previous forms, as a rejection of them.  As we have noted, Beckett was 
attracted more and more to the minimal, to absence and negation, as opposed to attempts at 
encompassing something real or full.  The two halves of the novel are autobiographical 
reminiscences of the protagonists, Molloy and Moran.  It is important to recognise that as 
opposed to something like  Ulysses  the stories the two men tell are in fact written down, 
being books within the book if you will.  Both are writing of the journey they took to bring 
them to their present state, with Molloy being handed blank pages and told to fill them by 
an anonymous figure, and Moran writing his report supposedly for the purposes of his job 
as a private investigator.  This said, the method of both the men is not one of calculated 
remembrance,  but  in  fact  seems  a  much  more  fluid  invoking  of  the  past,  with  both 
appearing to exist in the texts as if it were the present.  This is evidenced by the seemingly 
concurrent ways their consciousness moves, often engaging with the next part of the story. 
In Proust, Beckett’s early monograph on In Search of Lost Time (1913-1927) he of course 
speaks  of  the  book’s  most  famous  element:  its  usage  of  involuntary memory.137  This 
indeed seems to directly feature in Molloy and Moran’s narratives, with both experiencing 
involuntary memory that shifts and displaces them from the linearity of their  narrative 
throughout their respective journeys.  In terms of form this is achieved with the use of 
irregular punctuation and the rejection of stringent grammatical rules.  In the following 
example we can see past and present tenses converging and creating a fused recollection:
137 Samuel Beckett, Proust (1931); repr. in Samuel Beckett, The Grove Centenary Edition, IV (New York: 
Grove Press, 2006), p. 7.
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My name is Molloy, I cried, all of a sudden, now I remember.  Nothing compelled me to 
give this information, but I gave it, hoping to please I suppose.  They let me keep my 
hat on, I don’t know why.  Is it your mother’s name? said the sergeant, it must have 
been a sergeant.  Molloy, I cried, my name is Molloy.  Is that your mother’s name? said 
the sergeant.  What? I said.  Your name is Molloy, said the sergeant.  Yes, I said, now I 
remember.  And your mother? said the sergeant.  I didn’t follow.  Is your mother’s name 
Molloy too? said the sergeant.  I thought it over.  Your mother, said the sergeant, is your 
mother’s—Let me think! I cried. (MO, pp. 18-19.)
One can also get a sense from this passage just how Beckett’s style of first person narration 
differs  from  the  modernist  stream-of-consciousness  approach.   Looking  again  to  the 
realisation we examined in the opening chapter of this thesis, which allowed him to move 
into his own distinct mode of writing, he noted his move away from emulation of Joyce. 
Beckett said:
I realised that Joyce had gone as far as one could in the direction of knowing more, 
[being] in control of one’s material.  He was always adding to it; you only have to look 
at his proofs to see that.  I realised that my own way was in impoverishment, in lack of 
knowledge and in taking away, in subtracting rather than adding.138
Although we can see the roots of this awakening in the previous prose efforts, it is with 
Molloy that Beckett truly begins to find the ways and means most appropriate to achieving 
the negation in form and content he seeks.  Molloy is a character who embodies this idea; 
he is  essentially a  vessel through whom knowledge flows, but  who has only the most 
minimal semblance of order and retention.  As shown in the following passage in which he 
speaks of his mother, his narrative is characterised by its rambling, fervent nature:
She never called me son, fortunately, I couldn’t have borne it, but Dan, I don’t know 
why, my name is not Dan.  Dan was my father’s name perhaps, yes, perhaps she took 
me for my father.  I took her for my mother and she took me for my father.  Dan, you 
remember the day I saved the swallow.  Dan, you remember the day you buried the ring. 
I remembered, I remembered, I mean I knew more or less what she was talking about, 
and if I hadn’t always taken part personally in the scenes she evoked, it was just as if I 
had. (MO, p. 13.)
The style Beckett chooses for Molloy is also highly dependent on qualifications, which 
often mount one upon another, giving a dizzying impression in which the reader struggles 
to keep up with the original idea.  These qualifications are also a very effective way to 
138 Knowlson, p. 134.
127
render a situation humorous, frequently acting as a “reveal”, as in the previous example. 
Molloy says ‘I remembered, I remembered’ as if he is in the throws of reminiscence, only 
to immediately make the idea preposterous by stating that he of course wasn’t involved in 
the memories his mother is recalling but could pretend he was by his familiarity with the 
scenarios she is describing.  This comedic device is essential to the new modes Beckett 
employs in Molloy and is something I will return to.
What one also notes about Molloy’s narrative style is that it  is  often written in abrupt 
sentences, rarely with paragraph breaks, flitting from one subject to another, with certain 
expositional elements being left for the reader to infer.  The result of this is an impression 
of urgency to everything Molloy says, forcing one to follow the narrative at the rapid pace 
it  sets.   Alongside  the  often  multiple  qualifications,  asides,  tangents  and  purposefully 
missing elements the reader is left with a very distinct impression, one that can be seen 
most clearly in the context of ‘impoverishment’ Beckett was so keen to achieve.  In Gilles 
Deleuze’s famous essay on Beckett,  ‘The Exhausted’, he describes Beckett’s method of 
writing as related to the combinatorial:
The combinatorial  is  the art  or science of exhausting the possible through inclusive 
disjunctions.  But only an exhausted person can exhaust the possible, because he has 
renounced all need, preference, goal, or signification.139
This is what has just been emphasised.  These ‘inclusive disjunctions’ Deleuze describes 
are in fact the aforementioned relentless qualifications that pervade Molloy’s speech.  The 
exhausted person is Molloy,  free from the usual restrictions of society and with needs, 
preferences, goals or significations that he may immediately want, but which on closer 
inspection Beckett reveals to be a meaningless bad joke.  Deleuze goes as far as saying that 
in a sense the matter which is exhausted, the spaces our protagonist moves through, are in 
139 Gilles Delueze, ‘The Exhausted’, in Essays Critical and Cultural, trans. by Daniel W. Smith and Michael 
A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), p. 154.
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fact unimportant as their essence is (purposefully) never open to us.  It is the process, the 
‘inclusive disjunctions’ and what they illustrate that matters.
Before actually moving onto speculation about the purpose behind what may initially seem 
a counter-productive aim it is worthwhile to look at the other half of Molloy.  In a sense the 
splitting of the novel into two distinct and yet inter-related parts is familiar territory for 
Beckett.   Waiting for  Godot (1949) was famously described,  in  a  quotation which has 
become a cliché in itself, as ‘the play in which nothing happens, twice’.140  Whether or not 
this glib summary does justice to the play it is indeed a very neat way to bring out the 
similarities  with  Molloy.   In  Moran’s  narrative  we  are  not  initially  given  the  same 
gibbering, yet highly revealing fool that is Molloy, but by the end the very distinct lines 
separating the two have blurred.  In the following excerpt from the first page of Moran’s 
half of the novel he recalls his initial involvement in the Molloy case:
I  remember the day I  received the order  to  see about  Molloy.   It  was  a  Sunday in 
summer.  I was sitting in my little garden, in a wicker chair, a black book closed on my 
knees.  It must have been about eleven o’clock, still too early to go to church.  I was 
savouring  the  day of  rest,  while  deploring  the  importance  attached to  it,  in  certain 
parishes. (MO, p. 87.)
First of all what should be noted are the circumstances of Moran, in so far as they relate to 
the  style  his  narrative  adopts.   Whereas  Molloy  is  a  homeless  vagrant  with  a  fixed 
attachment to nothing, Moran is a relatively successful private investigator with a house, 
son, maid and a serious, if somewhat absurd devotion to the church.  This opposition is 
reflected strongly in the styles of speech the two men use.  In stark contrast to Molloy’s  
often  incoherent  ramblings,  Moran  employs  a  straightforward,  traditional  form  of 
narration, recalling the series of events as they happened with the journalistic rigour of 
someone confident in the actuality of what they say.  Perhaps the one area in which the two 
men’s narratives are similar is in their usage of abrupt sentences, although for Moran this 
140 Vivian Mercier, Beckett/Beckett (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. xii.
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seems reflective of his simplified worldview rather than any kind of disparate, unsettled 
consciousness.  
That is at least what we find at first upon comparing the two.  It is only later in the novel  
that the eccentricities we observe in Moran’s character expand and fill his consciousness, 
dislocating the simple binary relationship he understood himself to have with the world. 
Following the extraordinarily long preamble to their journey, Moran and his son venture 
out, apparently in mind of some unknown force, on foot and into the wilderness.  Trying to  
find Molloy, what then occurs are a series of changes in Moran directly parallel to the 
reduced circumstances the two face whilst supposedly on the case.  Both physically and 
mentally  he  rapidly  deteriorates,  the  oddities  evident  at  the  beginning  of  his  journey 
expanding to dominate and hinder their progress.  In the following passage we can see that 
the questioning aspect of Moran has come to plague his thought, with that which has been 
said, unsaid, intended and unintended obsessing him completely:
What did he tell you? I said.  I don’t understand, said Gaber.  You were saying a minute 
ago that he had told you something, I said, then I cut you short.  Short? Said Gaber.  Do 
you know what he told me the other day, I said, those were your very words.  His face  
lit up.  The clod was just about as quick as my son.  He said to me, said Gaber, Gaber,  
he said––.  Louder! I cried.  He said to me, said Gaber, Gaber, he said, life is a thing of 
beauty, Gaber, and a joy for ever. (MO, p. 158.)
If we are to compare this to the conversation Moran and Gaber have at the beginning of the 
novel, when the latter sends him in pursuit of Molloy, we form a very different picture. 
The two informed men communicating with supposedly perfect understanding have been 
reduced to speaking at crossed purposes; confusion now reigning as the principal mode 
Moran’s  speech  and  thought  adopt  in  his  new  consciousness.   What  is  more,  the 
fundamental breaking down and making suspect of Moran’s understanding of life, thought, 
communication and religion is matched and indeed works symbiotically with his growing 
physical incapacities.  What surprises Moran at the very start of the novel when his knee is 
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attacked by a sudden spasm of pain, comes to be normal for him as he witnesses his leg 
stiffen and stop working all together.  In both his physical and mental breakdowns there is 
an erosion of the distance between Molloy and Moran.  The speech of the two is almost the 
same, with the above example being nearly identical to the previously quoted episode in 
which Molloy is taken to the police station.   More and more as the novel progresses the 
latter comes to resemble the former and towards the end of the novel the two are almost the 
same character.  In this we can see a development of narrative technique begun with the 
1946 novellas.  In those we had the first person narrative positioning us in the mind of 
these doppelgänger vagrants, but in  Molloy  Beckett has developed his approach.  In the 
sprawling,  clause-laden  speech  of  Molloy he  illustrates  the  idiosyncratic  nature  of  his 
mental decline, with language again the overt symptom.  This new synergy of form and 
content is a progression we see mirrored in Moran's language impairment, as well as the 
failure of his body, which is again something we have seen featured heavily in the novellas. 
Molloy is  an  evolution  of  these  tools.   The  ideas  Beckett  communicates  are  largely 
unchanged, but the methods he uses are far better realised for his purpose.
  
The Character of  Molloy  
This  said,  what  I  will  try to  show in this  chapter  is  that  tools  like  Beckett's  narrative 
choices, are not made towards a single, definitive philosophical enterprise as some have 
argued.  Rather, Molloy, and indeed the majority of Beckett’s prose output, contain and are 
exercises in modes of thought which have already been sketched briefly, but which I seek 
to make more palpable.   If  Beckett’s work is fundamentally defined by its attempts to 
progress within the spheres of negation, reduction and absence is this something we can 
locate  and  pinpoint  within  a  novel  like  Molloy?   The  narrative  choices  we  have  just 
examined are a prime example that not only can we find these ideas put into practice, but  
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furthermore, that by examining them closely we can understand to a much fuller degree 
their purpose.  It is no accident that Molloy and Moran are writers, no decision Beckett 
made for the purposes of maintaining a more realistic plot.  It is abundantly clear, opening 
a page of Beckett at random and reading a few paragraphs, that realism, as a style, is not 
something he is interested in.  For one thing we can say that having the two protagonists of 
Molloy as authors brings about a blurring of the lines between the author and his work.  If 
we are to examine the central character of Beckett’s novels as essentially the same entity, 
albeit under different guises as the processes of evolution and refinement dictate, then we 
begin to see how the choice to have Molloy and Moran as authors makes perfect sense.  
Indeed Beckett  makes no qualms about the fact that with each successive character he 
creates he is trying to move closer to a better realised embodiment of the ideas he fixates 
upon.  Metafictional and intratextual references abound as testament to this awareness, as 
in the following example in which Moran’s consciousness is stretched to breaking point:
Oh the stories I could tell you, if I were easy.  What a rabble in my head, what a gallery 
of moribunds.  Murphy, Watt, Yerk, Mercier and all the others.  I would have believed 
that – yes, I believe it willingly.  Stories, stories.  I have not been able to tell them.  I 
shall not tell this one. (MO, p. 142.)
Throughout the novels moments like this are common, in which the characters of Beckett’s 
previous work reappear (sometimes literally), often as a skewed reincarnation.  Always 
they are invoked as failed attempts, as half finished, picked up in the form of the new 
protagonist  of  the  current  work.   To  say  that  the  Beckettian  archetype  is  an 
autobiographical creation is a step too far, and yet looking at this figure there is much from 
the author himself.  Beginning with the clearest example in the Belaqua141 of  Dream of 
Fair to Middling Women, right through to the barely recognisable voices who speak in 
How It Is, the figure invariably appropriates elements of Beckett the man.  From Dublin, 
141 Belaqua is of course a French variation on Beckett, and indeed may have been their original name as the 
family history traces back to Huguenot roots.  Whether or not this is accurate, Beckett made no qualms about, 
and indeed many have studied in depth the loosely shrouded incidents and people from Beckett’s own life 
that feature in Dream.
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which often appears transformed, or a distant incorporeal memory, we still can recognise 
the city of Beckett’s youth; the old masters whose work shaped and moulded the writer 
appear time and time again, in many obscure and sometimes even blatant references. 
The  notion  that  Beckett  has  a  clearly  definable  goal  behind  his  narrative  choices  is 
problematic.  As we have examined earlier in the thesis, in  The Philosophy of Samuel  
Becket John Calder argues the case that Beckett is a writer who has a distinct metaphysical 
perspective and further that ‘what  future generations can expect  to find in his  work is 
above all an ethical and philosophical message; the novels and plays will increasingly be 
seen as the wrapping for that message.’142  This idea of Beckett’s purpose, of his work as a 
vehicle for an ethical, humanist or even philosophical sense, in the Western metaphysical 
tradition, is an understanding that is often outdated and a lot of the time simply wrong. 
Many have cited Beckett’s influences as evidence of the aims his work takes.  Throughout 
Beckett’s oeuvre there are references made to the writers and thinkers who shaped his 
output.  Within Molloy alone there are several references made to Cartesian thinking, the 
Christian philosopher  Geulincx and of course one of Beckett’s  obsessions,  The Divine 
Comedy.  What is essential to understand with Beckett is that from his influences he did 
not merely produce work that was derivative, but engaged with them in a far more complex 
and ambiguous manner.  This is of course the idea of Beckett as the bricoleur which was 
explored fully in the chapter on Murphy.
Beckett is enamoured with the work of these great religious thinkers and yet he was from a 
very young age an atheist.  Littering his oeuvre are, as I have mentioned, references and 
homages paid to writers and works to which Beckett may owe a debt or enjoy but which he 
did not subscribe to in their entirety.  Take Geulincx for example, whom we have already 
142 John Calder, The Philosophy of Samuel Beckett (London: Calder Publications, 2001), p. 1.
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looked at in depth with regards Murphy.  Molloy says
I who had loved the image of old Geulincx, dead young, who left me free, on the black 
boat of Ulysses, to crawl towards the East, along the deck. (MO, p. 132.)
This  cryptic  remark  is  typical  of  Molloy and although designed to puzzle,  rather  than 
enlighten, it does give us specificity as to the sources the book draws from.  Again, the 
argument I would make is that this reappearance of Geulincx in a later work does not mean 
that we should search for the influence of the thinker in the aims of Molloy, but rather as 
part of the milieu of forces Beckett reacts to. 
In a sense we can understand the majority of Beckett’s influences in this way.  As well as 
being invested in ideas of negation within his work, Beckett also seems to operate in a 
similar  way  with  regard  to  his  predecessors.   The  areas  of  disagreement  with  these 
important  and defining figures in  Beckett’s  development  are  where his  most  important 
ideas become apparent.  With Descartes, it  is very much in a similar vein to Geulincx; 
obsessed by the opening of  Discours de la méthode  (1637) and  Meditationes de prima 
philosophia  (1641)  he  basks  in  the  proving  of  life’s  essentially  unknowable  character 
('Dubito') and yet winces at the defining 'cogito ergo sum', a step Beckett would never be 
prepared  to  make.   In  Molloy  this  essential  disparagement  is  brought  out  in  various 
parodies of rationalism and attempts to bring logical solutions to ridiculous problems.  This 
ranges  from Molloy’s  multiple  page  discussion  of  the  best  method  for  alternating  the 
sucking stones he regularly collects from beaches, through to Moran’s attempts to resolve 
the finer points of theology towards the end of his narrative:
1.  What value is to be attached to the theory that Eve sprang, not from Adam’s rib, but 
from a tumour in the fat of his leg (arse?)?
2. Did the serpent crawl or, as Comestor affirms, walk upright?
3.Did Mary conceive through the ear, as Augustine and Adobard assert?
4. How much longer are we to hang about waiting for the antichrist?... (MO, pp. 160-161.)
Rationalism and the various schools of thought Beckett studied at Trinity College, Dublin 
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appear, much like many of the events of his youth, under various guises throughout his 
prose output and yet are to be seen most effectively as part of a framework of things to 
engage with, and not to emulate.  This is most strikingly true in the relationship Beckett 
had with Joyce, something I have already highlighted in the earlier quotation in which the 
former categorises one of the most formative events of his writing career as his decision to 
attempt the opposite of Joyce.
What then are we to understand as the character of Beckett’s writing at this point? Is it an 
essentially hopeless affair as some have said; a nihilistic enterprise intended for nothing 
more than the reduction of prose and the rejection of its ideas until nothing is left?  In a 
sense this is true, although to think of a novel like Molloy in such pessimistic terms rests 
uncomfortably with an attentive reading of the work.  It is far more accurate to say of 
Beckett’s prose that it has a duality of purpose: it seeks to contain a set of shifting ideas 
(characterised by the similarities in their nature) whilst simultaneously functioning as an 
enactment of these ideas.  In a 1989 interview he gave to Derek Attridge, Jacques Derrida 
was questioned on why he had not written on Samuel Beckett, a writer whom many felt 
had affinities with the philosopher.  Derrida now famously, or infamously depending on 
your perspective, stated that he could deconstruct Joyce from a mere two words (as he of 
course did in his essay ‘Two Words for Joyce’), but that to try and attempt the same thing 
with Beckett would be impossible.  Derrida noted that he could take a work like Ulysses 
and from a single line he could deconstruct the entire novel,  revealing previously held 
truths about it to in fact be erroneous.  Beckett, and in particular Beckett after he began to 
write in French, was a writer for whom this kind of treatment was simply not appropriate. 
For one thing Derrida says that Beckett has his own French, a branch of a language he has 
created  which  would  require  an  entirely  new  set  of  criteria  to  approach  adequately. 
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Attridge asks Derrida if the problem with trying to deconstruct Beckett’s work is that it  
actually deconstructs itself, to which Derrida answers in the affirmative.143  This is actually 
in keeping with what many have argued in recent years, with some casting Beckett and 
Derrida as proponents of the same philosophical school, although using different types of 
writing.  I, however, will not attempt to argue for this kind of understanding.  Although in 
many respects Beckett is a poststructuralist writer, and indeed a prescient one at that, it is 
to reshape his work for one’s own purposes to suggest at this stage he can be aligned with a 
single school of philosophical thought, even one as disparate and undermining of Western 
philosophy as deconstruction.     
Beckett’s prose, much like the work of Derrida, is a body that is by its very nature an 
attempt to unshackle itself from the incumbent restrictions applied by the tradition into 
which it falls.  Both however, are also aware of the impossibility of moving outside one’s 
culture  and  the  consequent  prescription  incurred  by working within  a  set  of  recurring 
modes.  It could be argued the best way to think of Molloy then is as a novel fundamentally 
concerned with truth, in the sense of casting what is accepted theologically, philosophically 
and  linguistically  as  essentially  based  on  flawed  principles  and  in  need  of  revision. 
Beckett’s project is at every stage an attempt to undermine and dislocate the foundations 
upon which prescribed structures of various kinds sit.  Take the form of narration within 
the novel, which we have just examined; it operates through the character of Molloy as a 
highly eloquent way to represent the futility of language.  More than the gibbering fool he 
appears upon first examination he is also illustrative of the failures of communication, of 
its loose ends and shifting meanings.  This can be seen in the way his narrative is written, 
with the sprawling sentences qualified until almost senseless.  The impression that is given 
is that of a world in which everything is open to question.  The most basic statements need 
143 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 61.
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to be drawn out, turned on their head, revealed as hollow and then stated anyway for us to 
understand just  what is  at  stake.   In this  way  Molloy  is  an attack on intelligibility;  its 
purpose, not to show the reader an alternate reality in which meaning is suspect, beginning 
with language and expanding out into understanding as a whole.  Rather, it is to say this is 
in fact the world we currently occupy, an exaggerated and explicit mirror image of our 
relationship with language, thought, understanding and communication.  The difference 
with a character like Molloy is that he has, to a greater extent than most of us would allow,  
given himself over to the truth that understandability itself is not even an approximation of 
reality, but in opposition to it.  Indeed, Beckett’s characters in Molloy are, in a very strange, 
illustrative manner, some of the most didactic to be found in his oeuvre. 
This is reflected in the evaporating differences we witness between Molloy and Moran as 
the novel progresses.  As we have discussed Moran’s narration is something that moves 
from its relatively straightforward format at the beginning of his half of the novel, into 
something  with  far  more  ambiguity,  encompassing  elongated  sentences,  fractures  in 
thought  and  the  same  series  of  qualifications  we  found  with  Molloy.   Indeed,  the 
convergence of the two men towards the end of the narrative highlights Beckett’s position 
within  the  book.   Reflected  in  his  understanding  of  the  world  as  a  cohesive  and 
approachable entity the highly structured and simplistic narrative opens up as Moran’s 
consciousness dawns upon the truth that existence is in fact a complex, fractured thing, 
constantly dislocating its meaning and shifting under our gaze.  By the end of the novel we 
have  a  bizarre  situation  where  we  are  actually  unsure  if  Molloy  and  Moran  can  be 
understood  as  separate  entities.   They  have  become  so  similar  and  the  incidents 
surrounding their relationship are open enough to suggest that everything we have assumed 
is in fact unstable.  This is of course the precise effect Beckett is attempting to create and 
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Maurice Blanchot may have illustrated what happens best when he said
Moran,  without  knowing  it,  becomes  Molloy,  that  is  becomes  an  entirely  different 
character, a metamorphosis which undermines the security of the narrative element and 
simultaneously introduces an allegorical sense, perhaps a disappointing one for we do 
not feel it is adequate to the depths concealed here.144
Blanchot’s  writings  on  Beckett  are  admirable  not  just  for  their  attempts  to  formalize 
Beckett when so many have faltered in the face of the texts’ apparent resistance, but also 
for the clarity with which he presents the complex issues in the writing.  We can see this 
reflected in the idea of suggestion the quotation brings out.  What Blanchot is saying is that 
Molloy  purports  to  offer  all  the prerequisites  necessary to  infer  what  is  actually being 
stated; to read the subtext and divine the “true” meaning of the text.  However, in practice 
what it actually does is offer a series of dead ends. Perhaps more appropriately we could 
think of understanding the text in the conventional manner as being given glimpses of a 
truth that when approached reveals itself as wholly insubstantial.  When Blanchot says that 
what Beckett does is to tantalize us with ‘an allegorical sense’ he encompasses not just this 
one example but in fact a central mode of Molloy.  The promise of an allegorical end one 
can take from the text and understand is there only in form.  In Saying I No More Daniel 
Katz comments that
In fact, the widespread critical attempts to arrange the two narratives of  Molloy into 
some sort of chronological order seem to be a displacement of the problem, as within a 
hermeneutic logic of interpretation, the repetitions between the two narratives would 
lead less to the conclusion that we are dealing with two sets of events, who similarities 
consist in that they “happened to” and are recounted by the “same person,” than that we 
are dealing with the same events, recounted from two different perspectives.145  
However, I would argue that in this case even Katz's assertion these are the same events is 
a further example of the displacement he cites.  Of the many possibilities of the “true” 
nature of the Molloy-Moran relationship each is in fact a chimera; all the signs are offered 
for the reader to fully understand and therefore master the text, yet when they try to do so 
144 The Blanchot Reader, ed. by Michael Holland (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 95.
145 Daniel Katz, Saying “I” No More (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p. 74.
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they are led instead to a series of possibilities, all of which have equal weighting and are in 
fact intentionally without resolution.   This point is neatly summarised in the Longman 
Critical Readers volume on Samuel Beckett,
A critical  discourse  with  pretensions  to  master  the  text,  to  assimilate  it  to  its  own 
preoccupations, will find on engaging with Beckett’s textuality that it cannot be master, 
and is itself ‘held’ (and at least partially assimilated) by the work it aimed to hold.146
As before the purpose is one of negation and subversion.  Playing upon what one can and 
should expect from the novel Beckett offers the possibility of full understanding, only to 
refuse it at every juncture.   This is a process of undermining not just reader expectation 
but the fundamental metaphysical base upon which Western literature sits.  Again we look 
to  the  aforementioned  illusions  often  assumed  about  Beckett’s  relationship  with  his 
predecessors:  many have  cast  him as  far  more  of  a  Cartesian  writer  than  he  was and 
subsequently  have  came  to  conclusions  on  the  precise  nature  of  the  Molloy-Moran 
question that are simply not justified.
Paradoxically, Molloy aims for a lack of finality, for methods which will best illustrate the 
ragged,  unfinished  nature  of  understanding.   Just  as  there  is  no  actual  answer  to  the 
Molloy-Moran question there is no further answer to the structural basis upon which this 
understanding  sits.   Molloy  appears  distinctly  poststructuralist  in  this  regard;  the 
unresolved  nature  of  the  two  protagonists  sits  alongside  the  form of  the  narration  as 
analogous of the faltering relationship of signifier and signified. What may appear strange 
then  is  that  Beckett  is  a  writer  who  deals  with  serious  issues  at  the  bedrock  of 
understanding  and  existence  and  yet  chooses  to  do  so  by  a  process  of  mocking, 
undermining and absurdism.  Beckett is often cast as a morbid figure, obsessed solely with 
negativity and death; the next aspect of the novel I wish to look at shows a writer in stark  
146 Jennifer Birkett and Kate Ince, Samuel Beckett, ed. by Jennifer Birkett and Kate Ince (London: 
Longman, 2000), p. 28.
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opposition to this.
Destabilising Genre
The title of “serious author”, often assigned to Beckett is in fact a misnomer, at least in 
terms of the actual presentation of his work.  In the media the author’s works can too often 
be portrayed in a very sombre manner, no doubt encouraged by popular culture’s tendency 
to oversimplify and label.  James Joyce once remarked that for all the acclaim, controversy 
and attention that  Ulysses  garnered  he wished that  once someone would  mention  how 
funny it was.  Whether or not one agrees with Joyce’s assessment of his masterpiece, it is a 
grave mistake to think of a novel like Molloy as a dour affair.  The reason for this is that 
black humour is not merely part of the milieu of Beckett’s work; it is in fact central and 
functions in a very specific way, communicating an absurdist vision contributing to the end 
previously discussed.   There is  for example a moment when Molloy is on his bicycle, 
riding at top speed with his one bad leg perched on top of the handlebars as he rides into 
town.  The incident is related as follows:
But to tell the truth (to tell the truth!) I have never been particularly resolute, I mean 
given  to  resolutions,  but  rather  inclined  to  plunge  headlong  into  the  shit,  without 
knowing who was shitting against whom or on which side I had the better chance of 
skulking with success.  But from this leaning too I derived scant satisfaction and if I 
have never quite got rid of it it is not for want of trying.  The fact is, it seems, that the  
most  you  can  hope is  to  be  a  little  less,  in  the  end,  the  creature  you  were  in  the 
beginning, in the middle.  For I had hardly perfected my plan, in my head, when my 
bicycle ran over a dog, as subsequently appeared, and fell to the ground, an ineptness all 
the more unpardonable as the dog, duly leashed, was not out on the road, but in on the 
pavement, docile at its mistress’s heels. (MO, p. 28.)
Recounted at  the fervent pace Molloy is  exclusively capable of,  the moment when the 
bearded,  scrawny old  man,  the  dead  dog  and  the  bicycle  are  caught  up  together  and 
possibly all airborne is pure farce.  This is especially true when we consider Molloy has 
only just related how he mustn’t try to think whilst he rides his bicycle as this leads to 
accidents.  Beckett is a writer who deals with the most challenging of questions, but as 
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previously  stated  he  does  so  by  invoking  a  spirit  of  ridiculousness.   If  Molloy  is  an 
extended discussion of existence itself what are we told by the choice to make the two 
protagonists fools of differing sorts?  Some of Moran’s most ridiculous moments come 
from his interactions with his son before and during their journey.  Often cruel and strange 
his dedication to maintaining his self-image as the model citizen and father makes the set 
of rules he tries to live by seem frivolous and absurd.  When, for example he is going to 
great lengths to explain to his son how to purchase a bike, he states
Stop trying to understand, I said, just listen to what I am going to say, because I shall 
not say it twice.  He came over to me and knelt down.  You would have thought I was 
about to breathe my last.  Do you know what a new bicycle is? I said.  Yes papa, he said. 
Very well, I said, if you can’t find a second-hand bicycle buy a new bicycle.  I repeat.  I  
repeated.  I who said I would not repeat.  Now tell me what you are to do, I said.  I  
added, Take your face away, your breath stinks. (MO, p. 137.)
From  incidents  like  this  through  to  the  more  specifically  parodic  scenes  of  Molloy 
distributing and redistributing his sucking stones, the novel remains throughout a work 
which engages in philosophical critique whilst simultaneously undermining and subverting 
the seriousness of these things.  The end is again, not a clear and definitive statement but 
rather a reflection of an outlook which is fundamentally skeptical about our apprehension 
of  the  world.   As  in  the  example  above,  the  comedy arises  from the  abruptness  and 
unexpected  nature  of  what  occurs.  Events  that  are  in  fact  relatively  innocuous  in 
themselves, are combined and presented just slightly off-kilter to serve as a subversive 
tool.  In this way  Molloy  is, as has been noted in previous chapters, very similar to the 
novels of Kafka,  which equally present us with worlds highly recognizable,  yet unreal 
enough to imbue the work with a critique of the established structures of society.  Beckett  
is  even  broader,  showing  that  the  basic  principles  of  structure,  from  language  and 
expanding outwards into our interactions with every facet of the world are not the fixed 
and knowable things we assume, but rather a fractured and imperfect set of compromises 
for the failures in pure understanding.  This is what Beckett’s comedy seeks to bring out 
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and this is one of the key things Molloy does on a philosophical level.
The  aforementioned  abruptness  in  the  text  is  one  of  its  hallmarks.   It  pervades  the 
sentences of the work leaving the reader with a taste of unfinished ideas.  Even this sense is 
an unstable mode however as, despite the bleakly comic nature of the work, we do not 
expect the more domestic scenes and often are quite shocked by them.  Nowhere is this  
truer than in the scenes of violence which often erupt without notice.  Toward the end of 
Molloy’s half of the novel he is approached in the forest by a charcoal burner, a man who 
attempts to keep him there for unknown purposes.  Sensing the impediment to the search 
for  his  mother  the  usually  amiable  Molloy  promptly  bludgeons  the  burner  with  his 
crutches, before taking his time to line up, swing on them and kick the man in both his  
back and ribs.  Perhaps what is so unsettling about this incident is the fact it is told in much 
the same manner as any of the other trivial and light-hearted events.  Molloy as usual is a 
stickler for method and rationality, taking his time and describing the ingenious method he 
has found for quite possibly killing this man.  He notes,
So I smartly freed a crutch and dealt him a good dint on the skull.  That calmed him. 
The dirty old brute.  I got up and went on.  But I hadn't gone more than a few paces, and 
for me at this time a few paces meant something, when I turned and went back to where 
he lay, to examine him.  Seeing he had not ceased to breathe I contented myself with 
giving him a few kicks in the ribs, with my heels.  This is how I went about it.   I  
carefully chose the most favourable position, a few paces from the body, with my back 
of  course  turned  to  it.   Then,  nicely  balanced  on  my crutches,  I  began  to  swing, 
backwards,  forwards,  feet  pressed  together,  or  rather  legs  pressed together,  for  how 
could I press my feet together, with my legs in the state they were?  I pressed them 
together, that's all I can tell you.  Take it or leave it.  Or I didn't press them together.  
What could that possibly matter?  I swung, that's all that matters, in an ever-widening 
arc, until I decided the moment had come and launched myself forward with all my 
strength and consequently, a moment later, backward, which gave the desired result. (MO, 
pp. 78-79.)
The proximity of this violence to comedic moments unsettles our understanding of the kind 
of story we are being told and presents another of Beckett’s methods for breaking out of 
the confines dictated by prescriptive assumption. 
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Similar  to  this  is  the  way  the  relationship  between  Moran  and  his  son  is  described. 
Together  they  form  the  typically  Beckettian  double-act;  the  aforementioned  “TWO” 
Badiou describes.  Badiou noted that
This is the question that ultimately ties together all of Beckett’s work.  Is an effective 
Two possible, a Two that would be in excess of solipsism? We might also say that this is 
the question of love.147
If Molloy is to a limited extent representative of Beckett, if he is various exaggerations of 
his personality and embodiments of his ideas, and furthermore if Moran and Jacques are as 
Badiou says the hopes for an existence lived with another what does the novel tell us?  The 
relationship between son and father is similar to Molloy’s story in that it is often comic and 
yet undercut by moments of violence.  There is something of the silent film era about 
Moran and Jacques;  a  Laurel and Hardy quality,  with the blind leading the blind,  that 
Beckett is of course aware of.  One only needs look at his choice to cast Buster Keaton in 
Film (1965) to know Beckett saw his characters as at least partly slapstick creations.  So, it 
comes as a shock then that episodes like Moran sending his son to buy a bicycle (and 
throwing his shoe at him in frustration) are placed alongside the murder of the stranger, or 
the abandonment of Moran by his son.   This is  common to all  Beckettian twos: often 
mingled  in  with  elements  of  comedy  is  a  mean,  violent  or  unexplained  streak  that 
undermines reader expectation and unsettles the comfort of the relationship we see echoed 
from popular culture.  
In Molloy event and action are only ever present in the text as something to be undermined, 
mocked and parodied.  In fact alongside the rest of Beckett’s work Molloy is a text heavy 
with plot, or perhaps more appropriately with all the method and semblance of plot.  The 
central event of Moran’s tale is the search for Molloy, or at least it should be, but as has 
147 Badiou, p. 5.
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been discussed this is something which Beckett sets up and then makes no effort to fulfill. 
A disproportionately large amount  of the text  is  used to  describe the seemingly trivial 
exposition  of  Moran  preparing  to  leave  his  home,  whilst  the  journey  itself  is  only 
embarked upon with seemingly arbitrary direction.  This is what Pilling sees as another of 
Beckett’s tools in his overall destabilizing of primarily literature, but also of assumptions 
about language, philosophy and knowledge.  He achieves this most often by presenting us 
with something familiar, with the appearance of familiarity, quickly revealed to play no 
part in the system we assumed it had.  This is true of the violence in the book, a serious  
issue that is made to shift out of its usual status by virtue of its apparently arbitrary nature 
and the lack of consequences that arise from its appearance.
This imperative is present in every choice Beckett makes in the novel.  In terms of its genre 
it is often closest to the detective novels the author would read for fun.  Firstly, we have 
Molloy’s  searching for  his  mother,  and then of  course  the more  overtly genre-specific 
episode in which Moran is sent to find Molloy.  Again however, the genre only features in 
fragments and when it does appear it is only as a husk, which is parodied by the action of 
the story.  Take for example Moran, who belongs to an agency and has as his job the task 
of finding and dealing with various people.  With the Molloy case he is firstly unsure even 
of the name of the man he is supposed to find (considering that it may in fact be “Mollose” 
who he is supposed to be in pursuit of), he then realizes that he has no idea what he is 
supposed to do with Molloy once he has found him and pursues his target by following a 
seemingly random selection of impulses.  What using the detective genre does however is 
to  open  up  a  series  of  questions  about  the  possibility  of  knowledge,  a  play  around 
fulfillment of the work’s responsibilities insofar as it falls within its specific genre, and a 
thorough disavowal of answers that may be forthcoming.
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In Search of Lost Time
Time is another aspect of literature Beckett is keen to infuse with a sense of play.  I spoke 
of his monograph on Proust previously and reading that one gets a sense of the depths to 
which Beckett’s thinking on time within and beyond the novel stretched.  In Molloy time is 
the backdrop against which Beckett’s various invokings, parodies and states of play are set. 
It is both another issue the novel seeks to address, as well as being an extra equation that  
shifts and alters the previously discussed devices at work.  In Repetition, Theory and Text  
(1988) Steven Connor argues that whilst nearly all have understood the book as a move 
towards the minimal, how we should actually see it is as the turning point towards an ‘ever 
more intense awareness of the predicament of immanence.’148  To a certain extent I find 
this statement very appealing as a way to understand Beckett.  In Molloy more so than any 
of the previous work time is treated as fluid, and not merely affected by our perception of 
it,  thinking  along  the  lines  of  Proust’s  “involuntary  memory”.  Rather  time  itself  is 
questionable  because  of  its  supposedly  fixed  and  permanent  position,  an  abstraction 
Beckett could never accept.  This is why in Molloy the entire timeframe of the narrative is 
presented as  upon a shifting plateau,  where events  that  one thought  happened along a 
certain period are revealed as having happened completely differently, or most often as 
perhaps having not happened at all.  Looking at the novel in its broadest sense, we are 
never given any except the most questionable and incidental indicators of what year the 
story  takes  place  in.   We  can  piece  together  from  the  idiom  of  the  characters,  the 
domesticity and diet of Moran and the common availability of the bicycle that the story 
probably takes place in the twentieth century.  This said, even these markers are made to 
seem spurious with everything in the novel surrounded by an almost fantastical air, serving 
to distort the definition we seek to find within the work.  
148 Stephen Connor, Repetition, Theory and Text (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 45.
145
Connor’s definition is so apposite as what actually happens within the borders of the book 
is that the present becomes the dominant mode, despite the fact both parts of the novel are 
reminiscences.  Molloy is a character who throughout is determined by a tunnel vision 
which refuses him access to a greater perspective and see the past and future.  He lives 
entirely for his present state in which he must find his mother, although how to achieve this 
and what he intends to do upon finding his mother seems to be irrelevant.  His past is filled 
with incidents that may or may not have happened, names of people often reduced to the 
two or three most likely possibilities and the means by which he reached his present state 
completely unexplained.  Even this present state is seemingly ever-changing in terms of the 
observance  of  time.   There  are  occasions  when  Molloy  will  say  that  he  has  been 
somewhere for only a couple of days, to then reveal that it may in fact be weeks he is 
thinking of as he has been judging the passing of time by casual glances towards the moon.
Time for Moran on the other hand, at the start of his story, is a fixed and permanent thing 
he holds himself to and takes great pride in observing.  He is a regimented individual who 
has a schedule heavily involved with the church, diet and his other responsibilities towards 
his son.  It is only after he has departed his home and his world starts to change that time 
takes on an altogether different character.  A large part of Moran’s disintegration once he 
has  become stranded in the forest  is  the slipping of  his  supposed perceptions of time. 
Especially at such times as when his son goes to buy a bicycle and Moran is left alone, his 
sense of things passing becomes far more like that of Molloy: dependent on events and 
impulses to signal the movement of time as opposed to strict observance.  The collapse of 
Moran’s  world  is  also  his  discovery that  the  things  he  assumed to  be  true,  fixed  and 
immovable, now appear to him as hollow, surface fantasies.  As I have said, towards the 
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end his character becomes a mirror image of Molloy’s, with far more abstract concepts he 
had taken for granted brought under inspection.  Beckett therefore presents us firstly with a 
protagonist  in  Molloy  we  assume  to  be  insane  by  virtue  of  his  often  confused  and 
seemingly meaningless relationships with society, action, language, memory and time.  By 
the end of the novel however we find that the systems that Moran used to control and 
understand these phenomena fall apart around him.  He is left by the seemingly arbitrary 
series of events that lead him to his final return home to confront the fact that everything 
he relied upon was at the very best an approximation of reality and often outright false.  
Again in this  sense  Molloy  is  Beckett’s  most didactic  piece of work.  Not  only does it 
explore the areas of absence and ambiguity around his core set of issues, it in fact provides  
the alternative to this way of thinking; a man convinced of the solid foundations upon 
which he lives his life is shown to be in fact just as much at the whim of the random forces  
that truly control the world.  John Pilling notes that as the characters come to be defined by 
this state of eternally being in the present, they are in a kind of purgatory.  He contends that 
Beckett differs from his master Dante in that whereas the latter had the “triadic vision” 
hell,  purgatory  and  paradise  Beckett  would  never  follow  Dante  into  the  final  stage. 
Beckett's characters live and breathe the purgatory of life itself and are trapped in time, 
returning to various points, truly unaware of its exact nature and unable to move outside its 
limits.149
Language
Although we have already spoken of the central role the narrative choices Beckett makes 
play in our understanding of his philosophical position, what we haven’t looked at in detail  
is the language itself Beckett chooses to use.  In the introduction to volume II of The Grove 
Centenary Edition of Beckett’s work Salman Rushdie says of Beckett’s language that
149 John Pilling, Samuel Beckett (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 30.
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A man speaking English beautifully chooses to speak in French, which he speaks with 
greater difficulty, so that he is obliged to choose his words carefully, forced to give up 
fluency and to find the hard words that come with difficulty,  and then after all that 
finding he puts it all back into English, a new English containing all the difficulty of the 
French, of the coining of thought in a second language... (MO, p. xiv.)
Beckett once said of English that one of his major problems with it, or the reason he chose 
to write in French, was that he was always far too tempted to write poetry. 150  The subject 
matter of Beckett’s later works especially is often despair, poverty and these works usually 
feature  a  protagonist  who  is  some kind  of  confused vagrant.   Without  going  into  the 
philosophical reasons, these basic demands of subject make it easy to see why he would 
wish to find a method to mirror his content.  With French, a language for him that had 
fewer of the associations a first language brings, he could begin again and forge a language 
empty of sentiment or specificity.   Once he had used his new tools and the novel was 
written in French it  made it possible to translate the work back into English,  retaining 
much of what was in the French version.  Beckett wanted his novels to be written in as 
plain and unencumbered a language as possible.  
Although Molloy’s speech is full of details and he is keen to describe the action, what he 
actually does is to present the reader with a lot of information that is not retained in the 
normal way but serves instead as an impression.  Deleuze says:
Let us call this atomatic, disjunctive, cut and chopped language in Beckett language I, a 
language  in  which  enumeration  replaces  propositions  and  combinatorial  relations 
replace syntactic relations: a language of names.151
So sheer volume of information, words upon words that often repeat or add to what has 
already been said,  and that are sometimes deliberately obscure are the language of the 
novel.  It is the combinatorial relations of sentences, which we have looked at previously, 
that allow for the sprawling impressionistic imprint.  Despite the aim of the language to be 
150 Knowlson, p. 134.
151 Deleuze, p. 156.
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a  vehicle  and  an  unobtrusive  force  in  Beckett’s  writing,  it  can  also  be  somewhat 
conspicuous by virtue of this.  Pilling notes:
In Beckett such vocabulary does two things: it calls attention to itself (this is especially 
true  in  a  work  like  How It  Is  where  the  majority  of  the  work  is  rather  bare  and 
formulaic)  and  hence  mocks  itself;  but  it  also  makes  a  specialised,  scientifically 
accurate  language seem momentarily  possible.   As a  result,  the  first  mock is  often 
succeeded by a drier, more despairing mock, a risus purus indeed.152
If  Badiou is  right  in that  Beckett  has  been miscast  as  a  negative writer,  then Pilling’s 
suggestion  that  Beckett  not  only offers  his  language in  a  metafictional,  self-referential 
manner, but also that he offers the possibility of a language that may succeed where others 
fail,  then this  is  only ironically given as a possibility.  It  is  in the same way the other 
avenues of logic, philosophy and religion are also given, because of the impossibility of 
their truth.  Beckett’s work approaches these issues not by way of condemnation or leading 
by example, but rather by hinting at an alternative possibility, only to offer it up as another 
sacrifice to the purgatorial state of pure ambivalence with which we perceive the world.
In the work Ecce Homo (1888), which Friedrich Nietzsche wrote shortly before losing his 
mind, the writer looked back over his oeuvre and settled upon this as one of his principal 
realisations and achievements:
'Moral man is no closer to the intelligible world than physical man –  for there is no 
intelligible world…’ This proposition,  hardened and sharpened beneath the hammer-
blow of historical knowledge (lisez: Revaluation of All Values), may perhaps at some 
future time – 1890! – serve as the axe which is laid at the root of the ‘metaphysical 
need’ of man – whether more of a blessing or a curse to mankind who can say?153
Beckett was in no doubt as to whether the metaphysical need of man was a good or bad 
thing.  Molloy is a work aimed directly at the opening statement Nietzsche makes; it plays 
and toys with intelligibility and yet on closer inspection its methods are deceptive, for it is 
also the axe swiping at the roots.  In a time before consciousness was focused so sharply on 
152 Pilling, p. 49-50.
153 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), p. 64.
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Beckett as a “philosophical writer” John Pilling noted that with The Trilogy there is an 
awareness that 
Aporia pure and simple, as the Unnameable realizes, runs the risk of tedium; even the 
second possibility he entertains, ‘affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered’, fail, 
and when they fail, ‘other shifts’ must be tried, approaches of greater sensitivity.  All, 
however (as the word ‘shifts’ suggests), involve jolting us out of our usual quotidian 
certainties  and  complacencies;  and  constantly  trying  other  ways  of  solving  the 
problems.154
Can we see  Molloy  then as a high water mark of a particular set of approaches to the 
problems Beckett had been dealing with since the earliest works of his career?  It is not 
only this, but in fact an entirely new type of writing which blurs the lines of understanding 
between generic classification.  As I have said, this is not a deconstructionist text per se or 
a wrapping of philosophy in fiction as John Calder conceives it.   It is a work of art; a 
comedy in fact,  that  is  also an  enactment  of  a  philosophical  reaction.   The duality of 
past/present  narrative  Molloy  and  Moran  recount,  the  writing  back  to  and  against  the 
Western metaphysical  tradition and most  importantly the incessant erosion of language 
expanding out into structure are all an enactment.  An enactment of several distinct, yet  
intertwined and recurring  poststructuralist  moments  that  attempt  a  pulling  open of  the 
shutters obscuring our possible observance of true understanding.  In this sense Molloy is 
one  of  the  most  successful  works  Beckett  wrote.   The  methods  we  have  seen  him 
reworking over and over in previous chapters are as harmonious as they ever would be in 
offering this defogging of the glass.  In the next two chapters we shall examine if Beckett's 
work was capable of evolution past this point, if it would dare offer replacement answers to 
the problems it has thus far highlighted.
154 Pilling, p. 28.
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Chapter Five:
Overcoming an Impasse in  Malone Dies  ?  
In the last chapter we concluded that  Molloy was, in certain respects, the endpoint of an 
evolutionary process begun with Murphy and accelerated through the immediate postwar 
work.  Here we found Beckett reaching a plateau in terms of his evolving symbioses of 
form and content.  This marriage offered the clearest capturing of the various ideas155 the 
works had offered in response to his selected history of philosophy and literature.  The 
question that therefore needs to be asked at this juncture is: if  Molloy operates within an 
enacting,  illustrative  mode  working  at  an  incessant  destabilisation  of  our  implicit 
acceptance  of  metaphysics  and wider,  its  logocentric  tools,  what  can  subsequent  work 
achieve?  The first thing to note is that this period clearly didn't feel like an impasse for 
Beckett, as he completed his Trilogy in relatively quick succession, part of the 'frenzy of 
writing'  James  Knowlson identifies.156  In  previous  chapters  I  have tried to  show how 
Molloy and its predecessors built toward and refined an operation that could be described 
as defogging the glass of false understanding; a methodology that did not seek to affirm its 
own thesis, but instead worked always as a “reveal” or critique.  Are we to see  Malone 
Dies as a continuation of this method?  Or, alternatively, does this work differ from what 
has come before and offer a solution or replacement to the metaphysical problems Beckett 
repeatedly identifies?
It is quickly apparent upon even a cursory glance at The Unnamable that this final work of 
The Trilogy has  shifted significantly in  presentation from  Molloy.   In discussing these 
works it is understanding this gulf that many critics have been preoccupied with.  A result 
155 I of course refer here to the concerns that announce themselves most clearly in the 1946 novellas, before 
being reworked in the subsequent novels.  These include, but are not limited to, bodily decay, exile, love, life 
as purgatory and of course death.
156 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 358.
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is that  Malone Dies  is often approached as a bridging work, significant to a degree in 
itself, but much more so for what it reveals about the two novels that bookend it.  It is 
difficult to identify this as a trend, to cite examples of an absence in appreciation.  Beckett 
studies has not ignored Malone Dies in its entirety, but it is often marginalised in critical 
works that purport to deal with The Trilogy as a whole.  We can see this in significant texts 
in the history of Beckett criticism, such as Maurice Blanchot's essay 'Where now? Who 
Now?' which deals most heavily with The Unnamable.  In this case it is the focus on the 
last work and its ability to so clearly transcend the limitations of its status as a novel which 
relegates  Malone Dies  to a periphery significance.  We can find further examples of this 
marginalisation, including Michael Robinson's book The Long Sonata of the Dead in which 
he notes 'Molloy is still literature, a consciously written description of an extreme situation; 
The  Unnamable,  in  its  gasping,  breathless  anguish,  has  ceased  to  pretend.'157  The 
semicolon that splits the descriptions of the works is the space Malone Dies will often find 
itself  pushed  into:  a  strange  middle  ground  between  the  harnessing  of  a  response  to 
philosophy  as  part  of  a  recognisable  prose  offering  in  Molloy  and  the  more  overt 
experimentation of The Unnamable.
In truth, one can see why critics have found it difficult to approach the work in its own 
right.  Thematically it deals with many of the same concerns we find in  Molloy  and the 
1946 novellas.  Again, it is death, the body, communication, ageing and the issues which 
splinter from these with which the novel concerns itself.  The result, when examining the 
place of the work within Beckett's oeuvre as a whole is a difficulty in finding new areas of 
discussion.  To a large degree these issues are treated in much the same way and again 
work toward the collective purpose of demonstrating limitations in our understanding.  Yet, 
despite this, it is the intention of this chapter to return to these themes.  It would of course 
157 Michael Robinson, The Long Sonata of the Dead (London: Hart-Davis, 1969), p. 140.
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be a futile exercise to try and discuss their effects if they are treated in largely the same 
manner.  The idea will therefore be to examine certain key areas that differ from what has 
come before and augment our understanding.  Furthermore, they will all be discussed as 
fundamentally  altered  by  a  significant  new  focus.   Throughout  the  novel  there  is  an 
attention  to  the  process  of  narrative  and  storytelling  which,  although  featured  before, 
becomes an ever-present theme, branching out into and augmenting the way we apprehend 
the book's other concerns.  Narrative in Malone Dies becomes a sort of lens through which 
we examine these aforementioned established Beckettian themes and it is the aim of this 
chapter to reassess the importance of the work based on this.
The novel opens on Malone in his institutional deathbed outlining what he plans to do with 
his remaining time.  He says 'Whilst waiting [for death] I shall tell myself stories, if I can. 
They will not be the same kind of stories as hitherto, that is all.   They will be neither 
beautiful nor ugly, they will be calm, there will be no ugliness or beauty in them any more, 
they will be almost lifeless, like the teller.'  (MD, p.  174.)  Firstly, this quotation is somewhat 
loaded in terms of the implications for the baser, “ugly” elements we find in the stories, but 
this is something we shall return to later.  Important for our purposes is that, from the very 
outset, this is a novel concerned with stories and the process of storytelling.  After mulling 
the  division  of  his  remaining  time  and  therefore  the  progress  of  the  novel  Malone 
concludes  he  has  five  narrative  objectives:  'To  return  to  the  five.   Present  state,  three 
stories, inventory, there.'  (MD, p.  176.)  This is the running order he establishes, but from the 
outset the progress of his document, the document that is the novel, will undermine this 
order.  His present state and inventory will not just occupy the beginning and end of the 
story, but will weave in an out of the novel in the form of digressions to the tales he tells. 
Furthermore,  the  stories  he actually tells  bear  little  resemblance  to  the  descriptions  he 
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assigns  them,  or  rather  the  descriptions  are  so broad the  stories  may feature  the  non-
specific things he chooses to define them with.  His plan is 'each one on a different theme. 
One about a man, another about a woman, a third about a thing and finally one about an 
animal, a bird probably.' (MD, p. 174.)
In contrast to this claim Malone will offer episodes from the narratives of Sapo (boyhood) 
and Macmann (adulthood).  The aforementioned interjections of Malone into these stories 
provide a third narrative in of itself.   The interrelated Beckettian tropes of physicality, 
death and intratextuality are here augmented by the new focus on narrative and set Malone 
Dies apart from previous work.  This is achieved throughout in two ways.  Firstly, there is 
the frequent commentary Malone provides on the stories as he relates them.  These arrest 
their progress, bringing their artificial nature to the fore in a manner inescapable for the 
reader.  Often he will express a disgusted restlessness with what he is doing and question 
the structure of the narrative, as in the following example: 'What tedium.  If I went on to 
the stone?  No, it would be the same thing.  The Lamberts, the Lamberts, does it matter 
about the Lamberts?  No, not particularly.' (MD, p. 210.)
It  would  be  wrong  to  say  the  Lamberts  are  a  family  Sapo  befriends,  because  their 
relationship is very much one of mutual tolerance and a strange proxy affection.  Perhaps it 
is more accurate to say he spends time in their household in order to escape his own.  The 
above quotation is typical of the scorn poured over the story being told and the persistent 
attempts to reveal its inner workings and artificiality.  Like so much in Beckett the effect of 
this is suggestive in a manner akin to ripples moving from the centre of a break in water. 
The  implications  are  foremost  a  questioning  of  narrative  process,  which  is  in  turn  a 
questioning of language (its tool) and taken in the context of Beckett's oeuvre a questioning 
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of  affirmation  generally.   This  illustrative  approach  is  something  covered  in  previous 
chapters; the repercussions of a seemingly isolated and indeed trivial moment fracture and 
destabilize along a fault line.
The second kind of interruption Malone provides focuses more on the content of his stories 
and comes in the form of interjections that brazenly question the purpose and effectiveness 
of the illustrative process we have just discussed.  This kind of self-examination built into 
the  fabric  of  the  text  is  something we have  seen  fleetingly in  previous  works,  but  in 
Malone Dies  assumes a new prominence with Malone acting as critic of his unfolding 
narrative:
All is pretext, Sapo and the birds, Moll, the peasants, those who in the tower seek one 
another out and fly from one another, my doubts which do not interest me, my situation, 
my possessions, pre-text for not coming to the point, the abandoning, the raising of the 
arms and going down, without further splash, even though it may annoy the bathers. (MD, 
p. 270.)   
This accusation of pretext is a criticism, not just of Sapo's story or  Malone Dies, but of 
Beckett's work in its entirety up to that point.  The image of those in the tower searching 
for one another,  yet simultaneously moving apart is inserted amongst the various other 
examples more directly from the novel and shifts the criticism into the larger context of 
Beckett's  work  as  a  whole.   We can see  this  image  as  representative  of  the  desire  to 
understand  fully,  inevitably  undermined  by  the  very  desire  to  understand  upon  the 
logocentric, metaphysical basis the works subvert.  It is typical of a new restlessness with 
the  established  patterns  of  the  novels  up  to  this  point  and  the  call  to  abandon  these 
methods, relinquish attempts at control and occupy a moment of resignation.  The imagery 
is particularly striking, encompassing as it does death, birth, a swimming baths.  Perhaps 
we can read this last clause on annoying the bathers as a commentary on the inevitable 
resistance  one  no  doubt  faces  in  a  focus  on  hopelessness  and  acceptance  of  the 
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unknowability of our situation, without reprieve.  It certainly is prescient of those who 
would come to criticise Beckett as an essentially nihilist writer, claiming this “abandoning” 
as his essential characteristic.  However, this will not be the claim offered here.  I intend to 
argue that this questioning of Beckett's methodology and acceptance of abandoning, as he 
puts it, is another part of the fabric of the novel and not its final position.  Alain Badiou 
wrote that 'Contrary to popular opinion, I think that Beckett's trajectory is one that begins 
with a blind belief in predestination and is then directed towards the examination of the 
possible conditions, be they aleatory or minimal, of a kind of freedom.'158  The rest of this 
chapter will attempt to demonstrate how Malone Dies, using typically Beckettian themes 
achieves this.
Death as a Form of Birth
Looking again at the last line of the previously cited quotation, 'the raising of the arms and 
going down, without further splash, even though it may annoy the bathers'  (MD, p.  270.), this 
image suggesting both death and a kind of birth is not as singular as one may assume.  In  
the previous two chapters we have seen that death, by this point in Beckett's career, has 
become a central,  recurring issue.   His  geriatric  protagonists  of the post-war work are 
riddled with signs of their impending end and those of the 1946 novellas in particular often 
question whether they may already have died and be living through some sort of damned 
afterlife.   This  is  shifted to  the background somewhat  in  Molloy  but  again becomes a 
recurring theme in Malone Dies as we can see from the following examples,
The truth is, if I did not feel myself dying, I could well believe myself dead, expiating 
my sins, or in one of heaven's mansions. (MD, p. 177.)
I would not watch myself die, that would spoil everything. (MD, p. 174.)
There is naturally another possibility that does not escape me, though it would be a great 
disappointment to have it  confirmed, and that is that I am dead already and that all 
158 Alain Badiou, On Beckett (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2003), p. 55.
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continues more or less as when I was not.  Perhaps I expired in the forest,  or even 
earlier[...]  But my horse-sense tells me I have not yet quite ceased to gasp.  And it  
summons in support of this view various considerations having to do for example with 
the little heap of my possessions, my system of nutrition and elimination, the couple 
across the way, the changing sky, and so on.  Whereas in reality all  that is perhaps 
nothing but worms. (MD, p. 213.)
These speculations recall the ambiguity over the state of living the character occupies that 
we have seen in previous work, as well as being examples of the second type of narrative 
interjection just outlined.  The title of the novel alone lets us know its primary concern, but  
examples such as these stress a questioning in terms of placing the time of Malone's death 
within the novel.  We assume the title means the novel will cover the events leading up to 
Malone's death and it ostensibly confirms this.  However, these suggestions Malone may 
already  be  dead,  even  if  refuted,  offer  a  level  of  doubt  and  a  re-examination  of  his 
testimony.  Perhaps the most tempting interpretation at this point is a symbolic reading like 
those  attempted  in  previous  chapters,  in  which  one  could  argue  Malone  occupies  a 
purgatorial state, doomed to endlessly recall the three major parts of his life in the form of 
these  stories.   John  Murphy  and  John  Pilling  argue  for  this  in  their  respective 
interpretations, with the latter commenting
And if the only paradise is the paradise that has been lost (as Beckett says in Proust), so 
that it is only time and not paradise that can be regained (Proust's vision rather than 
Milton's), then the triadic vision of Dante that so appealed to Beckett (hell, purgatory, 
paradise)  has to  be replaced by a  kind of  monadic condition which,  for  Beckett,  is 
purgatorial. 159
Whilst there is certainly a great deal of validity in this kind of approach, I think Malone 
Dies offers something further on death.  The stories of Sapo and Macmann are flaunted as 
artificial and created time and time again, but here the greater level of authenticity we may 
ascribe to Malone's account of his last days on his deathbed is also brought into question. 
The effect is to lift all narrative layers within the novel off a stable hierarchical base of 
159 John Murphy, 'Beckett's Purgatories', European Joyce Studies, Iss. 16 (2005) 
<http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&xri:pqil:res_ver=0.2&res_id=xri:lion&rft_id=xri:lion:ft:abell:R04162688:0> [accessed 30 December 
2011] John Pilling, Samuel Beckett (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 30.  
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relative truth.  That is to say the truth of the stories Malone is telling us, the truth of his 
own story and his authority as a reliable narrator and wider the possible truth of any kind 
of  narrative.   This  is  a  kind  of  “play”  which  the  novel  mentions  explicitly  on  a  few 
occasions, specifically in the context of narrative or storytelling.  In the following example 
Malone is describing what he is actually achieving in relating Sapo's story.  He says 'And I 
call that playing.  I wonder if I am not talking yet again about myself.  Shall I be incapable, 
to the end, of lying on any other subject?'  (MD, p. 183.)  We can see throughout Malone Dies  
this kind of attitude towards the multiple narratives.  The suggestion that with the story of 
Sapo he is actually describing aspects of his own life we have already discussed, but for 
Malone himself  to  call  it  a  form of  play is  a  progression  in  terms  of  Beckett's  prose  
generally.   So powerfully do these works suggest a prescience in describing and using 
poststructuralist  methods  that  a  whole  branch  of  criticism  has  been  created  which 
specifically brings the two together.  We can see in examples like this why the temptation 
to do so has proven so strong and why Jacques Derrida would cite as explanation of his 
reluctance to write on Beckett the almost suffocating closeness their work shared.  
In his seminal lecture 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourses of the Human Sciences' 
Derrida documents a recent rupture in the history of Western metaphysics which has meant 
a disavowal of meaning as it has been known and in particular the tenets of structuralism. 
He presents this moment as the birth of what would later be called deconstruction and as 
providing a blueprint for many of the tools that help to define the process.  Essential to the 
move away from discourses which aim to fix meaning under a strictly regimented structure 
is  the  concept  of  “play”  or  “freeplay”  which  is  summarised  neatly  in  the  following 
quotation,
There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of freeplay. 
The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering, a truth or an origin which is free from 
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freeplay  and  from  the  order  of  the  sign,  and  lives  like  an  exile  the  necessity  of 
interpretation.  The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay 
and tries to pass beyond man and humanism.160
It  is  within  this  latter  interpretation  of  interpretation  that  Malone  Dies  operates.   Not 
content with merely describing or illustrating the inadequacies of signifier and signified 
through these physically and mentally broken men, the novel pushes toward methods that 
enact a form of freeplay.  The relentlessness in bringing every narrative layer, the meaning 
of the stories and the themes, which we shall discuss, into a state of permanent flux has the 
effect  of  a  replacement  in  the  stable  base  and hierarchy of  meaning that  is  crucial  in  
affirmation along structuralist assumptions.  Malone Dies  aims for a restless uncertainty 
through methods that assert a state of freeplay is the only viable solution to the inherent 
flaws in the most basic building blocks of communication.  The scope of this means that 
the methods themselves must also feature within the body of the text.  Malone asserts
This time I know where I am going, it is no longer the ancient night, the recent night. 
Now it is a game, I am going to play.  I never knew how to play, till now.  I longed to,  
but I knew it was impossible[...] From now on it will be different.  I shall never do 
anything any more from now on but play.  No, I must not begin with an exaggeration. 
But I shall play a great part of the time, from now on, the greater part, if I can.  But  
perhaps I shall not succeed any better than hitherto.  Perhaps as hitherto I shall find 
myself abandoned, in the dark, without anything to play with.  Then I shall play with 
myself.  To have been able to conceive such a plan is encouraging. (MD, p. 174.)
There is of course an inherently sarcastic tone in the way Malone says here he is going to 
move away from darkness through the use of play.  The final line in particular displays the 
familiar deadpan delivery we see time and time again in Molloy's rambling as well as here.  
However, if everything is to be questioned then the inherent scepticism is hardly surprising 
and does not necessarily negate the genuine shift from the ancient and recent night toward 
a more 'encouraging' method in “play”.  The degree to which we can say Malone's dialogue 
with himself moves outwith the boundaries of the novel and speaks more generally with 
Beckett's oeuvre as a whole is open to debate, but it of course would not be unusual for one 
160 Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', Writing and 
Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 292.
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of his characters to reference his predecessors, as we shall see further in the chapter.  This 
quotation in particular brings together a self-conscious focus on narrative, which we have 
argued is instrumental in what is new in the book, and play, coming directly after Malone 
describes his desire to tell stories.  We shall see in the rest of this chapter how Malone's 
play and the Derridean freeplay it could be argued it is an example of, manifest themselves 
in other aspects of Malone Dies.
Returning to the introduction of birth into the matrix of issues we often find intertwined 
with death in Beckett's work, we may find the confluence strange, especially considering 
the most obvious connotations of Eastern reincarnation.  We have seen a consideration of 
alternatives to Western metaphysics in previous work, most notably in the character of 
Neary within Murphy, but the context has never been a replacement of the inadequacies of 
these established systems with something more spiritual.  Certainly the bringing together 
of birth and death within Malone Dies presents a unity in the physicality of the two events, 
rather than a necessarily philosophical standpoint.  We find this even more so in some other 
examples, such as the following typical reflection from Malone,
All is ready.  Except me.  I am being given if I may venture the expression, birth into 
death, such is my impression.  The feet are clear already, of the great cunt of existence. 
Favourable impression I trust.  My head will be the last to die.  Haul in your hands.  I  
can't.  The render rent.  My story ended I'll be living yet.  Promising lag.  That is the end 
of me.  I shall say I no more. (MD, p. 276.)
This treatment of an idea or issue with strikingly base description or imagery is another 
Beckettian trope by this point in his oeuvre.  The pushing of humour into areas so black 
they transgress what we may feel comfortable laughing at we examined in Molloy's murder 
of the charcoal burner and the bodily descriptions of the 1946 novellas.  The starkness of 
'great cunt of existence' is undercut with the punchline 'Favourable impression I trust', but 
in an unsatisfactory way.  Rather than the latter relieving the tension, the subject is too 
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vital,  with  Malone  returning  to  the  dialogue  immediately  after,  creating  with  the 
mismatched tone a space of uncertainty.  This ambiguity is mirrored in how we are to 
understand this bringing together of birth and death.  Paul Sheehan argues 
If birth and death are not dissimilar, then they are not unique events, not definitive 'cusp' 
experiences  at  all.   To  be  human,  in  Beckett's  world,  means  to  undergo  a  slow 
suffocation in the amniotic fluid of being, an unwitting and unwilling accessory in a 
process that resembles a prolonged miscarriage.161
This understanding shares much with the previously cited assertion Beckett's characters 
occupy a purgatorial state.  In both, existence is cast as a sort of terminal no man's land 
between two not necessarily preferable states, but at the very least active ones.  Sheehan 
and  Pilling  argue  Beckett  writes  Everymen,  trapped  in  a  state  of  indeterminacy  and 
unknowability that cripples them.  We can even see this repeated in On Beckett  in which 
we know Badiou argues he is going to oppose typical understandings of the author by 
proposing  a  more  positive,  or  free  Beckett,  as  he  puts  it.   Andrew Gibson  writes  of 
Badiou's somewhat unique approach that
It  is  important  because  it  points  in  a  quite  different  direction  to  the  postmodern, 
poststructuralist  and deconstructive methodologies  that  have been significant  for the 
Beckett criticism of the past decade.  But it does this without any lapse back into the 
foundationalism, representationalism or existential humanism that so dominated work 
on Beckett before the arrival of Connors and Trezise.162
 
In  other  words  Badiou finds his  own path;  one in  which he is  unafraid to  define and 
enclose  the  various  devices  Beckett  employs  and  yet  that  does  not  deny  the  ragged, 
perpetually unfinished nature of the issues Beckett's work explore.  This can be seen in his 
exploration  of  the  point  of  dying,  discussed  as  a  permanent  deferral  that  leaves  the 
character trapped within a loop:
Immobility  would  thereby  find  its  complete  metaphor  in  the  corpse:  'dying'  is  the 
conversion  of  all  possible  movement  into  permanent  rest.   But  here  again,  the 
irreducibility of the functions means that 'dying' is never death.  In  Malone Dies,  one 
161 Paul Sheehan, Modernism, Narrative and Humanism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
<http://site.ebrary.com.libproxy.dundee.ac.uk/lib/dundee/docDetail.action?docID=10021402> [accessed 30 
December 2012], p. 164. 
162 Andrew Gibson, 'Beckett and Badiou' in Beckett and Philosophy (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
p. 93.
161
sees how movement and language ultimately infect both being and immobility, so that 
the point of immobility is constantly deferred; it does not allow itself to be constructed 
otherwise  than  as  the  unattainable  limits  of  an increasingly diminishing network of 
movements, memories and words.163
Immobility  and  the  absence  of  agency  is  of  course  a  reconfiguration  of  the  same 
interpretation we have been discussing and can be found in this specific guise within a few 
different critical works.  Ted Billy's essay 'Nothing to be Done": Conrad, Beckett, and the 
Poetics of Immobility' brings together Joseph Conrad's  Victory  (1915) and  Malone Dies  
based  on  an  immobility  we  could  just  as  easily  define  as  purgatorial  or  part  of  the 
birth/death simultaneity Sheehan argues for.164  Badiou differs in that he points toward a 
more open understanding by suggesting that the characters are never immobile, but part of 
a repetition moving towards an immobility impossible to reach.  I would argue that Malone 
Dies differs from previous prose efforts in that, as well as offering the illustrative method 
we have traced, the repositioning of death as a form of birth strives for a more ambitious 
endpoint.  The effect created reaches beyond the stasis understood in various incarnations 
by Pilling, Sheehan, Murphy and to an extent Badiou.  Malone is not static, but instead the 
novel suggests he oscillates between death and birth which, like narrative in the novel, 
creates  a  new  aporetic  space  in  which  we  can  try  and  look  beyond  the  incumbent 
restrictions of language and understanding.  As Badiou argues, it is a kind of freedom these 
later works move toward.  Both a freedom from the aforementioned restrictions but also 
from the limitations of the illustrative method that has defined Beckett's work up until this 
point.  Again I would highlight this as an example of the play active within the work. 
Derrida argues 
structure – or rather the structurality of structure – although it has always been involved, 
has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a centre and 
163 Badiou, p. 45.
164 Ted Billy, '"Nothing to be Done": Conrad, Beckett, and the Poetics of Immobility', Conradiana, 32.1 
(2000) <http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&xri:pqil:res_ver=0.2&res_id=xri:lion&rft_id=xri:lion:ft:abell:R00797808:0> [accessed 30 December 
2012] Billy makes a compelling case, arguing Conrad's characters are illustrative of immobility in much the 
same way we find in Beckett.
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referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin.  The function of this centre was not 
only to orient, balance, and organize the structure – one cannot in fact conceive of an 
unorganised structure – but above all to make sure that the organising principle of the 
structure would limit what we might call the freeplay of structure.165
In bringing together birth and death within  Malone Dies  Beckett calls into question the 
assumptions we make about the nature of the two events.  As Paul Sheehan says, they are 
'not definitive 'cusp'  experiences at  all',  but  are destabilised by being brought  together, 
stripped  of  the  identity  and signification  with  which  we associate  them.   In  doing so 
Beckett  is  seeking  to  delimit  the  freeplay  of  structure,  offering  shifting,  unstable 
reworkings of the most fundamental elements of life.
Intratextual Innovation
All is pretext, Sapo and the birds, Moll, the peasants, those who in the tower seek one 
another out and fly from one another, my doubt which do not interest me, my situation, 
my possessions, pre-text for not coming to the point, the abandoning, the raising of the 
arms and going down, without further splash, even though it may annoy the bathers. (MD, 
p. 270.)
Returning to this quotation we can note it is also typical of a novel which, as argued, offers 
direct criticism of the goals it has supposedly set out to achieve, even as it goes about 
trying to accomplish them.  Malone expresses an impatience with the stories of Sapo and 
Macmann, which on the face of it are very much in keeping with Beckett's previous prose 
efforts.  Again, they ostensibly work by a process of illustration.  As Paul Davies neatly 
summarises 
By describing what seem to be distinct individuals who are ultimately re-reflections of 
the  same  human  state,  Beckett  is  able  to  illustrate  the  human  consequences  of  a 
philosophical perspective, without naming it directly.166
This homogeneous identity Davies addresses is something we have examined in previous 
chapters as essential to the evolution of Beckett's prose throughout the works.  We find in 
165 'Structure, Sign, and Play...', p. 278.
166 Paul Davies, 'Three Novels and Four Nouvelles', in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. by John 
Pilling (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 47. 
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Malone Dies  the  same process  under  way,  both  in  terms  of  Malone himself,  but  also 
through Sapo and Macmann who represent varying levels of disintegration parallel to their 
age.  We have seen this played out in previous works through the younger narrator of First  
Love,  who  seems  a  deliberate  contrast  to  the  geriatric  protagonists  of  the  other  1946 
novellas.   As argued in  chapter  three  the  narrator  of  this  work suffers  from the  same 
awarenesses but because of his age has not yet been crushed under its weight.  We have 
also seen the process in Watt's transformation from socially detached, but still functioning 
member  of  society,  to  the  institutionalised  creature,  walking  and  speaking  backwards. 
Speaking generally we can see in the earliest works like Dream of Fair to Middling Women 
and  More  Pricks  Than  Kicks younger  protagonists  affected  by  the  ruptures  in 
understanding evolved in the later works.  This is not to suggest an intentionality from the 
outset in creating works that could subsequently be developed to include evolved narrators, 
symptomatic  of  the  effects  this  understanding  creates.   Rather  that  one  could  quite 
convincingly make the case Beckett  wrote  these  later  works  as  a  response to  his  first 
offerings.
However, as I have said Malone Dies differs from previous works in that, whilst it includes 
these illustrative characters  it  also constantly questions  their  effectiveness and validity. 
Returning to the quotation from the novel itself Malone says that 'all is pretext' referring to 
the  stories  being  told  and  Malone's  story  itself  for  'not  coming  to  the  point,  the 
abandoning...' (MD, p. 270.)  Here, I think, Beckett is addressing not just the progress of Malone 
Dies  but his work as a whole.  As I have argued, in many ways  Molloy  represents the 
zenith of this illustrative, character driven approach developed through the prose works up 
until that point.  The previous chapter of this thesis ended asking if anything more could be 
done with the medium of literature and language to progress past the point of metaphysical 
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refusal toward an alternative means and end.  In chapter two we examined how Watt was 
essentially a novel about the epiphanic moment of realising the failures in structure and 
dealing with the immediate crises it brought about.  To a certain extent we can see Malone 
Dies operating in the same way.  Although this is clearly a novel accumulative in its focus 
on  the  elderly  tramp  figure  in  contrast  to  Watt,  it  still  shares  a  base  of  circumstance 
resulting  from  the  same  realisation.   The  difference  between  the  two  is  an  inbuilt 
mechanism of dissatisfaction with its own possible ends in Malone Dies.  Malone points to 
the  end  as  this  release,  this  abandoning  in  which,  rather  than  merely  revealing  the 
unknowability  of  the  world  using  the  tools  of  language,  he  gives  himself  over  to  the 
vacuum left in its wake.  This end, which of course encompasses the death of Malone, but 
more  fundamentally  points  to  a  relinquishing  of  attempts  at  replacing  the  absence,  is 
suggested throughout the text, but not necessarily complemented by what it achieves.
The example though is typical of how Malone fits into the text and the stories he tells. 
Essentially he supplants much of the role usually assigned to the reader.  He does this by 
openly speculating on the import and meaning of the issues the book addresses, but of 
course with a greater degree of awareness, being the “author” of these stories.  Despite the 
autobiographical elements contained within them Malone's method of delivery does not 
feel like recollection, but rather a fluid invoking of past events into a renewed context via 
the creative process of the stories he forges.  In 'The Harpooned Notebook: Malone Dies'  
H. Porter Abbott argues the novel operates within a pre-existing generic framework he 
calls the 'intercalated or nonretrospective'167 narrative.  This is to say a mode where there is 
no looking back in terms of the text.  It unfolds continuously with the character and is 
unchecked, comparable to a found document or diary.  Abbott describes the three elements 
167 H. Porter Abbott, 'The Harpooned Notebook: Malone Dies' in Modern Critical Interpretations: Molloy, 
Malone Dies, The Unnamable, ed. by Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 1988) 
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that define the genre as the threatened or vulnerable manuscript, time as it runs into form, 
and lastly the blank entries of the document.  We can certainly see these elements within 
the novel.  As I have said the contrast is between what are clearly partially recollected 
stories  with  the  present  creative  framework  Malone  uses.   This  is  illustrated  in  the 
following example from the part of the novel which demarcates the story of youth in Sapo, 
to the story of adulthood in Macmann:
For Sapo – no, I can't call him that any more, and I even wonder how I was able to 
stomach such a name till now.  So then for, let me see, Macmann, that's not much better 
but there is no time to lose... (MD, p. 222.)  
The vulnerable manuscript is a consequence of Malone's existence in the institution and the 
blank entries within the document we see most clearly in the disintegration of the novel 
which occurs at its conclusion.  However, what we find here is that Malone has a strange 
relationship with time and the place his characters occupy in it.  At certain points it almost 
seems the events of Sapo and Macmann are not only real, but also occurring concurrently 
with Malone's deathbed activities.  In the following example it is almost as if the events of 
the stories are taking place all the time, but Malone's choice is whether or not he shall 
observe them.  He says:
I shall try and get myself out of the bed, for a start.  If not I do not know what I shall do.  
Go and see how Macmann is getting on perhaps.  I have always that resource.  Why this 
need of activity?  I am growing nervous. (MD, p. 248.)
Further to this we often have descriptions that suggest that not only are the stories real and 
loose  in  time with Malone's  present  state,  but  further  that  when he  describes  them he 
actually occupies these characters in some sense.  This is very much in keeping with the 
relationship Malone has, not only to Sapo and Macmann, but also to the protagonists of  
previous  Beckett  works.   Whether  or  not  we agree  Malone Dies fulfils  the  other  two 
prerequisites of Abbott's definition of the 'intercalated or nonretrospective' narrative, there 
is certainly a strong case to be made that in the novel time runs into form.  
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In previous chapters we noted the apparently inconsequential nature of the novels' plotting 
and the seemingly arbitrary progress they made.  In Malone Dies this is taken further with 
a degree of the story taking place in what are clearly autobiographical fictional fragments 
alongside the present observations of Malone in his bedridden state.  In the former, the 
stories of Sapo and Macmann, we have the same attention to seemingly trivial aspects of 
their lives and conditions.  For example, Sapo's story is clearly a pastiche of a boyhood 
memoir, with key incidents in the formation of the character's outlook and circumstance 
related in turn.  Malone Dies, in typically Beckettian fashion, shifts to instead relate minor 
everyday occurrences for Sapo: his mediocre performance at school, his preference to be 
out in the fields rather than with his family.  The focus of the major incidents in this part of 
the narrative is in fact not on Sapo at all, but instead on the Lambert family, which in a 
typically Beckettian reversal allows central character Sapo to be the observer, rather than 
the observed.  
Much like the rural Lynch family of  Watt,  we have in the Lamberts a poverty stricken 
household, ruled by cruelty and damned by circumstance.  Sapo observes their interactions 
from his sitting place on their windowsill, leaving them small gifts in exchange for being 
allowed to spend time in their house.  Much like in  Molloy  there are moments blackly 
comic, alongside bitter, cruel instances, creating a space of uncertainty for the reader.  In 
Sapo's time with the Lamberts we have the burying of their dead mule, its protruding legs 
hit with a shovel to fit in the grave.  We also have Big Lambert's obsession with his job as a 
'bleeder and disjointer of pigs.' (MD, p. 194.)  Through the winter he is sought after by many for 
his skills in this area and becomes almost entranced in the pleasure he takes from it.  It it 
noted that: 
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And for days afterwards he could speak of nothing but the pig he had just dispatched, I 
would say into the other world if I was not aware that pigs have none but this, to the 
great affliction of his family.  But they did not dare protest, for they feared him.  Yes, at 
an age when most people cringe and cower, as if to apologise for still being present, 
Lambert was feared and in a position to do as he pleased.  And even his young wife had 
abandoned all hope of bringing him to heel, by means of her cunt, that trump card of 
young wives. (MD, p. 194.)
This  passage  is  very similar  in  tone  to  episodes  such as  Watt  and Sam aiding  in  the 
cannibalisation  of  animals  within  their  post-lapsarian  Garden  of  Eden  or  Molloy's 
aforementioned murder of the charcoal burner, discussed in previous chapters.  There is a 
detachment to the emotions such cruel and base descriptions may bring forth.  They are 
treated as merely incidental examples of the state human beings share within the world. 
Paul Davies argues these are examples of the realities one is faced with when trying to live 
by a 'philosophical perspective'.168  This ignorance we exist in is illustrated through the 
extremities of the Lamberts' situation or any of the other examples mentioned.  Although 
they may seem entirely detached from our own existence, they are in fact just as much a 
condition of the absence in understanding human beings share.  What repulses us about 
them are merely the most forceful of states we cannot find an adequate way to engage 
with.   As  Davies  notes  they  are  illustrative  of  the  human  consequences  of  our  utter 
ignorance of even the tools we may need to begin a process of comprehension.
It is not just by observation of the themes of Malone Dies we can ascertain its relationship 
with Beckett's previous prose efforts.  The novel has an intratextual relationship with them, 
offering many blatant references to the sometimes separate, sometimes unified protagonists 
at the core of these works.  Alongside the stories of Sapo and Macmann we have Malone 
on  his  deathbed,  who  from the  outset  of  the  novel  offers  ambiguous  clues  as  to  his 
relationship with previous Beckettian protagonists.  We can see in the following quotation 
an example of the suggestion he often makes of multiple consciousnesses occupying the 
168 Davies, p. 47.
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same body.  He says:
Of myself I could never tell, any more than live or tell of others.  How could I have,  
who never tried?  To show myself now, on the point of vanishing, at the same time as 
the stranger, and by the same grace, that would be no ordinary last straw.  Then live,  
long enough to feel, behind my closed eyes, other eyes close.  What an end. (MD, p. 190.)
The opening line aligns Malone with Beckett, as the artist whose project is undermined by 
his inability to represent.  We have traced this throughout the works; the aspects of these 
characters, especially those latter authors who share the same frustrations as their creator. 
However, we can detect a shift in approach in what Malone says next.  The possibility of 
showing himself, of representation, is offered as a possibility and this is something that has 
been closed off in the past.  He is still  talking of his death, but imagining that after  a 
lifetime of being crippled by ineffability he is able, on his deathbed, finally to express his 
existence.  Again, one cannot help but feel with this Beckett is expressing something of his 
own predicament.  We have already seen that narrative choices in the novel have the effect 
of opening up possibilities that try and surmount unknowability, but here we may detect an 
example within the content of the novel itself.  Malone refers to his own life, but also to the 
lives of former Beckett characters.  The stranger referred to is somewhat ambiguous, but 
we can identify by the next sentence a reference to Watt, Murphy, Malone and so on.  The 
idea of eyes closing behind his own, after the possibility to express has been fulfilled is  
new territory for Beckett's novels.  We have seen in previous works the way Beckett often 
has past characters appear and identifies each new protagonist as a kind of reincarnation of 
these; embodying physical and mental traits that come to be the identifiable composition of 
the archetypal Beckettian hero.  The suggestion is of respite, of moving beyond the stasis 
or indeterminacy identified by Pilling, Sheehan and Badiou into death, but a death brought 
on by the possibility of expression.  The eyes closing behind Malone's are the end of these 
characters and also the end of the need for more of the same as will be shown in  The 
Unnamable and How It Is.  
169
This  can  be  seen  further  in  an  example  from later  in  the  novel,  even  more  overt  in 
identifying Malone as the end of a particular sequence:
And if I ever stop talking it  will be because there is nothing more to be said, even 
though all has not been said, even though nothing has been said.  But let us leave these 
morbid matters and get on with that of my demise, in two or three days if I remember 
rightly.   Then it  will  be all  over with the Murphys,  Merciers,  Molloys,  Morans and 
Malones, unless it goes on beyond the grave. (MD, p. 229.)
This is an example not only of the intratextuality we have been discussing, but also the 
type  of  narrative  interjection  highlighted  earlier  in  which  the  illustrative  method  of 
Beckett's work is criticised within  Malone Dies  itself.   The suggestion is again a more 
positive sentiment than we have already seen and indeed a playful one.  Despite the fact 
Beckett is again addressing ineffability with the admission 'nothing has been said', there is 
an acceptance of this and a relinquishing of the desire to understand.  As Malone says, 
things must move past this stage to his own end and the end of Beckett's characters as we 
know them.  Again, one does not wish to attribute the degree of foresight displayed in 
Malone Dies speculatively but it certainly seems to anticipate the emptying of character we 
find in the two novels to come.  The choice to list the characters as plurals identifies their 
uniformity  as  a  series.   Eventually  we  will  just  have  a  voice  and  this  idea  of  the 
simultaneously divergent and homogeneous protagonists seems prescient of this.  The idea 
of letting go of inexpressibility and subsequently attempting new avenues of exploration is, 
in terms of Beckett's oeuvre, a significant shift which should not be understated.  Looking 
to the often cited quotation from Damned to Fame, in which Beckett felt a crucial point in 
his career was the realisation he had to attempt the opposite of Joyce's totality of content169, 
I think we can see how to a certain extent these controlled moves towards reduction had 
been focused in very specific areas and defined the work up until  Molloy.  Malone Dies  
embodies a new freedom in the prose in that it brings everything into question including, as 
169 Knowlson, p. 134.
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we have seen, the very tools Beckett has been refining throughout the works.  Derrida 
describes the point of rupture in Western though in the following way: 'This moment was 
that in which language invaded the universal problematic; that in which, in the absence of a 
centre or origin, everything became discourse...'170  We can see in Beckett's new form of 
intratextuality  an  even  greater  desire  to  abandon  an  orientating  principle  and  offer  a 
freeplay of signification without end.
A New Kind of Violence
This can further be seen in the approach the novel takes towards physicality and violence. 
We  have  already  examined  how  distinctions  in  tone  become  blurred  when  base 
descriptions of body are inserted amongst serious reflection.  Like so much in the novel, it 
can  appear  on the  surface  that  the inclusion of  these physical  descriptions  is  purely a 
repetition  of  what  we  have  seen  in  previous  work.   Firstly  we  have  the  detailing  of 
Malone's failing body, as in the following example:
For my arse for example, which can hardly be accused of being the end of anything, if 
my arse suddenly started to shit  at  the present moment,  which God forbid,  I firmly 
believe the lumps would fall out in Australia. (MD, p. 228.)
This  type  of  description  is  most  heavily  used  within  the  four  novellas  and  we  have 
examined its effects in previous chapters.  There is primarily an attempt to bring discourse 
on the metaphysical concepts the works reflect upon down into an area usually detached 
from lofty reflection.  By doing so Beckett forces these discourses together with the often 
cruel and disgusting reality of the world they supposedly interpret.  We find, in Macmann's 
relationship  with  Moll  another  typical  theme  and  form of  description  in  sex  between 
elderly characters.  Like Molloy's relationship with Lousse the acts are described in ways 
purposefully  debasing  and  graphic,  part  of  Beckett's  attempts  to  drag  metaphysical 
concerns into a far grimier, realistic domain.  Malone tells us of their relations:
170 'Structure, Sign, and Play...', p. 280.
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summoning to their aid all the resources of the skin, the mucus and the imagination, in 
striking from their dry and feeble lips a kind of sombre gratification. (MD, p. 253.)
The spectacle was then offered of Macmann trying to bundle his sex into his partner's 
like a pillow into a pillow-slip, folding it in two and stuffing it in with his fingers. (MD, p. 
253.)
These examples form part of the illustrative basis we have already discussed as essential to 
Beckett's prose writing by this point.  It is however when the physical moves into the 
violent that we detect a shift, in keeping with the rejection or critique of the illustrative that 
Malone Dies attempts.  
We have at various stages of the novel examples of violence that are represented in much 
the same manner already seen in previous works.  Big Lambert in particular could be one 
of  the  Lynch family from  Watt  with  the  violence  toward  his  wife  and obsession  with 
bleeding pigs.  There is also the priest-like figure in Macmann's room who strikes him on 
the head, aligning the sanctity of religion with a much more physical impulse in a way we 
can see again when he kisses Moll, 'And in the pleasure he was later to enjoy, when he put  
his tongue in her mouth and let it wander over her gums, this rotten crucifix had assuredly 
its part.' (MD, p. 257.)  It is in the last scene of the novel however that the violence of the book 
takes on a new meaning altogether.  Again, it is the new focus on the narrative process 
which shifts our understanding of violence into an area of uncertainty.  Lemuel, the nurse 
that replaces Moll, is a creature of violence who regularly smashes his own head with a 
hammer and who is assigned to take Malone and some other inmates on a day trip to a 
nearby island.  This is funded by Lady Pedal, whose charitable intentions are mocked by 
what  happens  once  the  strange  assortment  of  characters  dock  their  boat.   Lemuel, 
seemingly without motivation, kills two members of the party with a hatchet and abandons 
the now injured Lady Pedal, who has fallen on seeing the dead men, possibly breaking her 
hip.  The action of the story ends with the remaining members of the party getting back on 
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the boat and floating off in the bay.  The final image is of Lemuel raising the bloodied 
hatchet.  However, the manner in which this is recounted requires discussion.  As the novel 
comes to an end there is a process of disintegration in the text.  First breaking into smaller  
paragraphs and then into sentences we find the narrative process again brought to the fore 
as Malone Dies crumbles:
Lemuel is in charge, he raises his hatchet on which the blood will never dry, but not to 
hit anyone, he will not hit anyone, he will not hit anyone any more, he will not touch 
anyone any more, either with it or with it or with or
or with it or with his hammer or with his stick or with his fist or in thought in dream I  
mean never he will never
or with his pencil or with his stick or
or light light I mean
never there he will never 
never anything
there 
any more (MD, pp. 280-281.)
In terms of the central narratives of Malone and Macmann which comprise the latter half 
of  the  novel,  this  unravelling  of  the  text  further  aligns  the  two  characters,  with  their 
respective ends occurring simultaneously.  We read Macmann's end ambiguously.  He is 
being taken by the homicidal Lemuel on a journey that's end is closed to us.  For Malone 
these last lines could be seen as the expiration of his life; a strange poem in which the title 
of the novel is finally realised.  Or, if we are to think of Macmann as a loosely shrouded 
Malone, brought into a fictional life through the narratives of the novel, then this endpoint 
again points to uncertainty over the actual state the characters occupy.  It could be that 
reaching the conclusion of Macmann's tale and his potential end is enough to cease the 
purgatorial state Malone has been occupying; a kind of life flashing before the narrator that 
brings the false state of writing his life to a conclusion.  The sentence 'with his pencil or 
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with his stick' is a further symbolic clue that Lemuel, as well as being separate, is also a 
part of Malone the author, the other character-authors, and of course suggestively Beckett 
himself.  Rońań McDonald notes that 'In the last few lines, as the characters in Malone's 
story are violently dispatched, his  narrative voice begins to flail  and fail,  the language 
breaks down into separate words, and partial lines, indicating both the dying narrative and 
the dying narrator.  It is one of the few moments in Beckett's oeuvre where form mimics 
content so explicitly.'171  It seems clear that whilst the ending raises many questions and 
clues it is not a definitive answer we should be seeking.  As McDonald notes the lack of 
resolution created through the novel's unexpectedly brutal and then ambiguously serene 
ending is mirrored and enhanced through the form of its final lines.  The method again 
brings forth a state of play.
In 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' Derrida questions 
Where and how does this decentering, this notion of the structurality of structure, occur? 
It would be somewhat naïve to refer to an event, a doctrine, or an author in order to 
designate this occurrence.  It is no doubt part of the totality of an era, our own, but still 
it has already begun to proclaim itself and begin to work.172    
In the violence of Malone Dies, in the way it reaffirms these established concerns of death 
and intratextuality whilst at the same time elevating these to a new level of freeplay it 
moves beyond the fleetingly poststructuralist moments of the previous works, anticipating 
concerns only to be articulated in the decades to come.  I  have tried to show that the 
persistent narrative focus of the novel not only offers a play which embodies a different 
approach to the metaphysical problems Beckett had tried to address with his illustrative 
method,  but  that  it  also lifts  these  established tropes  out  of  their  inherent  possibilities 
enabling a level of restless interchange where, as Badiou suggests, 'a kind of freedom'173 is 
171 The Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, ed. by  Rońań McDonald (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 99.
172 'Structure, Sign, and Play...', p. 280.
173 Badiou, p. 55.
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possible.  As Derrida suggests it would be not only be a grandiose proclamation, but also a 
naïve one to assert Beckett articulates the concerns of deconstruction twenty years before 
the term was coined.  However,  Malone Dies  is far more than merely the bridging work 
between two more important novels it can often be represented as.  More than ever before 
it is a novel that does not look back, but instead forwards in offering possibilities essential 
in Beckett's development and the work to come.
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Chapter Six:
Narrative Method and Deconstruction in  The Unnamable  
In the previous chapter we examined how the notion of “freeplay” as described in Jacques 
Derrida's  seminal  lecture  'Structure,  Sign,  And  Play  in  the  Discourse  of  the  Human 
Sciences' was enacted in  Malone Dies through novel uses of aspects like character and 
narrative.  Before that, I had begun this thesis by claiming that how Beckett was using his 
influences in Murphy was “bricolage”, as defined by Derrida.  The “antifictional” elements 
of  Watt  were cited as early evidence in support of the idea Beckett's work deconstructs 
itself.  With the four 1946 novellas it was their openness to the accusation of nihilism also 
levelled at deconstruction that brought Beckett's work in proximity with the movement and 
similarly  in  Molloy  it  was  the  question  of  a  communal  purpose  that  seemed  to  align 
Beckett and deconstruction.   In this chapter we are going to examine the idea that  The 
Unnamable is the endpoint of an evolutionary form of prose writing which began with 
Murphy, took firm shape in the 1946 novellas and accelerated through several refining 
methods in The Trilogy.  Specifically we are going to pose a direct question that has been 
hinted at and offered partially in previous chapters.  Is The Unnamable a deconstructionist 
novel?  We can trace in the most prominent aspects of the work methods which are not just 
analogous  to  a  poststructuralist  perspective,  but  are  an  active  and  prescient  form  of 
deconstruction.  This chapter aims to explore these aspects fully and conclude upon both 
the truth and possibility of having a deconstructive novel, and the consequent effect such a 
notion might have on Beckett's oeuvre as a whole.
Certainly Paul Stewart sees an inextricable link between Beckett and Derrida, suggesting 
that 'perhaps, as one writes of Beckett one must, at some level, be writing of Derrida, for 
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there exists between the two writers, at the very least, some notion of a certain kinship.' 174 
Although  this  is  perhaps  somewhat  of  a  generalisation,  especially  if  one  is  looking 
exclusively at the earlier work, the idea that there is an intangible, yet highly perceptible 
confluence of approach and thought between the two writers is something we shall  be 
trying to explore in this chapter.  
Essentially 'Structure,  Sign and Play'  presents the idea that there has been a rupture in 
Western thought regarding assumptions about the truth of traditional structural philosophy. 
It  then moves onto an active deconstruction of some works by structuralist  Emmanuel 
Levinas,  which  help  to  illustrate  this  break  with  tradition  whilst  also  describing  the 
methodology of deconstruction as it progresses.  Assessing the idea one could pinpoint a 
specific moment when this occurred, Derrida asks
Where and how does this decentering, this thinking the structurality of structure, occur? 
It would be somewhat naïve to refer to an event, a doctrine, or an author in order to 
designate this occurrence.  It is no doubt part of the totality of an era, our own, but still 
it has already begun to proclaim itself and begun to work.175
If  we are to think of this  idea alongside the responses Derrida gave to Derek Attridge 
regarding his reluctance to attempt a deconstruction of Beckett's work I believe we can see 
the pertinence of directly examining  The Unnamable  as a novel  that deconstructs.   As 
stated in a previous chapter on  Molloy, Attridge questions the reasons behind Derrida's 
seemingly odd decision not to write on Beckett, considering the similarities in thought the 
two seem to share.  Derrida responds by saying that Beckett is a writer who differs from all 
others, at least in terms of how Derrida can apprehend him.  He suggests they are not just 
similar but that 'This is an author to whom I feel very close, or to whom I would like to feel 
myself very close; but also too close...'176  Furthermore he notes that Beckett's French is so 
174 Paul Stewart, Zone of Evaporation: Samuel Beckett's Disjunctions (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006), 
p. 158.
175 Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', Writing and 
Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1993), p.  354
176 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 61.
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much his own language, being as it is a second language shot through with a Dubliner's 
sensibility  and  strange  idiomatic  identity  that  he  would  need  to  invent  a  whole  new 
counter-language  to  respond  to  it.   This  is  indeed  a  problem  any  Beckett  critic  will 
encounter and which renders a traditional reading, especially of his later works, somewhat 
redundant.  When we have a work which is systematically and convincingly dislocating the 
structures of thought we would use to assess it one can often feel foolish in doing so. 
Pressed by Attridge into the type of enquiry we are conducting here Derrida is unusually 
direct in the following exchange:
D.A.: Is  there a sense in which Beckett's writing is  already so “deconstructive,” or 
“self-deconstructive,” that there is not much left to do?
J.D.: No doubt  that's  true...   Above  all,  this  question  should  not  be  treated  as  a 
philosophical problem outside or above the texts.  When I found myself, with students, 
reading some Beckett texts, I would take three lines, I would spend two hours on them, 
then  I  would give  up  because  it  would  not  have  been possible,  or  honest,  or  even 
interesting, to extract a few “significant” lines from a Beckett text.177
This  last  idea,  that  isolating  Beckett  in  what  is  essentially  close-reading  is  a  fruitless 
endeavour  is  no  doubt  key in  understanding  the  modus  operandi  of  a  novel  like  The 
Unnamable  and we will return to the way this arrests the critic later.  However, broadly 
speaking the idea that Beckett's work deconstructs itself and is consequently an example of 
deconstruction  is  what  this  chapter  seeks  to  determine.   As  Derrida  points  out  in  the 
quotation from 'Structure, Sign, and Play' this unravelling of assumptions about structure is 
not just the work of the few, but something manifest in our history, something that has 
'begun to proclaim itself and begun to work.'178  Is there any reason a novel (if we are to 
take the liberty of calling The Unnamable that) or any other form or art or representation 
could not just comment upon or work parallel to deconstruction, but in fact be an example 
of it?  Key is Derrida's careful use of the words 'begun to work' because in this we already 
find part of the answer.  One could reasonably object that deconstruction is not in fact a  
177 Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 61.
178 Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play', p. 354.
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homogeneous movement at all and that its key proponents differ wildly in their approaches 
and beliefs.  If we take a member of the more theoretically focused Yale School, someone 
like  Paul  De  Man  and  compare  him  to  Julia  Kristeva  and  her  augmenting  of 
deconstructionist ideas with psychoanalytic concepts then we can see the distance such a 
label is forced to cover.  How can a novel be an example of something as disparate and 
shifting as deconstruction then?  The answer is that it is, of course, not a school of thought 
at all.  The very idea would reinforce the affirmative metaphysics it seeks to discredit.  In 
fact the only thing that does bind these various thinkers is,  as Derrida suggests,  work; 
deconstructive thought is a method and not a philosophy in the traditional sense.  So, when 
speaking of a shared understanding that 'proclaim[s] itself' Beckett can legitimately be a 
key proponent.  In his book on a similarly contentious and to a degree poststructuralist 
theoretical  movement  H.  Aram Veeser  writes  'The  New Historicism remains  a  phrase 
without  an  adequate  referent.'179  He  subsequently  suggests  that  the  only  thing  tying 
together  New  Historicist  thinkers  is  a  shared  set  of  'themes,  preoccupations,  and 
attitudes.'180  Based on this he produces a list of five assumptions181 (first for  The New 
Historicism  (1989) and  later  revised  in  The  New  Historicism  Reader  (1994))  which 
facilitate our labelling of certain thinkers with the term.  The same kind of formalising has 
not been achieved with deconstruction in such a successful182 and enduring manner but 
179 H. Aram Veeser, ‘Introduction’, in The New Historicism, ed. by H. Aram Veeser (London: Routledge, 
1989), p. x.
180 H. Aram Veeser, ‘Introduction’, p. xiii.
181 These are in full:
'1.  that every expressive act is embedded in a network of material practices;
2.  that every act if unmasking, critique, and opposition uses the tools it condemns and risks falling prey to 
the practice it exposes;
3.  that literary and non-literary “texts” circulate inseperably;
4.  that no discourse, imaginative or archival, gives access to unchanging truths nor expresses inalterable 
human nature;
5.  finally, as emerges powerfully in this volume, that a critical method and a language adequate to describe 
culture under capitalism participate in the economy they describe.' H. Aram Veeser, 'Introduction', p. xi.
One can see, especially with assumptions 2, 3 and 4, the partially poststructuralist base of New Historicism in 
the in-built critique of structural tools such as language and the rejection of discourse as a means to 
uncovering final truths.' H. Aram Veeser, ‘Introduction’, p. xi.
182 Criticism abounds whenever one tries to define a movement, but especially a movement like New 
Historicism that is based on a Focauldian assumption we have traditionally misunderstood history.  However, 
it is testament to the strength of Veeser's formalising that it is still largely applicable to the movement as it 
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'Structure, Sign, and Play' is probably the closest the movement has to a manifesto.  In 
describing the history of the break with structure Derrida touches on each of the key moves 
which, like Veeser's five assumptions, bring together deconstructive thinkers as tightly as 
possible.   The  rest  of  this  chapter  will  look  at  some  of  these  moves,  methods  and 
assumptions and assess how much we can see them at work within The Unnamable.
Summarising the content of this work is in some respects a far simpler task than any of the 
previous novels.  It is not overly complex in terms of the number of characters, settings or 
events and yet still remains, because of its nature, slippery to grasp.  I am reluctant to say it 
is  the  interior  monologue of  a  single  protagonist,  as  this  gives  a  fixed  identity to  the 
speaking voice,  which is  rejected by the various other characters he observes and also 
seems to inhabit.  These are named Mahood (formerly Basil) and Worm, and alongside the 
former protagonists of Beckett's novels weave in and out of the wandering musings of this 
unnamable  entity,  helping  to  construct  a  story which  is  both  the  culmination  and  the 
untelling  of  all  Beckett's  novels  have done before.   Settings  and events  are  limited  to 
ambiguous description in which he purposefully limits our understanding.  This said, there 
is a still a focus on the telling of stories and, much like in  Malone Dies, we are offered 
strange  episodes  in  which  the  banal  and  domestic  are  mixed  with  the  outlandish  and 
extraordinary.  Perhaps in The Unnamable there is an even greater focus on the latter with 
descriptions of The Unnamable's family 'carried off by sausage-poisoning, in great agony' 
(TU, p. 312.), as well as Worm's existence as a kind of lump of flesh, taken care of by a strange 
woman, in a jar opposite a chop-house.  If you have followed the reasoning that these 
characters are occupying a purgatorial space to a greater and greater extent as the novels 
has shifted and evolved through the years, largely due to the acknowledgement any such formalising is 
already hampered before it begins. This is assumption 4: 'that no discourse, imaginative or archival, gives 
access to unchanging truths nor expresses inalterable human nature.' H. Aram Veeser, ‘Introduction’, p. xi.  
The exact same kind of acknowledgement must always be in mind when thinking on deconstruction and 
especially in trying to in some way define or restrict it.
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have progressed then one can read this as the point at which this is confirmed.  However, if  
one believes  Beckett's  work resists  such a fixed idea then it  could be said the idea of 
multiple  characters  occupying the  inside of  a  skull  or  a  kind  of  purgatory is  invoked, 
without being subscribed to.183  
One of the most tangible pieces of descriptions The Unnamable offers is near the start of 
the novel in which he outlines the strange world he occupies.  From his vantage point he 
observes 'The place is no doubt vast. Dim intermittent lights suggest a kind of distance.' (TU, 
p. 287.)  He then goes on to describe himself as at the centre of entities which revolve around 
him.  At first he can only see Malone from the waist up: 'Malone is there.  Of his mortal 
liveliness little trace remains.  He passes before me at doubtless intervals, unless it is I who 
pass before him.  No, once and for all, I do not move.'  (TU, p. 287.)  However, after a time it 
becomes clear there are more and perhaps all of the previous novels' protagonists revolving 
around  him,  at  various  distances.   If  we  are  seeking  to  examine  the  possibility  The 
Unnamable  may be  a  deconstructionist  novel  we  have  in  this,  our  first  problem.   In 
'Structure, Sign, and Play' Derrida says of the break with traditional structural thinking that
Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center 
could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, 
that it  was not a fixed locus but a function,  a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite 
number of sign-substitutions come into play... a system in which the central signified, 
the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of 
differences.  The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the 
play of signification infinitely.184
This is an absolutely essential part of deconstructive thought.  It is the idea that, motivated 
by a desire to reconcile the aporetic uncertainties of true structure, the human condition is 
183 The Unnamable may be the most ambiguous and obscure of Beckett's novels up until that point, but 
contained within the wandering narrative are the same themes that have interested the author throughout his 
career.  The idea of his characters occupying a semi-literal purgatorial or even hellish reality, depending on 
your perspective, is again here and alluded to in examples such as the following: 'For I am obliged to assign a 
beginning to my residence here, if only for the sake of clarity.  Hell itself, although eternal, dates from the 
revolt of Lucifer.' TU, p. 289.
184 Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play', pp. 353-354.
181
to  fabricate  a  centre;  a  stable  ground  that  allows  sign-substitutions  to  function 
authoritatively, whilst also remaining detached from these signs in order not to be infected 
by their clear fallibility.  Derrida's assertion that there is no transcendental signified, that all 
stable ground is a fiction, dispenses with a centre and offers instead a non-structure that 
sees an endless network of unanchored signs.  If we are trying to examine the possibility 
The  Unnamable  is  a  deconstructionist  novel  then  does  this  opening  not  present  a 
significant problem?  It would seem that way, having The Unnamable at the centre of this 
world, with previous characters revolving around him like planets no less, emphasising in a 
typically Beckettian stroke the illustrative relationship of the personal to the universal.185  It 
is certainly possible that in fact what a novel like The Unnamable does is to present itself 
as something revolutionary because of its abstract and conceptual nature whilst actually 
reaffirming  hierarchical  understandings  of  structure  based  upon  a  centre-proximity 
relationship.  However, it should be noted that this is not representative of the book as a 
whole and that before passing judgement it is necessary to examine other facets.
The novel does not exclusively follow this descriptive path.  Moving in time as well as 
space we leave behind the arena where past characters revolve around The Unnamable. 
The return to storytelling in the twin tales of Mahood and Worm are a strange kind of 
memoir which may be said to betray and disavow the book's opening.  This is achieved 
through the narrative form, which is also the clearest example of how the novel seems to 
mirror Derrida's writing in particular.  After the introductory parts of the book, which are a 
kind of reflection on the character's  situation and its  apparently physical  surroundings, 
there is a paragraph in which he announces 
All these Murphys, Molloys, and Malones do not fool me.  They have made me waste 
my time, suffer for nothing, speak of them when, in order to stop speaking, I should 
have spoken of me and me alone.  But I just said I have spoken of me, am speaking of 
185 '...like a planet about its sun.' TU, p. 289.
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me.  I don't care a curse what I just said.  It is now I shall speak of me, for the first time. 
(TU, p. 297.)
This shift to the interior, to reflection upon the self is mirrored in the presentation of the 
text  itself.   Dispensing  with  paragraph  breaks  or  indeed  breaks  of  any kind  (section, 
chapter  and  so  on)  the  novel  becomes  one  giant,  unruly  paragraph.   Reminiscent  of 
Molloy's  rambling,  with  clause  building  upon  clause,  the  dizzying  effect  this  type  of 
writing creates demands a requisite type of reading which is almost hypnotic in the way it 
draws  in  attention.   Ideas  are  introduced,  abandoned,  returned  to,  intermingled  with 
vignettes of storytelling in such a way that to retain a grip on the text one is forced to read 
it  doggedly,  attention  fixed  at  a  regular  pace.   If  one's  mind  begins  to  wander,  even 
momentarily,  then  regaining  hold  of  the  various  strands  is  extremely  difficult.   In 
Understanding Poststructuralism James Williams attempts to explain both the difficulty in 
reading Derrida's work and the necessity in his mode of writing.  He explains that:
When you write you participate in the series of texts, not by adding a separate block, but 
by transferring the endless tissue of texts.  This argument explains why Derrida's work 
can be very hard to read when first encountered.  If we are used to reading quite short 
and hermeneutic sentences and paragraphs, then his long ones can be hard to follow and 
even harder to break down into separate ideas.  This is because the very idea of that kind 
of separateness is resisted in Of Grammatology.186
I am not trying to draw attention to a merely superficial similarity in these two writers' 
work, namely, they both write very long, difficult to understand sentences.  It is the reason 
behind this  choice which is  of  interest.   Despite  the apparent  reinforcing  of  structural 
norms in the introductory part of the novel, the subsequent mode of the restless, endless 
paragraph suggests an alternative purpose.  Williams is reiterating the Derridean position 
when he says we participate in an 'endless tissue of texts'.  This refers to the argument that 
no text is finished, that all texts not only recycle each other in an intertextual sense, but that 
wider  than  that  all  signs  participate  in  an  endless  series  of  substitutions  without  an 
identifiable base.  This is the “endless chain” often referred to by Derrida and wider in 
186 James Williams, Understanding Poststructuralism (Chesham: Acumen, 2005), p. 26.
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deconstructive  texts  generally.   He  writes  'The  presence  of  an  element  is  always  a 
signifying  and  substitutive  reference  inscribed  in  a  system  of  differences  and  the 
movement of a chain.'187  There is an endless tissue of texts containing a limitless chain of 
signifiers because language can never achieve the presence it  seeks.  The form of  The 
Unnamable is a reflection of this knowledge.  It offers no certainties, only 'affirmations and 
negations invalidated as uttered' (TU, p. 285.), fragments of stories, philosophy, snippets of texts 
both Beckettian and otherwise all forced out together, in an interwoven chain which moves 
through these in a futile attempt to supplant the need for presence within language.  As we 
have been tracing and Daniel Katz articulates, 'the shift from “L'Absent” to L'Innomable, 
from  ontology,  matter,  and  presence,  to  naming,  law,  and  signification,  I  think  can 
legitimately be seen as a shift from a binary oppositional structure of presence and absence 
into a differential, or supplemental schema.'  Deconstructive texts often work by seeking 
out the “traces” in a text.  James Williams described the process in the following manner: 
'But signs in language contain the trace of their contexts, of their histories and of their 
futures.   So any sign,  any event,  is  marked by things that  lie  outside it.   It  is  not  an 
unalloyed presence, but the trace of the processes that came to make it.'188  There is no 
finality in the trace, no origin, as per the fundamental beliefs of deconstruction.  The milieu 
of overlapping ideas from both inside and outside the text in the narrative mode of the 
novel affirms the trace and embeds the validity of the notion within The Unnamable itself.  
In  'The  Exhausted'  Gilles  Deleuze  breaks  down Beckett's  language into  three  separate 
types.  Speaking of the language of The Unnamable he says 'But if one thereby hopes to 
exhaust the possible with words, one must also hope to exhaust the words themselves; 
whence the need for another metalanguage, a language II, which is no longer a language of 
187 Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play', p. 389.
188 Williams, p. 26.
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names but of voices, a language that no longer operates with combinable atoms but with 
blendable flows.'189  Deleuze defines the language of The Unnamable by its difference from 
his language I, which works by the content of what is being said within Beckett's previous 
work.  In The Unnamable we have language II which operates and enacts through form. 
For Deleuze what the voice says is still important, but how it says it, its unrelenting and 
forever shifting nature that Deleuze calls 'blendable flows' is the defining aspect of this 
new approach.  Another of the key aspects of deconstruction is its self-awareness.  The 
Unnamable knows with every word he participates in an inescapable falsehood and yet is 
compelled  to  continue  this  stream  of  utterances.   In  fact,  despite  his  evolution  (or 
devolution if we prefer) from the other characters of the novels he still refers to himself as 
a writer, keeping that aspect of The Trilogy in unison.  He says
How in such conditions, can I write, to consider only the manual aspect of that bitter 
folly?  I don't know, I could know.  But I shall not know.  Not this time.  It is I who  
write, who cannot raise my hand from my knee.  It is I who think, just enough to write... 
(TU, p. 295.)
The novel does not shy away from its status as text.  The Unnamable writes this patchwork 
of ideas, aware the whole time of its inherent failure at passing beyond the limitations of 
language and communication.  As Derrida writes 'But we cannot do without the concept of 
the sign, for we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the 
critique we are directly against this complicity.'190  However, what kind of criticism can this 
be?  One that declares and pays testament to its futility with each subsequent sentence?  I 
think we can see that, as in deconstruction, an awareness of the disharmony within the 
structuralism that has held and guided the development of language does not mean we 
cannot aim for something greater.  Although we can never entirely bypass the limitations of 
language, we can use it to strive for a greater method; something that opens possibilities, 
189 Gilles Delueze, ‘The Exhausted’, in Essays Critical and Cultural, trans. by Daniel W. Smith and Michael 
A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), p. 156.
190 Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play', p. 355.
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rather than closing them down.
In The Unnamable,  as in previous works we have examined, Beckett works on one level 
through an illustrative method.  The relentless, sprawling monologue effectively proclaims 
the redundancy of communication.  It suffocates meaning by starving us of the space to 
breathe within a text.  It uses a seemingly endless stream of words that erase themselves as  
they go.  Williams says 'Deconstruction works to release writing from the grip of an inner 
voice and from speech.'191  This is precisely where The Unnamable aims.  At one point The 
Unnamable questions 'In a word, shall I be able to speak of me and of this place without 
plotting an end to us, shall I ever be able to go silent, is there any connexion between these 
two questions?  Nothing like issues.  There are a few to be going on with, perhaps only 
one.'  (TU,  p.  289.)  In these relatively obtuse remarks  The Unnamable in fact outlines two 
central  and  interconnected  concerns  of  the  novel.   The  first  is  just  as  I  have  been 
commenting upon.  The book is an attempt to move past the point of expression which has 
been necessary but also a hindrance to demonstrating the inadequacies of structure.  Shane 
Weller neatly summarises how Beckett has come to this point, writing that
Beyond  Malone's  final  'never  anything/there/any  more'  (T289),  with  the  naïve 
calculation of death having been exposed at the beginning of The Unnamable, we find 
that  narration-negation  has  yet  another  calculation  upon  which  to  rely:  that  if  the 
nothing  is  not  to  be  experienced  in  the  flight  from  object-world  or  subject-world 
(Murphy and Watt), or even from all world (Malone Dies), then it may just be possible 
in silence.192
As I have said, the way the text is presented for its majority is an attempt to exist,  to 
overcome the seeming necessity in saying nothing instead of fruitless expression.  The 
second issue is that, if one has to choose the mode of communication The Unnamable does 
in order to move towards a silence that is an untelling of the issues we have examined in  
previous chapters as central to Beckett's work, does this become the only concern?  Is this 
191 Williams, p. 30.
192 Shane Weller, A Taste for the Negative (Oxford: Legenda, 2005), p. 105. 
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in opposition to a silence without a referent?   In other words,  is  it  possible to refuse 
language in a way that encapsulates all of the issues that has brought one to that point of 
recognition or does one simply engage in a meaningless silence?  This is a key issue for 
The Unnamable as a novel and especially for a reader less informed of Beckett's previous 
work.  It may be that the evolutionary process of his prose writing had to culminate in this 
silence, in this strange relinquishing of control through an excess of words, but does this in 
fact  reduce the maelstrom of  issues  which  have  always  been at  the  heart  of  Beckett's 
writing to a marginalised position?193  As an isolated piece of work the issues which are the 
impetus  for  the  methodology Beckett  adopts  in  his  narrative style  are  certainly buried 
deeper by the silence.  This is a risk the work takes.  The Unnamable acknowledges as 
much when he says 'Long or short, the same silence.  Then I resurrect and begin again. 
That's what I'll  have got for all my pains.  Unless this time it's the real silence at last.  
Perhaps I've said the thing that had to be said, that gives me the right to be done with 
speech.' (TU, p. 387.)  Here we find an acknowledgement of the accumulative process Beckett 
has undertaken in his work.  The Unnamable, that reaches for a final silence is an attempt 
to both accomplish the zenith of a form which would accommodate Beckett's  ideas of 
redundancy, negation and so forth whilst also bringing the project to its conclusion.  
Of course after a lengthy break in which Beckett has acknowledged his trouble at finding 
new ground for his fiction to cover he returned to the novel and wrote How It Is  (1961). 
Beckett said of The Unnamable: 'The French work brought me to the point where I felt I 
was saying the same thing over and over again.  For some authors writing gets easier and 
easier the more they write.  For me it gets more and more difficult.  For me the area of  
possibilities, gets smaller and smaller... At the end of my work there's nothing but dust... In 
193 I am thinking here of issues such as death, purgatory, isolation, exile, love, influence and bodily decay 
which we have examined as rising to prominence and coalescing in the 1946 novellas and subsequent work.
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the last book, L'Innomable, there's complete disintegration.  No 'I', no 'have', no 'being'.  No 
nominative, no accusative, no verb.  There's no way to go on.'194  This is the point to which 
Beckett  brings the novel and may be another area in which we can see it differs from 
deconstruction.  Whereas deconstruction is a tool that is used on a variety of texts to reveal 
structural abnormalities inherent in their nature that then change our thinking on them and 
indeed, wider issues, there is a sense with Beckett that by the end of The Unnamable he has 
written  himself  into  a  corner.   Where  deconstructionists  are  often  keen  to  stress  the 
positive, exploratory nature of their work, in part due to accusations of nihilism or infinite 
relativism, as  The Unnamable  goes on it  moves towards a smaller and smaller area of 
silence.  It aims to finish by saying nothing and in this way is a closed system, which is in 
fact very counter-intuitive to a deconstructionist perspective.  Franco Fanizza wrote 'And 
since there is not, rigorously, a beginning or end in Beckett's works, it seems to us that one 
can find his most significant word in the novel récit The Unnamable.  In this work, we say, 
is contained his final (not in a chronological sense) “word”.'195  Despite Fanizza's assertion 
that, by virtue of the questions they are dealing with, Beckett's works have no end as such, 
he is correct that The Unnamable does not open up more possibilities, but rather fulfils and 
closes off a series of issues Beckett had been working on for years.  
Joanne Shaw on the other hand argues along similar lines but with a much more positive 
outlook.  Her historical interpretation is that after the holocaust Beckett had to represent 
the impotence of language and also its complicity in the face of the attendant destruction 
and horrors the world had witnessed.  She argues there is a repurposing of propaganda 
techniques in the way he unmakes and then remakes the world.  She repeatedly stresses 
194 John Fletcher, The Novels of Samuel Beckett (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), p. 194.
195 Franco Fanizza, 'The Word and Silence in Samuel Beckett's The Unnamable', in Twentieth Century 
Interpretations of Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable, ed. by J.D. O'Hara (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1970), p. 74.
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that the negativity inherent in The Trilogy may lead to an endpoint for Beckett's writing, 
but that it  is a positive creative force and opens up possibilities, rather than restricting 
them.  She writes 'What we can say is that Beckett's negative words neither finally make 
nor not-make; his and his characters' word negations leave an opening through which some 
kind  of  becoming  may (or  on  the  other  hand,  may not)  occur.'196  Shaw seems  to  be 
suggesting Beckett is a kind of pioneer; that his work leaves us at a point where someone 
else has had the necessary post-holocaust groundwork done for them and can begin where 
Beckett left off.  This is certainly in keeping with the prescience of Beckett's writing we 
have been examining and is further evidence the work enacts elements of deconstruction.
It is also in keeping with Theodor Adorno's understanding of Beckett, which argues for 
Beckett as, above all, a moral writer concerned with how our understanding of the world 
changed after 1945.  As Tyrus Miller puts it 'Adorno sought in his work of the sixties to 
illuminate the lingering presence of the war in 'post-war' society through the dark lens of 
Beckett's art.'197  Adorno's writings on Beckett are in fact very small in number, with an 
essay on  Endgame  his most sustained work and several references made in works like 
Negative  Dialectics  (1966).   Much in  the  way we are  here  exploring  the  relationship 
between Beckett and Derrida's work, Adorno saw Beckett's fiction as directly concerned 
with many of the issues he was trying to articulate through his philosophy.  We need not 
get into the intricacies of this philosophy now, especially considering the complexities of 
Adorno's reconfiguring of mimesis from its traditional, Aristotelian base however Miller 
summarizes his position quite succinctly, writing
...in  the  Aesthetic  Theory,  Adorno  stresses  Beckett's  figuring  of  the  contemporary 
situation of subjectivity, a situation characterised in his view by dehumanization, loss of 
196 Joanne Shaw, Impotence and Making in Samuel Beckett's Trilogy (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), p. 116.
197 Tyrus Miller, 'Dismantling authenticity: Beckett, Adorno, and the ‘postwar‘', Textual Practice, 8:1 
(1994), pp. 43-57. (p. 44.)
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individuation,  and  mimetic  adaptation  to  the  historical  horizon  of  war  and  its 
aftermath.198
This is particularly interesting in relation to the central question of this chapter, i.e. is The 
Unnamable a deconstructionist work?  It could be argued that in focussing upon this we are 
indulging in the abstract, where in fact these works are concerned with how the individual 
can live in the years following The Second World War.  Adorno writes that
But from that zero point where Beckett's prose works unfold their essence... a second 
world springs up, both sad and rich, a concentration of historical experiences, which in 
its immediate non-artistic form would not reveal the hollowing out of the subject and 
reality.  The shabbiness and damaged character of the image-world is the negative print 
of the administered world.  In this respect, Beckett is a realist.199
Adorno's argument is similar in some respects to the illustrative method I have described as 
essential  to how Beckett's  novels function throughout this  thesis.   He is  describing the 
world Beckett creates as a distorted mirror image of our own existence, but rather than this  
reflection  highlighting  the  problems  with  unknowability  and  ineffability  that  I  have 
focussed upon, Adorno sees Beckett's concern as primarily historical.  However, I do not 
see Adorno's approach as incompatible with my own, or as superseding the more abstract 
concerns of Derrida.  Rather, there is room for both.  Beckett's post-war work is no doubt a 
product  of  his  experiences  during  it  and  the  permanently  changed  face  of  the  world. 
However, it is also deeply concerned with how we can actually address these issues and 
problems  in  received  modes  of  philosophical  or  theological  approaches  to  the  most 
fundamental questions of existence.  Indeed, in the wake of such horrific events as The 
Holocaust these modes are exposed for just how insufficient they are in addressing the 
modern world.  Perhaps what Shaw and Adorno's readings most keenly make us aware of 
is not losing the context of Beckett's concern with problems of structure and the issues of 
violence, cruelty and lack of agency that we have explored as central to his work.   
198 Miller, p. 48.
199 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. by C. Lenhardt, ed. by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 45-46.
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Returning to the opening of the novel, before introducing the other characters revolving 
around him The Unnamable says 'I shall have company.  In the beginning.  A few puppets. 
Then I'll scatter them, to the winds, if I can... The thing to avoid, I don't know why, is the  
spirit of system.'  (TU,  p.  286.)  The Unnamable  is a novel that evolves and progresses as it 
unfolds.  We can see here it in fact declares how it will progress; initially reliant on a stable 
base of past avatars that it will discard as it moves into the main body of the text, a new 
kind of narrative that through its method enacts a rejection of any assumed hierarchical 
structure.  Like Malone Dies it uses illustrative means, but also reaches beyond these to an 
active mode that does not merely reflect, but performs.  The narrative mode, aware of its 
own redundancies as it is, is also an example of the kind of “play” we have examined in 
the previous chapter and grasps at something larger.  In speaking of the solution to the 
failures in structural thinking Derrida claims
The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass 
beyond  man  and  humanism,  the  name  of  man  being  the  name of  that  being  who, 
throughout the history of metaphysics or on ontotheology – in other words, throughout 
his entire history – has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin 
and the end of play.200
In deconstruction play is  conceiving structurality which does not rest  on a hierarchical 
base, but that accepts unanchored relations not dependent on an emotional yearning for full 
presence.  I would argue this is what the narrative method of The Unnamable enacts.  The 
restless,  sprawling network of content is in play.   It  resists  the authority of any single 
aspect over another and in this aims for something greater than the sum of its parts.  As 
Derrida writes 'Play is  always play of absence and presence,  but if  it  is  to be thought 
radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of absence and presence.'201  The 
latter cannot be enacted through language.  It can be conceived, but as we have examined, 
200 Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play', pp. 369-370.
201 Ibid., pp. 389.
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any utterance  participates  in  the illusion  of  absence and presence that  is  the basis  for 
language as it has been constructed.  The Unnamable offers the former.  I am not trying to 
argue the statements he makes only contain meaning in their “playful” relationship, but 
rather that as well as their own meaning the play they enact aims at a state where absence 
and presence would not be the only tools we have to move beyond traditional structure.
To argue The Unnamable is a deconstructionist novel is not as reductive and forced as one 
may be inclined to think.   Although we may not agree with the certainty Paul Stewart 
expresses  when he  writes,  'Beckett  can  be  seen  to  practice  deconstruction  in  his  own 
works, attacking the ruling metaphors of Western thought and literature, questioning the 
unity of the subject'202, there are certainly aspects of Beckett and Derrida's practice which 
seem to achieve the same aims.  We have examined how the novel evolves as it progresses 
into a narrative mode that enacts many concepts central to deconstruction such as the trace, 
the  chain,  presence  and  play.   We have  also  seen  that  in  some respects,  such as  The 
Unnamable's quest for a final definitive silence, the novel actually renders itself inert to the 
fluidity of deconstruction.  It is not an argument that this thesis pursues, but critics like 
Daniel Katz have argued that Beckett's reworking of the monologue within The Trilogy is 
doing many of the same things to Molly Bloom's monologue in Ulysses that Derrida would 
attempt some years later.203  In the first chapter of this thesis I argued against John Calder 
who wrote that 'what future generations can expect to find in his work is above all an 
ethical and philosophical message; the novels and plays will increasingly be seen as the 
wrapping for that message.'204  I have not changed this opinion.  I still believe that Beckett's 
work  is  primarily  art  and  can  and  should  not  be  seen  as  an  embodiment  of  any 
202 Paul Stewart, p. 158.
203 'In these ways, the trilogy's rendering of “monologue” seems, in many aspects, to explicitly work through 
certain aspects that Jacques Derrida explores through a reading of a “monologue” of obvious centrality for 
Beckett that of Molly Bloom in Ulysses.'  Daniel Katz, Saying “I” No More (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, 1999), p. 107.
204 John Calder, The Philosophy of Samuel Beckett (London: Calder Publications, 2001), p. 1.
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philosophical  school,  even  one  like  deconstruction  that  seems  to  attack  the  roots  of 
metaphysics as much as his work does.  In this thesis I have tried to chart the development 
of Beckett's prose output from the philosophical bricolage of Murphy, the establishment of 
his own critical voice in  Watt,  the postwar solidification of his key concerns in the 1946 
novellas,  right  through  to  the  most  experimental  and  philosophically  active  work  that 
comes  in  The Trilogy.   I  have  already written  in  this  chapter  that  in  The Unnamable  
Beckett, to an extent, writes himself into a corner.  This is however not an accusation of 
failure levelled at Beckett's project.  Indeed, it is difficult to even argue he had a project in 
the early works, writing mostly in response to the greats who had shaped his thinking as a 
young man.  By his own admission however205, he was clearly working at refining a mode 
of writing in his postwar prose.  This last work of The Trilogy is the completion of that 
evolutionary process and if we look at the negation we have traced and Beckett saw as 
essential to understanding his work then this relinquishing silence was an inevitability; the 
fulfilment of a process that had become intrinsic to his writing and lead the fundamental 
concerns of his writing into increasingly withdrawn areas.
This, as far as I am concerned, is the final question The Trilogy leaves us with.  At the start 
of the chapter one of the things I sought to discover was that, if indeed The Unnamable  
was a deconstructive novel, what were the ramifications for this in viewing Beckett's body 
of prose works as a whole?  Even though I have suggested the novel only enacts certain 
deconstructive techniques,  whilst  rejecting others,  the progress these works  have made 
towards a relentless experimentalism still brings out some interesting issues.  Reading a 
work like The Unnamable in isolation from the rest of Beckett's work one would certainly 
205 I refer here, as I have done in previous chapters to Beckett's characterising of his own work as the 
opposite of Joyce's: 'I realised that Joyce had gone as far as one could in the direction of knowing more, 
[being] in control of one’s material.  He was always adding to it; you only have to look at his proofs to see 
that.  I realised that my own way was in impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in taking away, in 
subtracting rather than adding.' James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 134.
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get an idea of the issues that have concerned him, but in truth one needs to be aware of the  
previous novels in order to understand not only the nuances of his thinking, but also the 
impetus which led him away from accessible writing and made the even barer speaking 
voice of  How It is  the only final move available.  What of the notion that the sacrifices 
Beckett makes in achieving the formal innovations of the later prose works are unworthy 
of the final product?  It could be argued that in the 1946 novellas and Molloy in particular 
there  is  a  balance  which  is  lacking  from  The  Unnamable.   These  earlier  works  are 
accessible  and  humorous,  illustrating  Beckett's  reactions  to  a  history  of  metaphysical 
problems and at times being formally innovative enough to presciently enact elements of 
poststructuralist  method.   The  later  works  on  the  other  hand  are  staggering  in  their 
conception and of course revolutionary in pushing at the very limits of what can be done 
with literature.  However, as argued already in this chapter, at no point can one escape the 
incumbent restrictions of language and its limitations as a vehicle.  This final silence may 
gesture  towards  a  means  beyond  traditional  structural  thinking,  but  it  can  never  truly 
escape it.  In this case it is not without some legitimacy that one can argue the final prose 
works abandon many of the best elements of the early works and indeed speak to greater 
and greater degrees to themselves.  This is of course a wider question of art in general and 
one encompassing far more than the prose works of Samuel Beckett.  I do believe however  
that  the  question  of  the  declining  worth  of  Beckett's  work  to  a  wider  audience  as  it 
progresses is one that we should not ignore and that should occupy a more equal place with 
the more analytical issues at the core of this body of work. 
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